- The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- vol.45, no.2, pp.99-114, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
According to the standard form of conceptualism, which comes from McDowell (1994), the conceptual content of experience is propositional. But this is at variance with naive realism, which conceptualism craves for. Given that, we should seek non-propositionalist forms of conceptualism, which make room for naive realism. In this paper I propose such a conceptualism, exploiting Sellarsʼs idea of visual experience as “thinking in color”, although he himself has never been conceptualist. Elaborating the idea will lead to the conception of visual experience as analogous, in a unique way, to drawing a picture. I argue that this enables conceptualism to take seriously the particularity and concreteness of perception, which are emphasized by naive realism.