- 哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
- vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015-04-01 (Released:2017-06-10)
In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of anti-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a deliberative sense; in its primal form, “pure” logic concerns descriptive laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the Prolegomena is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl’s criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl’s so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.