- The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- vol.49, no.1, pp.37-48, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)
In our daily lives, we assign some value to various things. For example, we say, ‘this picture is dynamic', ‘his clothes are unfashionable' and ‘she is brave'. In these cases, we experience the value of these things. In this study, I examine the nature of such value experiences. I argue that some value experiences are cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences and that what penetrates into them is emotion. In other words, owing to the evaluative component of emotion, which affects perceptual systems, perceptual experiences can represent things as having some value to us. Furthermore, I propose that this cognitive penetration model of value experience supports the particularistic view of evaluative judgement.