- 法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
- vol.2003, pp.7-18,236, 2004-10-20 (Released:2008-11-17)
Human beings have a double aspect: one is that of a patient and the other is that of an agent. With this aspect in mind, I try to consider evil, violence and injustice from a view of feminism as critique of violence. In considering this theme, one of the most important legacies of liberal vocabularies seems to reemerge. That is the right to resist. I propose a question. Does contemporary liberalism take this legacy seriously in the face of evil, violence and injustice these days, especially after the 9.11 and the war on Iraq With this question in mind, I rely on Judith Shklar's insights. Firstly, her “liberalism of fear” as a political doctrine is important for my purpose because it takes human beings as sentient beings seriously in comparison with an orthodox and “robust” liberalism. Secondly, her argument about “a sense of injustice”, which is based upon a distinction between misfortune and injustice, is also suggestive. I also rely on Yayo Okano's insight, which follows Shklar's arguments and develops them further. She emphasizes the importance of “doing justice after the violence” and tries to reconsider “restorative justice.” I regard Judith Herman' s Trauma and Recovery and many efforts following this innovative work as one of the various ways of “doing justice” or “restorative justice.” While I evaluate their ways of “doing justice”, they seem problematic. Their problematic points consist in their therapeutically institutionalizing disposition. How can contemporary “robust” liberalism consider “doing justice” or “restorative justice” with taking the right to resist seriously and without yielding to this problematic way The answer depends on whether it can take its legacy seriously in our flat battlefield.