著者
村井 忠康
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.99-114, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
参考文献数
24

According to the standard form of conceptualism, which comes from McDowell (1994), the conceptual content of experience is propositional. But this is at variance with naive realism, which conceptualism craves for. Given that, we should seek non-propositionalist forms of conceptualism, which make room for naive realism. In this paper I propose such a conceptualism, exploiting Sellarsʼs idea of visual experience as “thinking in color”, although he himself has never been conceptualist. Elaborating the idea will lead to the conception of visual experience as analogous, in a unique way, to drawing a picture. I argue that this enables conceptualism to take seriously the particularity and concreteness of perception, which are emphasized by naive realism.

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そのほか、webで読めるマクダウェル関連の論文として荒畑靖宏「経験と世界への開け」(2008)、村井忠康「知覚と概念」(2012)、川瀬和也「自然的かつ「独特」な概念能力」(2018)等があります。 https://t.co/pU7yklhgJn https://t.co/XsB4GWppIq https://t.co/kjZCE9il82

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