著者

満原 健

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.159-172, 2018 (Released:2020-01-29)

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In the preface of the reprint written in 1936 to An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida confesses that the standpoint of this work is psychologistic. In 1937 he again makes the same point while also insisting that his theory of pure experience is not entirely psychologistic. These statements bring up the question of what part of An Inquiry into the Good is psychologistic and what part is not. This paper is an attempt to clarify this point. According to Windelband, Rickert and Husserl, psychologism, which is the view that the mental is the ground for general validity, inevitably falls prey to relativism. Takahashi also claims that we cannot distinguish between truth and falsity if the mental is considered to be the ground for general validity. Nishida asserts in An Inquiry into the Good that the most concrete direct fact is the origin of all truths and that the criteria of truth is the state of our pure experience. In addition, he claims that truth is not independent of the subject. We can say that these assertions are psychologistic. However, Nishida also introduces the idea of a principle(理), which is the power of unification. This principle is defined not only as independent of the physical and the mental, but also as that which allows the physical, the mental and the reality to take place. These assertations allow us a non-psychologistic interpretation of his theory of pure experience.