著者

臼井 久和

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.54, pp.100-118, 1976

著者

バックレイ ロジャー

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.82, pp.182-186, 1986

著者

梶田 孝道

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.110, pp.1-22,L5, 1995

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The rights of foreigners, including their right to vote in local elections, are expanding in the European Union as the integration of Europe not only allows people to freely travel across the borders in the region but also has brought about the new legal concept of European citizenship.<br>Western Europe, however, has experienced an inflow and settlement of Asian and African immigrants and faces a serious problem concerning their social, economic and political rights. The purpose of this article is to explain the current status of the right of foreigners to vote in local elections in Western Europe and to generalize over the issue by comparing Western European countries with each other.<br>The current status of suffrage of foreigners in local elections in Western Europe will be briefly discussed. The countries which have granted foreigners the right to vote in local elections include Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. The remains of colonialism can be seen in the United Kingdom's approach to the issue, because the country has vested citizenship and suffrage to people from the Commonwealth of Nations. Ireland has also granted foreigners the right to vote, while the country decides whether it grants foreigners suffrage based on the historical relations between the United Kingdom and the countries the foreigners are from. The suffrage of foreigners has not yet been granted in France and Germany which have attracted many foreign workers, of whom Asian and African immigrants and Muslims account for a large percentage, although the issue has aroused much controversy in the two countries. These examples clearly indicate that the situations surrounding each country affect its approach to the issue of the right of foreigners to vote in a subtle way.<br>We will next examine a group of factors which enable countries to grant foreigners the right to vote and a group of factors which prevent them from doing so. The former group of factors includes the history of granting foreigners suffrage in a certain region, such as North Europe, a close relation between the former colonies and suzerains, the diplomatic policy of the country concerned (e. g. Sweden), free trade and the openness of the country. The latter group includes the ideology of a strong nation state (e. g. France), strong nationality (e. g. Germany), the ratio of foreigners to total population, a large cultural and religious distance between society which foreigners come from and society which accepts them (e. g. France and Germany) and the existence of a strong anti-foreigner movement.<br>Next, the logic behind granting the suffrage to foreigners and the logic against it will be discussed, and based on this discussion, the reasons why some countries have granted foreigners the right to vote and why others have not will be examined. The experiences in Western Europe could offer many suggestions to Japan which is facing the problem of whether to grant foreigners the right to vote in local elections. The problem of the suffrage of foreigners tends to be discussed at the level of norms, and there is little discussion on the matter from a positive point of view, such as how foreigners will be granted the right to vote and how heavy their turnout will be. Japan will be able to learn many things from experiences of Western Europe concerning this problem.

著者

石野 裕子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.165, pp.165_156-170, 2011

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the ideological background in the transition of "Greater Finland (Suur-Suomi)" idea by examining the interpretations of Finnish national epic, the <i>Kalevala</i>, focusing on three researchers: Kaarle Krohn, Jalmari Jaakkola and Martti Haavio.<br>Today "Greater Finland" idea is often regarded as "expansionism", but at first it was a sentiment only by Finnish intellectuals on Finnish "relative tribes", mainly Karelians living in Russian Karelia adjacent to Finnish eastern border. This sentiment of Finnish "relative tribes", however, was intended to unite Finnish and Karelians under Russian Empire rule. It was spread around Finnish people through diffusion of the <i>Kalevala</i> by a compiler Elias Lönrrot who gathered oral songs mainly from Karelians in Russian Karelia at the end of 19th century. This developed the theory that Karelians had kept Finnish national epic since ancient times.<br>"Greater Finland" idea had been politicized when Russian Empire shifted policy from appeasement to deprivation of Finnish autonomy, called <i>Russification policy</i> at the end of 19th century. Resistance group, Aktivisti recognized Russian Karelia as a defense area against Russia, and also regarded it as a target of Finnish <i>irredenta</i>. This idea overlapped with independence of Finland after the outbreak of the First World War, which triggered the military action for gaining Russian Karelia just after Finish independence. Meanwhile, before and after the independence of Finland, Finnish folklorist Krohn claimed that Finland had culturally connected to Russian Karelia and Estonia in his studies.<br>On the contrary, Finnish historian Jaakkola, who flourished between World Wars, denied the cultural relations between Finland and Estonia, and stressed the unity of Russian Karelia and Finland in ancient times instead. He also tried to place Finland as the European outpost against the attack of "barbarian Russia". According to Jaakkola's opinion, heroes in the <i>Kalevala</i> were real people who expedited from Western Finland to Russian Karelia, and settled there. This interpretation had been a popular theory of Karelian origin until advocate of new theory in 1950's : Karelians and Finnish were different origins. His theory was made use of the military negotiation with Germany just before the outbreak of the second Soviet-Finnish War (19411944). Finnish government utilized Jaakkola's study for the justification of Russian Karelia's annexation.<br>After the Second World War, Haavio claimed that Finland had come under the cultural influence of all over the world including Russia, and had had the cultural connection with Russia. Therefore the <i>Kalevala</i> had the nature of international epic. Now his <i>Kalevala</i> study was widely accepted among Finnish society which tried to build a new relationship with Soviet Union for promoting the area cooperation with Russian Karelia.<br>It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that the concept of "Greater Finland" idea was changed from "Unity" to "Separation", and furthermore to "Cooperation" in the transition of time.

著者

中井 和夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.114, pp.135-150,L13, 1997

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The first Ukrainian state already has lasted five years. But it does not mean the end of long dreamed of statism, but the beginning of hard ways for building a nation.<br>The border of Ukraine has a peculiar character. Almost all border lines were drawn by dividing regions, each of which comprised historically one region. This condition also makes the task of building a nation difficult.<br>In the western part of Ukrainian border, such regions are Galitsia, Carpathian, Bukovina and Bessarabia. If you turn to the east, there are two divided regions, the Donbass and the Slobidska Ukraine.<br>The Ukrainian border was made by dividing regions that caused difficulties in building the Ukrainian nation-state. Because of the dividing the regions automatically made Ukrainian Diaspora or <i>irredenta</i> outside Ukraine. In Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, Ukrainians have been living as a minority group. At the same time the opposite sides, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, consider the regions which were incorporated with Ukraine their <i>irredenta</i>. Between Ukraine and Russia there is another but major border dispute on the Crimean Peninsula.<br>Ukraine herself is divided into two parts, Eastern and Western. The Western part of Ukraine, called Galicia, has some characteristics which are not seen in other parts of Ukraine.<br>On the contrary to the Galicia, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine have different characteristics. The Donbass and Crimea belong to these regions. These regions have strong tles with Russia although they belong to Ukraine. The Crimea, now an autonomous republic in Ukraine, belonged to Russia until 1954. A part of the Donbass was belonged to Russia before the 1917 revolution as the Don Army District.<br>The contrast between the West and the East in Ukraine can be seen on the map. There is an interesting piece of evidence to show the dichotomy between the West and the East. It shows the change of support for the first president Leonid Kravchuk and the second president Leonid Kuchma. In Ukraine we can hear a new Ukrainian proverb, saying, "Ukrainian Presidents born in the East will die in the West". This proverb well explains the dichotomy between the East and the West in Ukraine.<br>For Nation-building in Ukraine there are some obstacles in terms of integration of people into one consolidated group. Ukraine is divided not only by geography but also by culture and identity.<br>Language problems may be the most visible problem in today's Ukraine. The second obstacle for the integration of the Ukrainian nation-state is religious splits among the people. Ukraine is, of course, a secularized state. But the history of the suppression of national churches such as the Uniate Church (Ukrainian Catholic Church) and Ukrainian Orthodox Church made these churches political factors.<br>Ukrainians have failed to form a nation-state. Russians have also failed to form their own nation-state. Russians have always been a subject of a big empire, first the Russian Empire and next the Soviet Union. Above all things they carried out their mission to build and maintain an empire. Ukrainians, in contrast, are eager to build their own nation-state, not an empire. This is an identity difference between two nationalities. And this difference reflects the dichotomy in Ukraine between the East and the West.<br>The geopolitical position of Ukraine in the International arena has been a factor of difficulties for the building a nation state. For Ukraine, located between the West and the East, between Germany and Russia, inevitably it has been geopolitically in either a buffer zone or a battleground. In the Northern War in 18th century, the Napoleonic War, Crimean War, World War I and World War II, Ukraine was one of the major battlefields. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the region which includes the territory of Ukraine became a battlefield between Europe and Russia b

著者

鈴木 均

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_98-173_111, 2013-06-25 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

100

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Due to Japan’s flood of export during the 1970s and 80s, Japan and the EC (European Community) member states faced trade conflict. Because the common foreign trade policy was launched in January 1970, member states were to abolish bilateral safe-guard measures and agree with Japan on a common foreign tariff. Negotiation between MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan) and the European Commission, however, faced a deadlock. The Federal Republic claimed free trade and condemned France and Italy for keeping protectionist measures against Japan. Britain, however, took a unique position by both criticising Japan’s aggressive export as “abuse of free (trade) rules” on one hand, but also inviting Japanese companies, especially Nissan, to build a factory in Britain on the other. Margaret Thatcher decided to invite Nissan from the first day of her office. The British automobile industry, which had been heavily penetrated by car imports from Germany, France and Italy after Britain had entered into the EC in 1973, could export to the EC market vigorously and therefore reduce Britain’s trade deficit. A new Nissan factory would also reduce unemployment and boost economy in developing areas: Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. Due to its ambition to overtake its impeccable rival Toyota, Nissan agreed to Thatcher’s invitation, regardless of the costs and risks: the overall investment cost of 200 million Pounds, required high local contents of cars produced in the new factory, reliability of Britishmade parts, and frequent labour disputes. Nissan’s advance into Britain made Thatcher’s administration into a fore-runner of EC common policies of welcoming foreign investment into the EC, acquiring Japanese management techniques, and furthering free trade. For such sudden and drastic change of Britain’s EC diplomacy, Thatcher and her office was condemned not only by France and Italy but also by Germany as a “Trojan horse of Japan.”

著者

臼井 勝美 安岡 昭男 池井 優 波多野 澄雄 増田 弘 宇野 重昭 横山 宏章 中見 立夫 植田 隆子 佐々木 雄太 油井 大三郎 福田 茂夫 草間 秀三郎 佐藤 信一

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1979, no.61-62, pp.2-107,L4, 1979-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

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The Japan Association of International Relations, which was established in 1956, considers one of its main objectives to contribute to the progress of the study of the history of international relations, in paticular to research into the history of Japanese diplomacy. Japan's Road to the Pacific War is a representative example of what can be done by the joint endeavour of this association.We would like to point out, as a specific characteristics of recent research on the history of international relations, firstly, a tendency to remove the limitations which are encountered by a study of so called “diplomatic history” in isolation from everything else.We would like to examine the change from the move traditional approaches, which have emphasized only bilateral or multilateral relations between states, to the more modern, original approaches. The interest of researchers will be to cover a wide area of historical phenomena, such as the political decision-making process, public opinion, economic pressure groups and the process of communication amongst other things.The second characteristic has been the flowering of collaborative reserch between Japanese and foreign scholars, and we are now receiving the excellent results of their labours. For instance, the conference at Lake Kawaguchi in 1969, the result of which was, “The history of Japanese-American Relations, 1931-41” is a representative example of this trend. However, it is regrettable that the participants in these collaborative research projects have been mainly limited to Japanese and American scholars. It is to be hoped that, in future, there will be further opportunities for collaborative research and conferences not only with American scholars, but also with scholars from China, England, Korea, the Soviet Union and South East Asia.We hope the future tendency of research will be for the themes of the role and limitation of the individual in international affairs, as well as the problem of individual responsibility, to become the common interest of scholars.We hope that, in future, the increasing variety of scholarship will not become merely scattered and diffused.

著者

君塚 直隆

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.173, pp.155-169, 2013-06

著者

清水 謙

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_87-172_99, 2013

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The impact of 9/11 was strong enough to change the Swedish security doctrine of neutrality that had existed since the Cold War. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated that the security policy of 1992, that is "Military non-alliance making it possible to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in the vicinity", had served well. This means that Sweden has practically abandoned its neutrality, confronting international terrorism.<br>Swedish society, generally known as 'an open society', has many internal "security holes" and the terrorist incident in central Stockholm on December 11th 2010 exposed such kind of vulnerability. That incident was "home-grown" and the generous migration policy was challenged again.<br>This article investigates 'the securitization of migration' in Sweden using the analytical framework of 'securitization' the Copenhagen School provided. The Copenhagen School insists that 'speech act' by securitizing actor(s) and 'acceptance of the audience' are required in the process of securitization and that 'extraordinary measures' beyond the state's standard political procedure will be legitimated. The first two steps mentioned above are well discussed in Sweden in earlier research (<i>e.g. </i>by Abiri), while the third one is still controversial. Therefore, my aim in this article is to present a crucial example of an extraordinary measure.<br>Indeed, the securitization of migration started to occur already in the 1990s or earlier, but a conclusive extraordinary measure was not implemented until December 2001, namely the case of repatriation of two Egyptians (<i>Egyptenavvisningarna</i>). In 2005 the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (<i>Justitieombudsmännen</i>) and the Committee on the Constitution (<i>Konstitutionsutskottet</i>) investigated this deviant case and declared that the governmental action was too optimistic and that the method of the repatriation was inappropriate. The repatriation itself has been treated as an accomplished fact in the Parliament even though the decision was adopted in irregular procedure. Therefore, this result leads us to the conclusion that the process of the securitization of migration has been fulfilled.<br>The Securitization of migration in Sweden is still idling and there are no signs of 'desecuritization' after the terrorist incident in Stockholm. Furthermore, the sequential terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011 are thought-provoking and indicate that the Nordic societies have to cope with migrational issues.

著者

末内 啓子

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.101, pp.90-105,L10, 1992-10-24 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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Studies of International Relations have been undergoing debates for some time. Contrasting views of international relations have resulted in debates, such as those between idealists and realists over norms and objectivity, and between traditionalists and behavioralists over history via-a-vis science. Recently, the influence of “critical theory, ” which examines relations between a theory and its norms, challenges the mainstream of International Relations, which has pretended to separate itself from values. For instance, recent studies by Robert Cox, R. B. J. Walker, Richard K. Ashley, and Mark Hoffman assert that any theory in the field of International Relations is bound to values and history. These studies try to examine the assumptions and the nature of theories in International Relations.Under the influence of the recent development of studying the relations between norms and theory in International Relations, this paper analyzes state-centric models in the tradition of realism (i. e. H. J. Morgenthau) and neorealism (i. e. Robert O. Keohane, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Robert Gilpin). This analysis encompasses questions such as: what are the theorists' views of international relations? What are the normative values underlining their views? How are these explanations and values related to each other in each theory?The state has been seen as the most significant actor in the mainstream of International Relations, including realism which sees international relations as a competition among states, and neorealism which recognizes the increasing importance of international economic issues and international regimes during the era of declining U. S. hegemony. The state continues to be described as a rational actor, and at the same time as an indispensable actor in international relations. Both realism and neorealism are based on their assumptions of the separation between theory and norm and are engaged in their pursuits of science. As natural scientists pursue the control of nature, realists and neorealists consider that their science of international relations will provide practical tools to create order and stability out of international relations, which are seen as originally anarchic.This examination argues that despite their pretension to value-neutrality, objectivity, scientific outlook, and rationality, the mainstream studies in International Relations are heavily grounded in values. The separation of values and methods create a norm of analytical supremacy and scientific rationality which give the illusion of control over international relations. Realism and neorealism also eliminate challenges to themselves by asserting their “scientific” legitimacy. Accordingly, the dominance of state-centric models in realism and neorealism resulted in their peculiar structure of logic and justification, leaving the field undeveloped in terms of critical challenges to these approaches.Therefore, this analysis concludes that it is essential to examine the nature of relations between theory and norms within theories. This attempt encourages the examination of these models by challenging their premises. This approach would not immediately invent an “alternative” theory; yet, it is a significant beginning to the reassessment of the state of the field and the consideration of theoretical alternatives. Accordingly, it is essential to create an analytical dialogue with these theories and to examine the textures of theories which weave together norms, values, and ideas within a historical context.

著者

種稲 秀司

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.152, pp.98-114,L13, 2008

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Foreign Minister Shidehara kijuro intended to lead the nations of the world in diplomacy oriented towards China. Around the time of his second term as foreign minister, the US had responded to the customs treaty revisions of the Nanjing government and the world's nations had kept apace, but Japan was lagging behind and was deadlocked in relation to China. In order to resolve the situation, Japan aimed at taking the lead in resolving the negotiations that had run into difficulties between China and the other nations regarding the revocation of extraterritorial rights, and indicated their favorability on the issue to Nanjing.<br>Under those circumstances, Shidehara regarded the Sino-Soviet conflict as a violation of the Sino-Soviet pact and advocated the Soviet position of status quo ante, as the Chinese had instigated that conflict leading to the compulsory restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Nanjing, however, sought the understanding of Japan regarding the restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while also unsuccessfully requesting the mediation of Germany and the League of Nations. Consequently, the only effective means left to China for settling the Sino-Soviet conflict was through Japanese arbitration, but the Nanjing government was adamant about the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway and was halfhearted in this matter. Shidehara, seeing in mid-October that the Soviets had expressed a willingness to negotiate directly with the Northeastern government which had softened its stance, sounded out a solution based on direct negotiations between the Soviets and the Northeastern government, but the Nanjing government was not responsive. The government at Nanjing realized the necessity of arbitration after the Soviet army attacked in force in mid-November. However, by this time the US was demonstrating through the extraterritoriality issue a more favorable stance towards China than Japan was, and Nanjing was pinning their hopes on that. Nanjing in the end accepted the status quo ante solution worked out in negotiations between the USSR and the Northeastern government because of the expanding Soviet military threat, armed attack, and US support of Chinese Eastern Railway status quo ante. That thirtyeight nations joined the US-led statement calling for a non-belligerency pact speaks of the inability of Shidehara, who had aimed at conflict resolution led by Japan, to shape opinions among the nations. Japan was not able to recover its leading role in Chinese-oriented diplomacy because of the expansion of US influence, and Japanese diplomacy towards China continued in that state.

著者

小谷 賢

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_94-107, 2012

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There are lots of studies on the Suez Crisis, which show us why the British government carried out such an infamous military intervention in Egypt in 1956. Various reasons of the intervention have been discussed since 1960s; some explain British intentions of regaining control over the Suez Canal, dealing a heavy blow to Nasser's regime and holding the British Empire in the Middle East, while others refer to political inside stories of Anthony Eden's administration, especially impact of hawks in the Tory, "Suez group" and Eden's health conditions.<br>These interpretations can be persuasive for understanding the crisis, but we should also view the problem from a different perspective: that is, why could Eden carry out his plan despite the fact that some of his ministers and the Foreign Office opposed to Eden's belligerent attitude. One of the keys to reconsider the crisis is to examine senior government bureaucrat in the Whitehall who personally supported Eden's foreign and military policy, but it has been difficult to follow these senior staffs' influence on the crisis. When Anthony Nutting, ex-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs published his book, <i>No End of a Lesson</i> in 1967 (which is still one of the basic works for Suez watchers), the British Government censored the book and eliminated most secret matters, including names of senior bureaucrat alleged to have an involvement with the crisis decision-making. However the British National Archives opened record of the censor and we come to know their roles, especially Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Kirkpatrick's subordinate at the Foreign Office.<br>Recent studies such as <i>Whitehall and the Suez Crisis</i> (2000) and <i>Reassessing Suez 1956</i> (2008) reveal the role of the senior officials during the crisis. This essay also focuses on the influence of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department (PUSD) on the crisis decision making, which Kirkpatrick and Dean were involved in. Documents released at the National Archives, Kew, oral history records of the Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives, King's College London and private papers of the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford would give us a chance to reconsider the crisis.

著者

村島 滋

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.45, pp.75-92, 1972

著者

庄司 潤一郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.54-69,L8, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

93

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At the beginning of 1945 American forces landed in the Philippines and Manila fell. As the war situation grew still more desperate, Konoe Fumimaro attended the court on February 14 for the first time in over three years and presented a long memorial to the Throne. In this memorial Konoe adomitted that defeat was inevitable but reasoned that defeat itself did not necessarily mean the end of the national polity, as the real threat was a communist revolution which could occur as a result of defeat. Therefore Konoe concluded that Japan should seek to terminate the war as immediately as possible.Until now studies about this memorial have focused mainly on his fear against the danger of a communist revolution. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to reexamine his aim in this memorial.Not only Konoe but also the Jushin, Hiranuma, Kido, and Wakatsuki, had strongly expressed the same view. It is natural that the ruling class has such feeling, and Konoe, who was a prince, has been frightened by the fear of a communist revolution from his youth.Konoe also stressed that the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War and their expansion into the Pacific War were skillfully plotted by one group within the army which have long time aimed at a communist revolution. But Konoe was strongly influenced by Ueda Shunkichi, Yosida Shigeru, and other some adherents of Kodoha, who had helped draft this memorial to begin to hold this conspiracy. Moreover this idea has been developed and intensified by his strong anger toward the army, which regarded his detachment as negativism and watched him with deep suspicion, the Sorge Incident, and his political motive to attempt a Kodoha revival.More noteworthy is Konoe's grasp of the international scene. On the one hand he pointed out that the Soviet Union was pushing revolution not only in Europe but also in East Asia. On the other hand he observed that America and Britain had not yet decided over forcing Japan to abolish the national polity. Through obtaining much accurate information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other channels, he was somewhat optimistic about American opinion. Amongst his contacts, Ogata Shoji, chief of the second section of the Investigation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, played a most important role by talking and submitting the memorandum to Konoe about the international situation.In particular Konoe was very sensitive to the trend about Japan in America and knew well that there were some influential persons like Joseph Grew and Hugh Byas, who understood the position of Konoe and Japan. He concluded that Japan must terminate the war immediately by negotiating with America in order to avoid a communist revolution and to preseve the national polity.Four months later Konoe agreed to go to the Soviet Union as special envoy by the Emperor's entreaty. Though he personally distrusted the Soviet Union, he had one secret plan to negotiate directly with America using this chance. But his plan was not realized, as the Soviet Union did not accept the Konoe mission.

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.122, pp.202-205, 1999-09-24 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

岡部 広治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.57, pp.23-41,L1, 1977

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The Cuban Revolution had progressed from the democratic phase to the socialist without interruption, soon after its triumph over the Batista dictatorship backed by the U. S. imperialism in 1959.<br>The problem on which we should like shed light in this paper is: Why could Fidel Castro lead such a revolution as a passionate <i>non-communist</i> revolutionary, in spite of the fact that the Popular Socialist Party (the Communist Party in Cuba) had been relatively strong in Latin America? We could find a principal reason for it in his basic thoughts and activities as their realization.<br>In the first place, he has always emphasized the role of the <i>popular masses</i> in the revolutionary process. Even in formulating the armed struggle as the principal way to the revolution, as in the Moncada attack and the guerrilla warfare in Sierra Maestra, he had striven to develop the revolutionary consciousness of the people. The idea that the people make history has been running as a constant current in his mind.<br>Secondly, he has persistently pursed for the formation of the <i>united front</i> against the Batista dictatorship and the U. S. imperialism. It is true that the 26th of July Movement led by him could not reach to the agreement of common struggle with the Popular Socialist Party until immediately after the victory of the revolution, but it was because of the profound anti-communism, the main obstacle to the united front, of the other bourgeois opposition party leaders, who had signed the "Pact of Caracas" with the Movement. Fidel has never had any animosity against the communism, having read and learnt the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin since his university years, though he had had some "prejudices" against the Communists. Hence, his constant presence in the revolutionary leadership.<br>Thirdly and finally, he has consistently looked for the <i>democracy</i>, not only in the political aspect, as did the bourgeois opposition political leaders, but also in the economic and social, that is, in the true sense. Thanks to his profound conception of democracy, he could naturally and spontaneously transform himself from the simple democrat into the assiduous socialist. And he could add some particular hues to the Cuban socialism, with the democratic emphasis.

著者

湯澤(下谷内) 奈緒

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_58-171_71, 2013-01-30 (Released:2014-12-13)

参考文献数

37

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Building on a growing body of literature in international and comparative politics on transitional justice, this article examines the debate as to whether international criminal justice contributes to peace. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has often been hailed as the culmination of international human rights standards that have been developed and advanced as norms following World War II. Yet the ICC’s prosecution activities have been criticized by those who argue that the threat of punishment causes dictators to cling to power, resulting in delaying the end of conflicts or a smooth transition to democracy. This article demonstrates how the “peace vs. justice” debate is rooted in opposing ideas for fostering international peace, both premised on the decentralized nature of international society, and how the tenets for their arguments are being shaken when faced with the reality of international human rights protection. Advocates for international criminal prosecution believe that strengthening centralized law enforcement authority beyond sovereign states will deter future atrocities. Given that a victor’s justice is no longer tolerated on one hand and that there is no world government in sight on the other, however, efforts to make credible the threat of prosecution would remain incomplete. Meanwhile those who criticize the ICC as an idealistic endeavor find the basis of international order in bargaining that occurs within sovereign states, but their logic is difficult to sustain because the ICC is making the promise of amnesty, considered crucial to strike a compromise, less credible. The article argues that international criminal prosecution should be understood as part of the international community’s efforts to intervene in and improve internal governance of weak, failing or collapsed states. The limits of the ICC lie not just in weak enforcement but in the very act of questioning the legitimacy of leaders who are caught in conflict. International human rights norms encourage democratized states to address past human rights violations committed under previous regimes; however, they do not solve the problem of how to deal with perpetrators who are currently engaged in violence during times of democratization and peace negotiations. To make international criminal prosecution a viable force for the prevention of future atrocities, it must be coupled with assistance to domestic civil society, which has to bear the consequences of these ultimate decisions.

著者

山崎 眞

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_145-154_160, 2008

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Recently, it has been closed-up again that Japan relies on the import mostly of the energy source, food, and the raw material because the sudden rise of the oil price and the price hike of food and various raw materials, etc. occurred in early 2008. A serious discussion about the food security is happening, too. Japan imports most 99 percent of oil, 87 percent of wheat, 95 percent of the soybean, and 100 percent of other iron ore and rare metals, etc. and 98 percent of those materials are transported through Sea Lane. Japan has developed economically for 60 years after the war because such a raw material etc. were able to be imported without trouble by can the free use of the sea, and to export the product.<br>A two great sea power of U. S. -Soviet was rivaled, and the stability of the ocean was kept because two great military power of U. S. -Soviet faced it at the cold war era. The balance of such a sea power collapses when the cold war is concluded, and the element of instability in the ocean has increased. Therefore, the confrontation by the race and the religion, etc. came to light, and the pirate and the outrage, etc. for the capital work of these group and organization came to be generated. Moreover, maritime terrorism came frequently to occur chiefly when becoming after 2000 years. Safety and the stability of the ocean are deteriorating than the cold war era because of such a situation, and it has come not to be able to disregard the influence given to the economy of the world. For instance, the Strait of Malacca passes by 50 percent of the amount of the oil transportation in the world and 30 percent of the amount of the world trade, and if here would be blockaded by the terrorism such as mines, it is said that the economy of the world will become a situation that nears panic.<br>And furthermore, recent Chinese naval modernization and reinforcement and North Korean nuclear armament under opaque situation will bring insecurity in this region. 90 percent of the trade of the world depends on marine transport now. Moreover, 75 percent of the world's population and 80 percent of the capital are in the coastal frontier. Safety in the ocean therefore can be called a base for the world economy as well as the human race living. Especially, this is extremely important for Japan that is the maritime country.<br>The ocean policy of Japan was something like a inconsistent stripe passes existed in the situation in which the national interest in the ocean was being lost for this by the government office organizations of lack of coordination so far. The former political administration of Prime Minister Abe enforced &ldquo;The Basic Law of the Sea&rdquo; to demonstrate a strong statesmanship considering such a situation and to straighten the situation as the country in July, 2007. The Cabinet Council was continuously decided to &ldquo;Oceanic basic plan&rdquo; based on this law in April 2008.<br>On the other hand, the United States that valued safety and the stability of the ocean made &ldquo;New Maritime Strategy&rdquo; public after an interval of about 20 years in October 2007. This is a new idea of acquiring safety and the stability of the ocean in the world by cooperate about the ally and the friendly country strong. It is the one that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's being sending the fleet to the multinational fleet in the Indian Ocean coincident with such an idea. Now, there is no country that can defend safety in the ocean in the world by one country. Peace in the sea can be acquired only by concentrating the imperative power such as naval forces and coast guards in the world.<br>It is necessary that Japan cooperate positively in such the world strategy.

著者

北村 治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.150, pp.52-65,L9, 2007

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It is often mentioned that democracies do not, or are very unlikely to, make war against other democracies. This "democratic peace" theory has become a commonplace not only in international political thought but also in the mindsets of American presidents and diplomats. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, for example, have referred to this international ethical cycle: promoting democracy would make world peace. The idea of democratic peace was advocated by Kant. Kant thought that a majority of the people would never vote to go to war under the republican (democratic) governments because they were cautious of war.<br>However, the road to democracy may involve war. Democratic peace increasingly seems to be linked to war. It is obvious that democracies are peaceful towards each other but in general they are as war-prone as any other regime type. The theory of democratic peace, therefore, remains fragmentary as long as it fails to account for the practice of war on the part of democracies. At the dark side of democratic peace, "democratic war" occurs. According to Harald Müller, "democratic war" means the resort to the use of force by democracies in order to promote democracy for peace.<br>In the history of international political thought, some thinkers acknowledge that democracies tend to be war-prone. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, pointed out that democracy in America was likely to go to war. It is true that America foreign policy contains this Tocqueville's legacy. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has justified wars and military interventions to export democracy to non-democratic states. Moreover, in order to prevent transnational terrorism, American foreign policy supports. "war against terrorism" under the just war tradition. For American foreign policy, "war against terrorism" is a just war. Promoting democracy is strongly related to combating against terrorism. Moral justification of war is one of the most important things for American foreign policy after the Cold War.<br>There was same logic behind the justification of the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the United States' invasion of Iraq was justified in part as a preventive war for making democratic peace. American "democratic wars" are developed by the universalistic (Kantian-Wilsonian) principles of democratic peace. However, attempts to make democratic peace by using external force would have failed eventually. Without regard to humanitarian purpose or not, it is obvious that democracy in America is more war-prone rather than the reverse.

著者

川崎 剛

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.123, pp.211-214, 2000