著者
野口 和彦
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.4, pp.37-55, 2007 (Released:2014-09-30)

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.
著者
玉田 芳史
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.4, pp.42-60, 2015 (Released:2015-11-10)

Thai politics has become chaotic since 2006 due to democratization and the tenacious attempts to oppose it. Democratization advanced slowly from the 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s, partly because the military, politically influential for a long time since 1932, retreated from politics after 1992. It became possible for the people to choose the prime minister and the government through general elections. However, anti-democratic demonstrators who felt unhappy with democratization appeared in 2005. They paid little respect to elections results and, instead, asked the monarchy to dismiss the prime minister and appoint a new one. They formed the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in 2006. There have been three waves of de-democratization. Anti-democratic forces, spearheaded by PAD, included judicial institutions and the military as the main actors. They successfully toppled elected governments in 2006, 2008 and 2014. In 2013, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), led by several politicians of the opposition Democrat Party, assumed the role of commanding demonstrators in place of PAD. Court verdicts and military intervention have become more instrumental in the change of national leaders than national elections. This essay will analyze how the anti-democratic forces succeeded in negating election results and depriving the people of power. In their struggle against democratization, they have resorted to a kind of nationalism. The nationalism is neither ethnic nor exclusionist, partly since democratization in Thailand was not the product of external pressure. Rather it is nationalism opposed to democracy, or popular sovereignty. It gives the highest priority to the monarchy rather than the people. The Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul has called it “royal nationalism.” The Thai political regime officially stipulated in the constitutions since 1978 has been “a democratic regime with the monarch as the head of the state.” The bizarre feature of this regime is that the monarch and the people are co-owners of sovereign power. It is not a democratic regime based on the principle of popular sovereignty. The monarchy is not necessarily under the constitution. Respective percentage shares in sovereign power between the monarchy and the people have never been fixed. It is quite reasonable to allege that the monarchy holds the larger share in order to negate or dilute the democratic legitimacy of elected politicians. This is the reason why the anti-democratic forces, PAD/PDRC, the military and the judiciary have pledged their allegiance to the monarchy and have lavished the highest laudatory statements on the monarchy. Thus the undemocratic forces, unhappy with the advancement of electoral democracy undermining their conventional power and privileges (for example, the royalists hoping for an expanded role for the monarchy, and the urban middle-class feeling disadvantaged due to their numerical inferiority) have supported “royal nationalism.”
著者
杉浦 康之
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.54, no.4, pp.70-86, 2008 (Released:2014-09-15)

This study attempts to establish the limits of the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s perception of Japan based on negotiations over the Fourth Japan-China Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki national flag incident. It explains the underlying rationale for and reason why the Chinese decided to break off relations with Japan, what their perceptions of the situation were, and what they had failed to perceive. In addition, this study analyzes the interaction between Chinese intelligence acquisition, data analysis and the perception of Chinese policy-makers. When the trade negotiations began in Beijing in September 1957, China’s policy-makers, albeit wary of the Kishi cabinet’s attitude towards China, were optimistic about the prospects for Japanese domestic approval of Sino-Japanese trade; China’s negotiators were not ready to compromise. After the negotiations broke down, demand for trade with China grew strong in Japan and the Kishi cabinet actively worked towards concluding an agreement, whereby the Chinese leaders, although holding fast to certain principles, displayed a more flexible stance. Negotiations were reopened in February 1958, but there was no change in the ambivalent position of the Chinese policy-makers on Japan and their negotiator won some concessions from the Japanese side. During these negotiations, any arbitrary analysis of information obtained by China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies was checked and nothing suggested that the policy-makers entertained any noteworthy misunderstandings of Japan. China turned to stronger methods when Taiwan’s objection to the Fourth Japan-China Trade Agreement developed into a dispute between Japan and Taiwan. At the time of Japan’s general elections, Chinese policy-makers tried to encourage a more China-friendly public opinion by criticizing the policy towards China that the Kishi cabinet was practicing, thereby hoping to alter the Kishi government’s position on China. These moves were consistent with China’s existing policy of “Japan neutralization”. However, there was limited domestic criticism of how Kishi dealt with China, a fact that Chinese intelligence agencies were to some extent informed of. Motivated by a disapproval of the Kishi cabinet and high hopes for Sino-Japanese trade, they made arbitrary deductions based on gathered information suggesting that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. In these circumstances, Chinese policy-makers adopted an even tougher position on Japan in the wake of the Nagasaki national flag incident and decided to break off relations. The Chinese did not intend a complete and permanent cessation of relations, but rather wanted to apply pressure on Kishi. As such, the decision was in line with China’s policy of “Japan neutralization”. On the other hand, Kishi perceived China’s hard-line stance as interference with Japan’s general elections, and chose to observe calmly how events unfolded. Japanese opinion continued to support Kishi government policies. However, China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies disregarded this fact and produced arbitrary intelligence that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. Hence Chinese policy-makers persisted with their hard-line stance and did not modify their “Japan neutralization” policy. In retrospect, this chain of events suggests that one cause for China’s failed Japan policy was the failure of its intelligence agencies to comprehend that mounting Japanese domestic demand for trade with China had the potential to alter Japan’s foreign policy. Chinese intelligence analysis had backed up its policy-makers’ hard-line stance, and hence China continued to maintain the ambition of achieving its “Japan neutralization” policy. The limited insight of China’s Japan-related intelligence agencies was the result of the following three factors: firstly, their abilities to collect and analyze intelligence were not yet fully developed;
著者
シナン レヴェント
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.1.2, pp.69-88, 2012 (Released:2014-09-15)

The term Eurasia is more than just a geographical statement; it acquired political meaning in the first half of the 20th century. As the term is capable of various definitions, here we restrict the meaning to former-Soviet lands. This paper examines the political intentions of imperial Japan towards the region in the interwar period in terms of Japanese policy towards Islamic populations and the Axis allies, especially German–Japanese military co-operation. The sources are mainly those that relate to questions about Islam and anti-Soviet feelings during this period.The strategy of supporting those who opposed the regime in Russia dates back to the Russo-Japanese war. Based on this experience, Japan, in an attempt to play a more important role in international issues after the Paris Conference in 1919, tried to make Tokyo an émigré-center, like Berlin, Paris, and Istanbul at the time. From early 1920s Turkic-Muslim people were recruited and formed a community in Japan under the leadership of the influential Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali. Subsequently, Abdurresid Ibrahim arrived in 1933 and took the initiative by replacing Kurbanali in 1938. It was assumed that Japan was utilizing these anti-Bolshevik Muslim factions to foster the anti-Sovietism adopted by the military; this explains the infiltration of Japanese influence into the Muslim groups, especially those suppressed by Soviet Russia.As is well known, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed the Anti-Commintern Pact in November 1936 against international communism in name, but in fact against Soviet Russia. Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese military attaché to Germany at the time, made an agreement with Wilhelm Canaris on behalf of the German army covering two areas: (i) anti-Soviet intelligence co-operation; and (ii) aid to support propaganda of anti-regime minorities based on an order from the Chief of the Army General Staff of imperial Japan. To summarize the agreement: ‘To collaborate with the German army concerning the intelligence of the Soviet Union so that the independence movements of minorities in the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda can be easily supported. This would assist the Japanese army to understand the deficiencies of Soviet Russia and move accordingly in the case of war between Japan and Russia’.Finally, the plans mentioned above did not bear fruit in terms of putting Eurasia under Japanese influence due to the fact that Japanese military operations on the Asian mainland and the German invasion in Russia ultimately ended in failure.
著者
本名 純
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.4, pp.22-41, 2015 (Released:2015-11-10)

Indonesia’s post-Suharto governments have conducted democratic elections every five years since 1999 for both parliaments and presidency. The latest elections in 2014 showed a heated battle between two presidential contenders, namely Joko Widodo (popularly called Jokowi)—the Governor of Jakarta—and Prabowo Subianto who led his right-wing political party, Gerindra. The victory of Jokowi in the presidential election has widely been seen as a success story of ordinary man with no elite background to enjoy strong grass-roots support. Jokowi’s rise to Indonesia’s seventh president is therefore evaluated both domestically and internationally as a critical step towards the country’s democratic consolidation. However, the fact that Prabowo—who was Suharto’s son-in-law and a top army general during the authoritarian days—gained 47% of total votes and performed a close contest with Jokowi should not be ignored to understand the nature of electoral democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia. Why could Prabowo, a legacy of the authoritarian heyday, gain such a large number of votes and become a serious threat to Jokowi? It was antiforeign nationalism and Suharto-era romanticism that characterized Prabowo’s electoral appeal. On the one hand, he clamored for the return to good old days in facing today’s ‘excessive’ democracy heavily influenced by the West. On the other hand, he openly criticized that foreign companies operating in Indonesia are predators who exploit the country’s economic resources, insisting on the need for propelling protectionism in various sectors in the name of saving the country. If he were the winner of the 2014 presidential election, Indonesia’s democratic outlook would be very different. This article examines the dynamics of Prabowo’s electoral challenge and reveals socio-economic structures that contributed to his vote mobilization. I argue that Prabowo’s challenge has been discussed mostly in the context of his personal political ambition, but it actually goes beyond that and resonates with socio-economic cleavages that have been deepened under the previous government led by President Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Thus, the article concludes, it is possible that a similar challenge will recur even without Prabowo in the future, and, to understand such a threat to democratic consolidation, it is important for us to ‘de-personalize’ Prabowo’s challenge and examine the socio-economic vulnerability that creates wider political space for right-wing conservative elitism to maneuver in the age of globalization.
著者
保城 広至
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.1-19, 2007 (Released:2014-09-30)

In January 1962, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, now ESCAP) proposed to establish the Organization of Asian Economic Cooperation (OAEC) in order to promote Asian intraregional economic cooperation. However, the proposed organization was never created due to internal opposition from within the region. It has been said that the one of main opposition countries was Japan. The objective of this paper is to look at the various players in the Japanese government, and to eliminate their interests in and problems with the proposed OAEC by analyzing the foreign policy decision-making process within Japan. This approach should reveal one of factors why regional economic cooperation did not make progress in this era.Japan’s policy regarding the proposed OAEC was to refuse to sign the draft declaration establishing the organization, but to propose instead to convene a ministerial-level preliminary meeting to discuss economic cooperation in Asia, including the establishment of the OAEC. The Japanese government declared its full support for such a process. That is, Japan was not necessarily opposed to the proposed organization. This final decision was a compromise between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF). MOFA wanted to make the proposed OAEC an ‘Open Asian Community,’ which would include developed countries like the United States. MOF and MOAF, however, opposed any‘ Asian Community.’ MOF was worried that Japan would increase its financial burden by extending credit to the less-developed countries in Asia. MOAF (especially its minister, Kohno Ichiro) feared damaging domestic agriculture due to the increase of intraregional trade. The domestic agriculture problem has been one of the main factors preventing the region from creating a multilateral Asian framework.ECAFE, together with a number of Asian countries, noted the behavior of the Japanese government, and considered the Japanese decision to refuse to sign the draft declaration as opposition to the OAEC itself, and did not try to implement the proposal. As a result of this, the proposed organization faded from the scene and remains only a historical episode.
著者
陳 嵩
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.2, pp.40-54, 2015 (Released:2015-07-07)

Conventional arguments regarding the attitude of the Chinese populace toward the 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China speculate on the characteristics and motivations of participants in anti-Japanese protests by observing their participation. By conducting surveys with average citizens at their residences immediately prior to anti-Japanese demonstrations rather than observing actual participants demonstrating on the street, this study sheds light on what regions and what types of people have the strongest inclination to demonstrate.First, it became clear that, prior to the occurrence of anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012, different regions and income brackets differed in their inclination to demonstrate. On the whole, a trend of strong inclination to demonstrate was observed in the eastern region, where economic development is relatively advanced. Additionally, a strong inclination to demonstrate was observed among low-income individuals overall. A variety of factors increases a person’s inclination to demonstrate. A negative attitude toward Japan and a high level of patriotism are the factors that most increase inclination to demonstrate. Further, dissatisfaction with societal inequality and the belief that China protects freedom of speech are also factors that add to the inclination to demonstrate.
著者
八塚 正晃
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.60, no.1, pp.37-55, 2014 (Released:2014-10-25)

Official Chinese Communist Party history simply indicates that Deng Xiaoping launched the open-door policy in 1978, largely discounting international factors, such as China’s joining the United Nations and China-U.S. reconciliation. With regards to the pre-1978 era, most studies focused on inter-Politburo politics, because during the Cultural Revolution power struggles often occurred among the leadership. According to the literature, the political situation after the death of Lin Biao is described as the struggle between Zhou Enlai, who aimed at economic reconstruction, and the radicals such as the “Gang of Four,” but they were under the almost complete dominance of Mao Zedong. Previous studies describe how Zhou’s economic policy was at the mercy of politics, and do not analyze his intention and policy. This article reconsiders the conception and limitation of the open-door policy which was launched as a part of Zhou’s policy, considering the importance of the changing international circumstances through analyzing a project designed to import large industrial plants from Western countries. This project was called the “4-3” development strategy, because its total projected cost was US$4.3 billion.Closer examination reveals that the industrial development strategy underlying the open-door policy was formed gradually in the early 1970s, in association with the change in the leadership’s perception towards new international circumstances. Until then, the Chinese leadership had pursued the construction of “the third front” as a preparation for war, which was a massive construction of defense and heavy industries in inland China. However, the change in the international situation in the early 1970s reduced the necessity of preparing for a war. Zhou Enlai and the bureaucrats therefore proceeded with the “4-3” development strategy as a part of a new national strategy, which included the reorganization of the bureaucracy to support the open-door policy and the shift of investment from military industry to agriculture and light industry and from inland to coastal areas. They implemented these policies through modifications of the 4th Five Year Plan.However, there was a conflict between the open-door policy and Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic strategies, despite Mao’s support for the former. The conflict came to the surface as the U.S.-Soviet détente emerged, and the pursuit of the opening was hampered. However, the open-door policy was gradually transformed into a comprehensive industrial policy. As a result, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were able to launch a systematic open-door policy soon after Mao’s death.
著者
奧島 美夏
出版者
一般財団法人アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.60, no.2, pp.44-68, 2015 (Released:2015-01-27)

This study aims to describe recent trends in the nurse migration policy of Indonesia. Lagging far behind the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, Indonesia started to send nurses to the Middle East in 1989 only in a small number, mainly because Indonesian nurses had less professional skills and proficiency in English than those from the abovementioned countries. However, Indonesia found its niche in the international health workforce market—low skilled domestic workers such as maids and babysitters, who also work as caregivers for the elderly and the handicapped. Faced with bad working conditions and frequent ill-treatment at their workplace, however, the outflow of domestic workers from Indonesia is decreasing recently, and the country is now encouraging the out-migration of nurses and qualified caregivers who work in hospitals and care centers.For nurses and caregivers to adapt to the work in foreign countries, they need not only to master local language but also understand the local disease structure, learn related law and local work ethics of nursing and caregiving. In a developing country like Indonesia, medical workers often deal with infectious disease and maternal and child health problems. But what is more important in developed countries, where Indonesian nurses and caregivers will be sent, are nursing and caregiving for the elderly and the handicapped. From 2008, Japan started to accept candidates for nurses and caregivers from Indonesia and some other ASEAN countries on the basis of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between Japan and these countries. However, these candidates are facing difficulty in adapting to the work environment in Japan and in passing the examination, which is conducted in Japanese and required to work as qualified nurses and caregivers in Japan. It is argued that the benefit of accepting Indonesian nurses and caregivers to Japan is not enough to compensate for the cost of reeducating them.In this study, Indonesia’s current health policy will be examined and its problems will be revealed. The country’s current nurse migration policy, which is changing under the national goal of human resource development and the increase of out-migration after the Asian economic crisis, will be reported. Finally, the prospects for further changes in the nurse migration policy and challenges it faces will be discussed.