著者

真船 えり

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.69-84, 2012-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

参考文献数

36

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Hume distinguishes two cases of personal identity in the Treatise, one with regard to ʻour thought or imaginationʼ and the other with regard to ʻour passions or the concern we take in ourselvesʼ. First, I consider Humeʼs concept of character from the perspectives of durability and revisability. I propose to interpret Humeʼs ʻcharacterʼ as the habit of particular ways of forming beliefs from these perspectives. Then I examine the reasoning from character to actions, and the relation between moral judgment and necessity in voluntary actions. Finally I present Humeʼs framework of the link between person and character evaluated in terms of reciprocal relationships in human life. Through this investigation, I show that Hume discusses, though implicitly, the second case of personal identity in terms of the concept of character in the three books of the Treatise.