著者

寺井 滋 山岸 俊男 渡部 幹

出版者

日本社会心理学会

雑誌

社会心理学研究 (ISSN:09161503)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.2, pp.94-103, 2003-12-15 (Released:2017-01-13)

---

Using computer simulations, this study examined whether mutual cooperation can occur in social dilemmas characterized by the absence of a central authority. In the absence of a central authority, provision of a sanctioning system that administers selective incentives-a well referred solution to social dilemmas-constitutes a second-order social dilemma. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the generalized tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is an extended version of tit-for-tat that is applied in n-person games, can help solve the second-order social dilemma. The results of computer simulations indicated that the second-order social dilemma could be resolved when group members adopt the Generalized TFT. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the Generalized TFT strategy could survive and prosper in a population originally dominated by "probabilistic actors."