著者
寺井 滋 山岸 俊男 渡部 幹
出版者
日本社会心理学会
雑誌
社会心理学研究 (ISSN:09161503)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.19, no.2, pp.94-103, 2003-12-15 (Released:2017-01-13)

Using computer simulations, this study examined whether mutual cooperation can occur in social dilemmas characterized by the absence of a central authority. In the absence of a central authority, provision of a sanctioning system that administers selective incentives-a well referred solution to social dilemmas-constitutes a second-order social dilemma. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the generalized tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is an extended version of tit-for-tat that is applied in n-person games, can help solve the second-order social dilemma. The results of computer simulations indicated that the second-order social dilemma could be resolved when group members adopt the Generalized TFT. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the Generalized TFT strategy could survive and prosper in a population originally dominated by "probabilistic actors."

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寺井滋・山岸俊男・渡部幹 2003 2次的ジレンマ問題に対する集団応報戦略の効果 https://t.co/nKzV4GmM5U 真島理恵・山岸俊男・松田昌史 2004 非固定的関係における信頼… https://t.co/chfY1IE1fa

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