著者
金杉 武司
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.47-63, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
参考文献数
11

Self-deception has traditionally been conceived as a phenomenon in which one is motivated by a desire that P to deceive oneself intentionally to form a belief that P despite his/her possession of a belief that not P. It has been argued, however, that this traditional conception is confronted with two paradoxes precisely because it construes self-deception in such a manner. Consequently, in recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have come to abandon the traditional conception of self-deception to deny that a self-deceiving subject owns a belief that not P and/or that self-deception is intentional. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that some of phenomena called “self-deception” should nonetheless be conceived under the traditional framework and, further, explores a possibility for avoiding the paradoxes under the traditional conception.

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よくわかる。 " 自己欺瞞の主体がしばしば,自分が現実逃避をしていたことを恥じる,あるいは,他者によってその現実逃避を道徳的に非難されるという事実に示されているように思われる." https://t.co/lZKtRO5sew

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