- The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- vol.44, no.1, pp.1_75-1_90, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)
In his Book Kagaku no Sekai to Kokoro no Tetsugaku, Michio Kobayashi features on Descartes’ theory of minds as “subjective-active consciousness”, and defends it against the physicalist movement of philosophy of mind. I try to show that Kobayashi’s method has a difficulty for defending the existence of our mind because Descartes didn’t allow the scientific investigation of our mental experience from outside. In addition, Cartesian theory of mind cannot appropriately grasp the significance of “other minds”. Instead of Cartesian view, I propose the “mind in general” view, in which minds are open to our world and exists in our communication.