This paper explores how analytic social epistemology has incorporated social aspects of inquiring activities into epistemological research, and how non-epistemic values can be related to it. Since the 19th century, science as a kind of inquiring activity has been socialized in many senses. Scientific community is institutionalized and the research itself is often conducted collectively; outside influence became also visible through national funding system and increase of so-called ‘mode 2’ knowledge production. Given such socialization of science, analytic social epistemology, such as Goldman's veritism and social falsificationism of several authors, has expanded epistemology to include institutional and collective aspects as objects of epistemic appraisal. Non-epistemic values are also included as parts of such social aspects. However, the standards of epistemic appraisal, such as truth conductivity and objectivity through mutual checking, remain epistemic. Some authors, such as Stephen Stich and Steve Fuller, criticize such epistemological conservatism and advocate non-epistemic evaluation of cognitive processes and scientific institutions. Even though they both make good points, the role of analytic social epistemology as a part of total assessment of an inquiring activity should not be denied. What epistemologists need is the awareness that their enterprise is an indispensable part of such a larger project.