著者

林 采成

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.46-62, 2010-10-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

参考文献数

62

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the personnel management of Japanese National Railways (JNR) during the wartime period and clarify the postwar implications of that policy. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out, JNR faced great instability of railroad labor and a concomitant attenuation of skills. In response, JNR reinforced its internal training system and adjusted the disposition of its limited human resources. Through the expansion of incentives including allowances, bonuses and fringe benefits, the decline of real wages was halted. Programs for the ideological reinforcement of laborers' spirit and lifestyle were implemented as well. However, as the war escalated to become the Pacific War, labor supply was further restricted, finally running short, and the quality of labor consequently deteriorated. As a countermeasure, JNR implemented administrative streamlining and established a personnel maintenance committee, focusing human resources allocation within the organization according to importance. Female workers and students were employed as a new source of labor. In particular, to compensate for a marked decline in living standards, chances of promotion were expanded. Railroad operational efficiency was achieved through this personnel management style and in 1943 JNR reached the highest level of productivity since its foundation. Nonetheless, in the face of a transportation crisis and with a mainland battle seeming imminent, JNR could not avoid conversion to a military organization. For this conversion, a new rank of Vice Associate Railroad Officer was established as a temporary measure and more than 100,000 personnel were promoted to this rank and the existing Associate Railroad Officer. At the same time, the lowest rank of employee was abolished. These wartime measures and the military organization of JNR were reformed during the radical postwar reorganization of Japanese National Railways under the Allied occupation of Japan.

著者

林 采成

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.1, pp.1_3-1_28, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the wartime transportation control of Japanese National Railways (JNR) and make it clear that the management of JNR reached the limit, as the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid became intense.Since the Sino-Japanese War broke out, JNR had to cope with the sharply increased transportation demand caused by the industrial development as well as the military operation. In addition to the demand increase, JNR was always requested to supervise and support other companies, especially colonial railways as not only a transportation enterprise but also a regulatory agency to transportation companies. However, JNR was not a passive existence but the one to secure human and physical resources aggressively to some degree in case of negotiations with other ministries as one of the government ministries. As far as the railroad operation was possible, the profit seeking was a subsidiary matter. The persistent cooperation of JNR with Japanese Government and Army was shown by maximum transportation capacity even when JNR had insufficient management resources. Especially, after the breakout of WWII, Japanese wartime economic management could be difficult without the land transportation of JNR which substituted for marine transportation. Nonetheless, JNR resisted Japanese Army's intention to seize the railroad management right, which led to the dissatisfaction of the Army until the end of war.As a result, an efficient railroad operation system was accomplished according to the evolution of wartime economy and military situation. But, it reached the limit because of the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid.

著者

林 采成

出版者

東京経済大学経済学会

雑誌

東京経大学会誌. 経済学 = The journal of Tokyo Keizai University (ISSN:13486403)

巻号頁・発行日

no.297, pp.61-82, 2018

著者

林 采成

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.3, pp.28-36, 2016-04-30 (Released:2018-04-30)

参考文献数

20

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This paper focuses on the Korea-U.S. Combined Economic Board (CEB), which developed comprehensive policies for the Korean economy after the Korean War, and reconsiders presuppositions about the “development period” by examining economic recovery and stabilization under the American aid program.Rehabilitation and stabilization in the Korean economy were achieved through cooperation and opposition between Korea and the U.S. The CEB played a central role in this process. Although it is true that significant differences of opinion occurred over the amount and composition of economic aid, the accumulation and use of counterpart funds, and exchange rates, the MSA programs that integrated economic aid and military assistance ultimately caused more friction than did the philosophies of CEB participants. The result was issues over how Korea and the U.S. would share the economic expenses for post-war rehabilitation.Once the exchange rate was adjusted to meet the increase in prices, a system of cooperation between Korea and the U.S. was formulated, including exchanges in manpower, and management of the Korean economy became highly sophisticated. In particular, the Korean government implemented plans that succeeded in stabilizing the economy, enabling long-term maintenance of the exchange rate. In other words, from the mid-1950s on, Korea and the U.S. were able to avoid excessive friction. The introduction of large volumes of aid supplies enabled Korea to implement an array of projects and thereby to return to its prewar production levels, and long-term economic development plans were drawn up with U.S. support with the aim of enhancing Korea’s capacity for economic independence. The Korean government, however, seeking to stay in power, failed to rein in the sharp increase in prices, and was therefore unable to extend exchange-rate adjustments with the U.S. Ultimately, it faced an economic crisis that resulted in the early demise of its long-term economic development plans.The above shows that, contrary to the premise of “collapse” and “delay” presented in existing research, the Korean economy of the 1950s did achieve rehabilitation after the war, as well as economic stabilization, and was able to lay the groundwork for the “development period.” Fluctuations in economic aid are not enough to explain the process. That is, the rehabilitation and stabilization of the Korean economy would be impossible without the accumulation of experience and the resulting maturity of administrative capacity.

著者

林 采成

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.3, pp.3_27-3_50, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

41

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This paper examines the constitution of JNR Workplace Committee and its administration from the prewar to the wartime periods and analyzes the process and the reality of JNR labor movement that subsumed into the Familism. The Workplace Committee attempted to internalize the labor movement by letting the laborers display their dissatisfaction as well as the demand as a part of adaptation mechanism within the internal organization, sometimes offering the opportunities for fringe benefits and promotion. This was the reality of the labormanagement relations that subsumed into the JNR’s Familism. Even though the Workplace Committee functioned as the passage to obtain better working environment during the 1920s, in the 1930s, it became to be a defensive mechanism that dealt with delayed follow-ups for the issues brought up by the pay raise and the promotion. In the background of such transformation, there was the existence of the antagonistic labor union that pressured the authorities to consider the demand of the Workplace Committee, as well as the JNR’s economic foundation that enabled its realization. The adaptation of the Workplace Committee to the JNR system deepened in the 1930s and it transformed into ‘the Service Society’ during the wartime period. The price of “service” was the improvement of labor treatment and the stability of livelihood. The postwar JNR labor-management relations began on the basis of these factors.

著者

林 采成

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1-15, 2006-10-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese continental railroad system was expanded from Korea and Manchuria into northern China. The management of the railroad became the prerequisite condition that enabled the maintenance of a large occupied territory, the execution of military strategy, and the supply of Chinese strategic goods required for the Japanese wartime economy. Management resources were supplied from the South Manchuria Railway, Inc., and a new transportation entity called the North China Railway Co. (NCR) was established in Northern China. While this entity was formed as a result of Northern China separation maneuvers, the Japanese side compulsorily enforced the nationwide unity of railroad management. Wartime transportation was not limited to the local area of Northern China, but was also strongly interlinked with policy deployment in Manchuria and colonial Korea. Consequently, a huge transportation demand was also generated locally both internal and external to the region. Nevertheless, since strengthening of the transport capacity by huge investment was impossible because of lack of resources, the NCR tried to enhance transport capacity by increasing the number and frequency of trains in operation. By this means a labor-intensive railroad management system was realized with a concomitant increase in traffic and improvement in productivity. However, after the outbreak of the Pacific War, in order to compensate for the decline of marine transportation tonnage, alternative land transportation was deemed necessary to make possible the supply of important materials from Northern China to Japan. Although the necessity for unified management of a continental railroad system was increasingly clear, the shortage of transport capacity was too vast, and conventional operation became impossible. Consequently the NCR had no choice but to impose rigorous transportation controls over local traffic. The NCR however was doomed to failure. Aggravated by resource restrictions, U.S. air strikes, increasingly intense activity by anti-Japanese guerrillas and continued severe cold, the NCR reached the limits of its management capability and faced a transportation crisis.

著者

林 采成 Chaisung Lim

雑誌

立教經濟學研究

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.5, pp.95-119, 2016-03

著者

林 采成

出版者

土地制度史学会(現 政治経済学・経済史学会)

雑誌

土地制度史学 (ISSN:04933567)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.2, pp.1-17, 2001-01-20 (Released:2017-12-30)

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With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese colonial government in Korea attempted to use statecontrolled operation of the colonial economy to allocate its limited resources preferentially to the war effort and warrelated sectors. The land transportation sector, which had occupied only a secondary position in economic activity in peacetime, became a vital influence on the wartime economy. The Korean National Railways(KNR) had to adjust to wide gaps between supply and demand. This was done not only by reinforcing seasonal and geographical regulation of freight traffic, but also by allocating transportation capacity according to state-defined order of priority. General planning of transportation was promoted with the development of the controlled economy and the sudden increase in military transportation from 1941. An ex ante allocation system of transportation capacity through information exchange between KNR and its distribution control association was established. Simultaneously, state control was extended to the terminal sector of rail transportation and controlled mergers of forwarding agencies were promoted. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the government emphasized relay land transportation of resources from China via the Korean Peninsula to make up for the decline in marine transportation capacity. The colonial government in Korea established a linked land and marine transportation system through an administrative reorganization that included merging the land and port forwarding agencies. Although transportation planning was extended to the China-ManchuriaKorea-Japan traffic stream, integration of the four railways for planning optimization was prevented by the Korean colonial government's objection to the separation of transportation and administration - an objection grounded in the view that planned transportation was indispensable to the operation of a planned economy. Thus, only a limited degree of unification was achieved in the management of relay transportation. There was a clear need for increased state intervention, given market conditions of excess demand and centralized planning of the economy. This greater state control was in fact achieved, but transportation still ended up becoming a bottleneck of the wartime economy, due to resource shortages and poor coordination between the different areas under Japanese control.

著者

林 采成

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.1-15, 2013-07-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the development of the railroad business as the core business of the South Manchuria Railway Co. (SMR) with a focus on the significance of SMR's efficiency and profitability. The SMR became part of the Japanese Empire's railway network after the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. It was founded on occupied railways and military railways of the Russo-Japanese War, so large-scale investments were made early on. Thereafter, many workers were dispatched to these facilities and additional investments were made. The fact that the SMR was less capital intensive than other railways signifies that labor-intensive railroad management and capital savings policies were implemented. The SMR was also characterized by a freight-centered transport structure under which freight transport saw steady increases by comparison with passenger transport. In particular, the SMR sought improvements in frequency of train operation, load efficiency, car allocation capabilities, and the concentration of transportation, in order to cope with the temporal and spatial fluctuations involved in freight transport. Demand for passenger transportation was secured through improvements in passenger-car quality and train operating speed. Needless to say, car usage efficiency rose as a result; improvements in efficiency were also made possible by decreasing the ratio of cars under repair. The SMR achieved extremely high levels of capital and labor productivity and a highly efficient railroad management system in comparison with other railways. This was accompanied by economies of scale, so that profit rates showed a long-term trend upwards from the SMR's founding until the end of the 1920s. After the state railways of Manchukuo and the Hamgeongbuk-do portion of the Korean National Railways were commissioned to the SMR after the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the SMR's productivity decreased abruptly and its profitability also deteriorated. The efficient management system that had been built up by the SMR was thereupon extended throughout Manchuria and efficiency improvements confirmed in the entire Manchurian railway network, including the state railways. During the war, new demand and supply adjustments were made to achieve improvements in efficiency. However, the substitution of land transport for marine transportation had a negative effect on efficiency and profitability. The SMR, which had been established in wartime and had prospered in peacetime, eventually reached its limits and collapsed under wartime conditions.

著者

林 采成

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.3-26, 2007-06-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

86

著者

林 采成

出版者

社会経済史学会

雑誌

社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.1, pp.71-93, 2002-05-25 (Released:2017-08-14)

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With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Korean National Railways (KNR) was confronted by a serious dilemma. Wartime mobilization required an increase in its transport capacity reinforcement, but the necessary material resources were lacking. To solve this dilemma, KNR reorganized its procurement process and established a labor-intensice railroad operation by means of increasing its operation frequency and train units. However, after the outbreak of the Pacific War, these measures ceased to be effective since KNR suffered from an extreme scarcity of management resources. Ultimately, this led to a transport crisis. After Korea was liberated from colonial Japanese rule in 1945, the Korean staff had to take complete responsibility for the operation of the railway network. But this led to a systematic crisis on top of the product-factor crisis because the Japanese staff who had been in charge of the upper strata of the internal organization had been dismissed and the railway network was divided into north and south. KNR had to develop new strata of Korean executives and set up a new procurement network under the command of the U.S. occupation forces. In conclusion, the operation of KNR by Koreans themselves began with the transition-period experiences which followed the 1945 Liberation.