著者
小草 泰
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_29-1_49, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
16
被引用文献数
2

Intentionalism and disjunctivism are two main views in the current debate about perceptual experience. In this paper, I will focus on a couple of (supposed) basic properties of perceptual experience, put forward by disjunctivists, which they claim will motivate disjunctivism as opposed to intentionalism. One is the epistemologically special status of perceptual experience as (providing) knowledge; the other is the phenomenological property that this or that particular object seems to be given to us in perceptual experience. By examining these properties, I will show that, in spite of disjunctivists' claim, they do not exclude intentionalism, and that they can be appropriately accommodated into intentionalsits' view.

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