著者
木村 二郎 Jiro Kimura
雑誌
桃山学院大学総合研究所紀要 = ST.ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ISSN:1346048X)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, no.3, pp.205-213, 2003-03-20

The Policy Board of the Bank of Japan announced the stock purchasing plan on September 18, 2002 (“New Initiative Toward Financial System Stability”) in which the Bank would explore possible policy measures to enhance financial institutions’ efforts to reduce their shareholdings. And on October 11, at a regular board meeting, the Board approved basic guidelines on the purchase of stocks held by commercial banks. The purpose of this plan is to secure financial system stability and to foster disposal of nonperforming loans. This plan is not traditional but truly exceptional in the history of the central bank of the world. We will research the facts and the reviews about the plan, and make it clear the problem of it. Our conclusion is that not only this plan is no main job of the central bank but also the plan will injure credibility of the Bank of Japan. Because stocks are very risky assets, the central bank should not have such a risky asset as stocks. It is true that it has some positive effect to secure the stability of financial system, but at the same time it has negative effect on the quality of the asset of the BOJ.
著者
木村 二郎
出版者
桃山学院大学総合研究所
雑誌
桃山学院大学総合研究所紀要 = ST. ANDREW’S UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ISSN:1346048X)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.3, pp.29-43, 2017-03-16

In the 46th general election of members of the House of Representatives held on December16, 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) gained a substantial victory, and the Abeadministration was established. In his inaugural address, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressedhis firm intention to promote a set of economic policies named the “three arrows” : aggressivemonetary easing, flexible fiscal stimulus, and a new growth strategy, with the aim of rescuing theJapanese economy from prolonged deflation. Pushed by the government, and based on a joint announcement(policy accord) issued with the government, Masaaki Shirakawa, the then Governorof the Bank of Japan (BOJ) agreed to set a 2% inflation target in January 2013. To achieve thistarget, Haruhiko Kuroda, who succeeded Mr. Shirakawa in March 2013, introduced the quantitativeand qualitative monetary easing (QQE) policy on April 4, 2013.During the period of rock-bottom rates that started in 1995, the BOJ introduced a new monetarymeasure called “unconventional monetary policies,” including zero interest rates, quantitativemonetary easing (QE) and comprehensive monetary easing policies. Similar unconventionalmonetary policies have also been employed in the United States and European countries since theLehman Brothers went bankrupt in 2008. Generally, the QQE policy adopted by the Kuroda-ledBOJ can be categorized as an extension of these unconventional monetary policies. However, becausethe implementation level and impact of QQE are more extensive than existing policies interms of scale and extent, the QQE policy by Mr. Kuroda is also called “ijigenkanwa” (differentdimension easing policy). It can be said that QQE was actually introduced under compulsion ofthe government as a measure to attain the 2% inflation target.Although three years and several months have passed since the introduction of the QQE policy,the BOJ has not yet achieved its initial goal of “realizing a 2% inflation target within two years.”The purpose of this study is to assess the monetary easing policies implemented by the BOJ. InChapter 1, I examine the dogma of pro-reflation economists (a doctrine that considers deflationas the cause of the economic stagnation), which is an underlying idea of the QQE policy, from acritical viewpoint. Chapter 2 clarifies that although the QQE policy has had a favorable impact onthe monetary economy such as foreign exchange rates, the stock market and the bond market,their effectiveness in the real economy has not yet been adequately confirmed. Chapter 3 examinesthe relationship between monetary policy and fiscal policy, particularly focusing on “monetary financing” issues, in an attempt to point out that the increase in the future risk of economicdifficulties such as sudden rise of interest rate (sudden drop of government bond price), hyper-inflation and so on is an adverse effect of the QQE policy. Chapter 4 introduces existing principalstatements/opinions on QQE policy assessment issues. Chapter 5 provides a critical examinationof the details of “a shift in monetary easing policy” and “comprehensive assessment,” which werediscussed at the BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting held in September 2016.
著者
木村 二郎
出版者
桃山学院大学
雑誌
桃山学院大学経済経営論集 (ISSN:02869721)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.3, pp.5-23, 2002-01

BOJ changed the main operating target for money market operations from the current uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank of Japan on 19th March in 2001. This change in the main operating target is the first experience in the BOJ history. We will research the minutes of the monetary policy meeting and newspapers, and make clear the issues in the decision making of the policy change. As a result, we got the conclusion that there were some illusions on the quantity theory of money and the hard political pressure from outside of BOJ. So there were no rational reasons in the policy change except political reasons.