著者
島村 修平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.29-46, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
参考文献数
24

It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.

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なぜ私たちは自分自身の心を知っていなければならないのか https://t.co/Er5Xbu1Ash

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