著者
松里 公孝
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2022, no.51, pp.1-20, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)
参考文献数
30

This paper investigates the endeavors to solve the Donbas Conflict typologically. The first and most consistent policy was the Minsk Accord belonging to the category of federalization. As has been the case with other post-Soviet secession conflicts, federalization was a hopeless policy, which produced serious commitment problems, while contradicting the real interests of both the parent state (Ukraine) and the secession polities (the DPR and LPR). In the context of the Donbas War none proposed the second type of solution, that is, land-for-peace. Ineffective diplomatic endeavors induced both Ukraine, Russia, and the DPR/LPR to solve the situation in a military way. Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 disposed Ukraine for a coercive solution of the Donbas problem (the reconquest policy). The Russian political and military leadership split into two groups: one supporting the policy to make the secession polities (the DPR and LPR) Russia’s protectorates and another supporting the policy to destroy the parent state (Ukraine). The unsatisfactory results of Russia’s choice in 2008 of the protectorate policy vis-à-vis South Ossetia and Abkhazia and underestimation of Kyiv’s defense capacity made the Russian leaders opt for the destruction of Ukraine itself.
著者
松里公孝編
出版者
講談社
巻号頁・発行日
2008
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
北海道大学スラブ研究センター
雑誌
スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, pp.1-36, 2000

This paper focuses on the characteristics and genesis of the Tatarstan political regime during the leadership of the republic's President Mintimer Shaimiev and will question the popular view that his regime is a typical authoritarian dictatorship, although this conception appears to be justified by extraordinary electoral results in the republic. For example, Shaimiev was the only candidate for presidency in 1996 and gained 97.1% of the valid votes. My first point is that the Tatarstan regime should be analyzed in comparison with other post-communist political regimes. The Tatarstan republic, along with other national republics in Russia, is a marginal type placed, spatially and typologically, between the highly deconcentrated, ethnically Russian regions of Russia and the unitary Central Asian countries. In Tatarstan local chief administrators are appointed by Shaimiev, but nevertheless they are obliged to run for local and republican deputy elections and thus justify themselves through their electoral ability. If a chief administrator loses one or both of these elections, Shaimiev fires him. A similar practice can be found in Ukraine, another marginal type placed between the highly deconcentrated, ethnically Russian regions of Russia and the unitary Eastern Central European countries (in particular Poland and the Czech Republic). In Ukraine, governors and chief district administrators are appointed by the president and governors respectively, but nevertheless they are not bureaucrats in the Weberian sense, who are responsible only for their managerial performances. Rather, they take charge of electoral results in their regions or districts. If a governor or administrator cannot mobilize sufficient votes for Kuchma or his parties, he too will be fired. I term the marginal political regime represented by Tatarstan and Ukraine as "centralized caciquismo," considering that it camouflages local boss politics by outward, constitutional unitarism and that it combines the "merits" of appointment and electoral politics: the upper echelon can check the lower's electoral ability without giving the latter independence. The second section of this paper examines the criteria for comparing the political regimes of Russia's national republics: ethnic factors; the roles of leaders; socioeconomic structures; the penchant for coercion; the survival of the pre-1990 elite and their monopoly of electoral machines; the status of the national republic under the old regime; and relations between nationalist and pro-Moscow oppositions. The third section proves that the present Shaimiev regime satisfies the requisites for caciquismo: the local leaders' hidden desire for independence from the republican authorities; the uninterrupted development of an electoral machine in post-communist Tatarstan and the exploitation by Shaimievites of this electoral ability in their negotiation with Moscow; and federal (not command-subordinate) relations between the republican and local elites. The fourth section illuminates the genesis of this caciquismo. A secret of Shaimiev's success in making this regime emerge was his behavior exclusively as a peacemaker. Benefited by this image, the pre-1990 elite in Tatarstan could effect an ethno-Bonapartist policy, exploiting the antagonism between the two wings of the opposition, Tatar nationalists and pro-Moscow democrats. An English version of this paper was distributed at a panel at the AAASS annual convention held in St. Louis on November 18-21, 1999.
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2000, no.29, pp.49-71, 2000 (Released:2010-10-27)
参考文献数
30
被引用文献数
1 1

Kuchma's “cassette tape scandal” in 2000-2001 exemplified the patrimonial phenomena that has become prevalent in post-communist Ukrainian politics. However, this patrimonial tendency has not been combined with classic authoritarianism but machine politics (or ‘caciquismo’), in which election votes play a decisive role in intra-elite struggles for power. As a rule, caciquismo is based on independent meso-elites which function as mobilizers of votes and also as political brokers between localities and the center. Ukraine is not an exception, although in this country the meso-elites independence is masked by a constitutional unitarism and an appointment system of regional and ‘raion’ chief executives. Therefore, we need to pay attention to patrimony building at the regional level, which provides a social basis for strong regional electoral machines. I sampled four regions which contributed to Kuchma's victory in the 1999 presidential elections : Odesa, Transcarpathia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. Remarkably, despite previously sympathizing with the opposition, the electorate in these regions changed their political inclinations in the few years leading up to the 1999 elections. Along with the common tendency of electoral machines being based on the regional patrimony, a contrast was found with the extent to which this machine/patrimony had been legalized. This is the problem of regional party building. The development of a regional party system is determined by two factors :(1) intra-elite competition and,(2) interactions between party system levels. Regarding the latter, if infra-regional issues are converted into national political issues in a region, we can say that the interactions between party system levels have been activated. In 1994-98, Odesa Region experienced harsh infra-elite competition between its governor and Odesa mayor, but even in 1998 this conflict remained infra-regional (Kyiv only intervened sporadically). Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk politics were forcibly nationalized in 1996 and after 1997 respectively, since the top leaders of these regions became rivals for Kyiv politicians (Donetsk governor Shcherban versus the then prime minister Lazarenko ; and the Dnipropetrovsk Soviet chair Lazarenko versus President Kuchma). Nevertheless, Kyiv could not divide these regions' elites. In Transcarpathia conflicts between the governor and the mayor of the regional capital Uzhhorod became nationalized in 1997-98 because the governor allied with the Medvedchuk faction of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United), a typical legalized clan organization from Kyiv. In other words, only in Transcarpathia were the two conditions fully met and thus a formal party system was able to develop.
著者
沼野 充義 三谷 惠子 松里 公孝 柳原 孝敦 青島 陽子 小松 久男 乗松 亨平 楯岡 求美 井上 まどか 亀田 真澄 下斗米 伸夫 坂庭 淳史 池田 嘉郎 湯浅 剛 阿部 賢一 安達 祐子 加藤 有子 平野 恵美子 羽場 久美子 柴田 元幸
出版者
東京大学
雑誌
基盤研究(A)
巻号頁・発行日
2013-04-01

ソ連解体後のスラヴ・ユーラシアの変容と越境の様々な様相に焦点を合わせた包括的な研究である。グローバル化時代の世界情勢を考慮に入れ、新たな研究の枠組みの構築を目指した。代表者および19名の分担者の専門は、地域的にはロシア、ウクライナ・コーカサス・中央アジア、中・東欧から、東アジアや南北アメリカに及び、分野も文学・言語・芸術・思想・宗教・歴史から政治・経済・国際関係に至るまで人文社会科学全体にわたる。このようなグループによる超域的・学際的アプローチを通じて、国際学会の組織に積極的に関わり、日本のスラヴ・ユーラシア研究の国際的発信力を高めるとともに、この分野における国際交流の活性化に努めた。
著者
望月 哲男 越野 剛 後藤 正憲 鈴木 正美 鳥山 祐介 長縄 宣博 中村 唯史 沼野 充義 野町 素己 松里 公孝
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(A)
巻号頁・発行日
2009

ヴォルガ地域の文化的な様態を、各流域の民族・宗教文化的特徴、および中世期から現代までの複雑な歴史的経緯を踏まえて整理し、包括的文化圏としてのヴォルガ地域像を解明した。ヴォルガ河の表象にみられる多義性・多面性とその変遷を、18世紀以降の文芸の諸ジャンルにおいて検討し、その特徴や文化的機能を分析した。近現代の宗教・文化思想を題材に、東西文化論におけるヴォルガ地域の特徴と機能を整理した。
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター
雑誌
スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, pp.71-105, 2021-09-08

The military interventions led by the United States and its allies in Iraq (2008), Libya (2011), and Syria (indirectly since 2011), despite their promised purposes, produced failed states and nurseries of jihadism. This dismantled the moral legitimacy of the unipolar world. Bitter lessons procured from the Libyan crisis made Russia and China veto any resolution authorizing the West’s and Gulf States’ possible military intervention in Syria at the UN Security Council. In 2012-2014, Russia’s police and security organs intentionally allowed domestic Islamists to emigrate to Syria to become jihadist fighters for the sake of domestic security on the eve of the Sochi Olympic Games. Fearing their return to Russia and the former Soviet territories after the expected seizure of Damascus by the radical Islamists, President Vladimir Putin decided (perhaps in early August 2015) to conduct air strikes on their military facilities in Syria. The essay critically examines widespread interpretations attributing Russia’s participation in the Syrian War to Putin’s domestic populism, Russian leaders’ desire to protect the Bashar Assad regime, and their attempts to overcome Russia’s diplomatic isolation after its annexation of Crimea. The main purpose of Russia’s military intervention was to change the decision making procedure of the unipolar world. Russia’s Middle East policy was benefited from its developed Middle Eastern studies inherited from the Soviet Union, whereas in the United States “Arabists” have traditionally been alienated from policy-making vis-à-vis the Near East and North Africa. Based on area specialists’ expertise, Russian policy-makers do not primordialize confessional confrontations in the Middle East, which facilitated Russia’s brokering roles between conflicting local parties. Michael Kofman calls Russia’s decision-makings on the Syrian and Middle Eastern problems a lean strategy, which, in my view, well echoed the “hedging diplomacy” pursued by Middle Eastern countries. The collaboration between Russia and the US since the beginning of Russia’s military intervention in Syria in September 2015 could not continue due to US domestic politics in 2016. Instead, the radical Islamists’ evacuation from Aleppo to Idlib was implemented by the collaboration of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In 2017, this tri-polar collaboration developed into the Astana Process managing de-escalation zones in Idlib, East Ghouta, and North Homs, while the collaboration of the US, Russia, and Jordan in Southern Syria generated the Amman Process to control the South de-escalation zone. In 2018, three de-escalation zones, except for that of Idlib, practically functioned as mechanisms to allow radical Islamists to evacuate from there to Idlib, as a result of which these territories returned to government control. The Russian MFA is skeptical of the Astana Process and is concerned about the practical shelving of Syria’s political transition, determined by the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254 (December 2015). For the MFA, a “multi-central dualism” privileging the participants in the Yalta-Potsdam Declarations, not just a multipolar world, should follow the declining unipolar world. Thus, dual diplomacies between the Russian MFA and military emerged, which has barely been coordinated by the hyper centralizing presidential authorities.
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, no.36, pp.17-29, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)
被引用文献数
1 1

The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no “clashes of civilizations” between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine.Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor.Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.
著者
松里 公孝 東島 雅昌 鳥飼 将雅 大串 敦 立花 優 吉村 貴之
出版者
東京大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2022-04-01

ソ連継承諸国の中で、安定的な支配党体制を建設したロシア、アゼルバイジャン、カザフスタンの政治が注目されてきたが、実は、短命な支配党が現れては消える脆弱支配党体制の方が多数派である。本研究は、ウクライナ、モルドヴァ、ジョージア、アルメニア、クルグズスタンにおいて、脆弱支配党体制が生まれたのはなぜかを明らかにする。
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
学士会
雑誌
学士会会報
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.2, pp.30-34, 2015-03
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2000, no.29, pp.49-71, 2000
被引用文献数
1

Kuchma's &ldquo;cassette tape scandal&rdquo; in 2000-2001 exemplified the patrimonial phenomena that has become prevalent in post-communist Ukrainian politics. However, this patrimonial tendency has not been combined with classic authoritarianism but machine politics (or &lsquo;caciquismo&rsquo;), in which election votes play a decisive role in intra-elite struggles for power. As a rule, caciquismo is based on independent meso-elites which function as mobilizers of votes and also as political brokers between localities and the center. Ukraine is not an exception, although in this country the meso-elites independence is masked by a constitutional unitarism and an appointment system of regional and &lsquo;raion&rsquo; chief executives. Therefore, we need to pay attention to patrimony building at the regional level, which provides a social basis for strong regional electoral machines. <BR>I sampled four regions which contributed to Kuchma's victory in the 1999 presidential elections : Odesa, Transcarpathia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. Remarkably, despite previously sympathizing with the opposition, the electorate in these regions changed their political inclinations in the few years leading up to the 1999 elections. Along with the common tendency of electoral machines being based on the regional patrimony, a contrast was found with the extent to which this machine/patrimony had been legalized. This is the problem of regional party building. The development of a regional party system is determined by two factors :(1) intra-elite competition and,(2) interactions between party system levels. Regarding the latter, if infra-regional issues are converted into national political issues in a region, we can say that the interactions between party system levels have been activated. In 1994-98, Odesa Region experienced harsh infra-elite competition between its governor and Odesa mayor, but even in 1998 this conflict remained infra-regional (Kyiv only intervened sporadically). Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk politics were forcibly nationalized in 1996 and after 1997 respectively, since the top leaders of these regions became rivals for Kyiv politicians (Donetsk governor Shcherban versus the then prime minister Lazarenko ; and the Dnipropetrovsk Soviet chair Lazarenko versus President Kuchma). Nevertheless, Kyiv could not divide these regions' elites. In Transcarpathia conflicts between the governor and the mayor of the regional capital Uzhhorod became nationalized in 1997-98 because the governor allied with the Medvedchuk faction of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United), a typical legalized clan organization from Kyiv. In other words, only in Transcarpathia were the two conditions fully met and thus a formal party system was able to develop.
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, no.36, pp.17-29, 2007
被引用文献数
1

The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no &ldquo;clashes of civilizations&rdquo; between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine.<BR>Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (<I>Diyanet</I>), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor.<BR>Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.
著者
家田 修 林 忠行 松里 公孝 月村 太郎 仙石 学
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(A)
巻号頁・発行日
2002

本研究では東欧(旧ソ連のロシア以外のヨーロッパ部分を含む)地域社会全般を射程に入れ、EU統合が及ぼす影響、そして逆にEU拡大がEUに与える影響について包括的な研究を組織した。その中でハンガリー地位法制定を契機として全欧州的な問題となった主権国家論争を取り上げ、欧州統合における主権国家と国民、そして少数民族問題という具体的な論題を巡る国際会議を、本研究計画の総決算という意味を込めて、2004年10月にハンガリーのブダペストで開催した。この会議には日欧米だけでなく、インドやトルコを含む世界12カ国から研究者が参集し、さらに欧州で民族問題を担当する実務専門家も招聘して議論を深めた。この会議は東欧の少数民族問題を理論的、包括的かつ具体的に論ずる貴重な機会であったため、OSCEなどの全欧州的な国際組織から多くの傍聴者が参集し、ハンガリーのマスメディアも大きく取り上げた。この会議では東欧における冷戦後の地域社会形成が国民形成、国家建設、少数民族共同体形成の三位一体として進行したこと、そして問題解決のためには従来のEU統合の枠を越えた新たな市民権概念(fuzzy citizenshipなど)、あるいは柔軟な国境という考え方(flexible border controlなど)、さらにはネオ・ミディーバリズムなどの複合的アイデンティティが必要とされる、などの具体的かつ新たな知見が示された。こうした国際的共同研究の成果の一部は既に本研究代表者を編著者とする英文著書The Hungarian Status Law : Nation building and/or Minority Protection, SRC, Hokkaido University, Slavic Eurasian Studies Series, No.4, 2004として刊行され、さらにThe Status Law Syndrome in Post-communist Eastern Europe, SRC, Hokkaido University, Slavic Eurasian Studies Series, 2005として新たな知見が国際的に発信される予定である。
著者
松里 公孝 長縄 宣博 赤尾 光春 藤原 潤子 井上 まどか 荒井 幸康 高橋 沙奈美
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2009

ロシアの諸宗教を網羅的・多面的に研究した結果、宗教というプリズムを通じてロシア社会を観察することが可能であることが明らかになった。宗教の視点からは、ロシアはより広い地理的なまとまりの一部であり、キリスト教の「教会法上の領域」の観念、巡礼やディアスポラを含めて広域的な観点から分析する必要性が明らかになった。「脱世俗化」の傾向はロシアにも共通するが、その特殊な形態を明らかにする作業が行われた。
著者
望月 哲男 亀山 郁夫 松里 公孝 三谷 惠子 楯岡 求美 沼野 充義 貝澤 哉 杉浦 秀一 岩本 和久 鴻野 わか菜 宇山 智彦 前田 弘毅 中村 唯史 坂井 弘紀
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(A)
巻号頁・発行日
2005

ロシア、中央アジア、コーカサス地域など旧ソ連圏スラブ・ユーラシアの文化的アイデンティティの問題を、東西文化の対話と対抗という位相で性格づけるため、フィールドワークと文献研究の手法を併用して研究を行った。その結果、この地域の文化意識のダイナミズム、帝国イメージやオリエンタリズム現象の独自性、複数の社会統合イデオロギー間の相互関係、国家の空間イメージの重要性、歴史伝統と現代の表現文化との複雑な関係などに関して、豊かな認識を得ることが出来た。