著者
野口 和彦
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.4, pp.37-55, 2007-10-31 (Released:2014-09-30)
参考文献数
68

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.

言及状況

外部データベース (DOI)

はてなブックマーク (1 users, 1 posts)

Twitter (46 users, 60 posts, 58 favorites)

@shigaku_sv 例えば、国家の指導者が「負ける」ことを覚悟して始める戦争は、常識や直観に反するので「パズル」です。だから、日本は負けると悟りながら、なぜ対米開戦に踏み切ったのかを説明できれば、価値のある研究になります。拙稿は、このパズルに一つの答えを出しました。 https://t.co/DRDYVFU5rw
@Lowenbrau0106 拙いものですが、ご参考まで。 https://t.co/DRDYVFU5rw
https://t.co/DdVkXyRj4M
アジア政経学会編『アジア研究』に掲載された日米開戦の拙稿は、査読は意外なほど、すんなり通りましたが、ある国際政治史の研究者から「歴史を弄んでる」と罵倒された一方で、日本政治外交史のある先生からは、対米開戦決定過程に新しい視座を提供したと評価して頂きました。https://t.co/Egb82bfIkh
>開戦前年の. 1940 年、日本の GNP は約 92 億ドルだったのに対して、米国は 1000 億ドルだった。日本. は 1939 年に経済力のピークを迎え 米国は同じ時期に 10% を超える飛躍的な経済成長を遂げていた(森本、2005: 393–402) https://t.co/iYv1LoSlkc
これの47~48頁あたりが参考になります https://t.co/tfa1vcfTGX
野口和彦の『パワー・シフト理論と日米開戦--システム要因と戦争の因果分析』にもこの頃の海軍側含む帝国指導者層の判断について述べられていますので是非ご一読を https://t.co/BEaoWDoASW https://t.co/QPTcAXfTDC https://t.co/vxjttB7RNv
野口和彦の『パワー・シフト理論と日米開戦--システム要因と戦争の因果分析』もついでに https://t.co/BEaoWDoASW https://t.co/QPTcAXfTDC
野口和彦「パワー・シフト理論と日米開戦」 https://t.co/UBh1ecd0xP
@bn2islander 詳しくはこちらの論文がご参考になるかと思いますが、戦争を起こさなくとも国力の低下は避けられず、戦争を起こした場合には国力回復の可能性が僅かでもあるとされた場合には、後者を選択することは合理的だとの趣旨です https://t.co/QEkxzjGBeH

収集済み URL リスト