- 年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)
- vol.66, no.1, pp.1_283-1_305, 2015 (Released:2018-06-10)
This study investigates the effect of legislator behaviors on electoral outcome using the panel data of 47 prefectural assembly elections in Japan from 1975 to 2007. In particular, we focus on two legislator strategies to influence public policy under the institution of the Japanese local government: party control of the local governor through electoral support and bill introduction on their own. Theoretically, legislator behaviors would affect electoral fortune, whereas electoral forecast would affect legislator strategies. To address such an endogeneity problem, we adopt the Arellano–Bond estimator for dynamic panel data. The results controlling the endogeneity indicate that parties increase their electoral margins when affiliating with the governor and that the number of bills introduced by parties has no effect on their electoral margins. Furthermore, we discuss that the difference of the effectiveness between the two legislator strategies is caused by the institutional feature of the Japanese local government, where the governor dominates the policy-making process.