著者

樹中 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.152, pp.67-82,L10, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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E. H. Carr has commented the politics between the periods of the two World Wars as “The Twenty Years' Crisis”: the democracy versus fascism, especially, the conflict between the Bolshevik and the fascist was the source of crisis. However, the composition of ideological opposition in Europe did not directly reflect the Asian power politics in the same era.This study is to analyze the domestic and international power politics with a specially proposed concept “strategic linkage”. The concept can be used to discuss Chiang's closeness towards Leninism and fascism through three levels:(1) Choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy(2) Institutionalization of ruling(3) and Resistance to Japanese imperialismThere were three characteristics of the pattern of strategic linkage reflecting the Kuomintang's political system.First, Chiang's choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy (policy of associating Soviet Russia and Germany) was directly linked. Chiang tried to strengthen the national movement of China in order to resist Japanese invasion through the “World Revolutionization” of national revolution and the “Sinicization” of fascism. However, by no means did Chiang intend to meddle with class revolution or overseas invasion. Preferably, he tried to win over the union and independence of the Republic of China through associating Soviet Russia and Germany under the Versailles regime.Second, Chiang used the Bolshevik and the fascist organizational principle and the centralism technique models for his party state, and through formal and informal institutionalization he established dictatorship. Under the democratic centralism and the principle of party leadership, Chiang set up party state, and through imitating the fascist Blue Shirts Movement, he consolidated his political power.Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, Chiang modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship. Thus the mixed polity of Leninism and fascism was the main feature of Chiang's authoritarian regime based on military force.Third, Chiang combined the leadership-dictatorship and the united front line, and through uniting the KMT and the Chinese communist, he organized a one-party dictatorship regime like that of Leninist party or fascist party, trying to overcome the splitting situation of China. To reach the goal of national union, Chiang was able to cooperate with the communist. Though Chiang believed in the KMT's ideology, he accepted Leninism and fascism based on realism, associating Soviet Russia and Germany to get close to Stalin and Hitler to resist Japan. In “The Twenty Years' Crisis” of Asia, Leninism and fascism were not necessarily antagonized, but combined tactics for organizing national emancipation and independent movement.

著者

鬼丸 武士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.191, pp.191_64-191_79, 2018-03-28 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

48

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From mid-19th century onwards, the world was increasingly connected by modern modes of transportation and technologies of communication, such as railways, steamships, modern banking systems, the telegraph, and so on. In East and Southeast Asia, the highest degrees of connectivity were found in and between the capitals or maritime port cities, including Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, and Rangoon. These cities were linked by steamship, rail, and telegraph services, and covered with networks extending the flows of people, commodities, money, and information. That era of deepening regional connectivity and flows in East and Southeast Asia corresponded with the peak of political revolutionary movements grounded in nationalism, communism, religion, or anti-colonialism. Colonial and national governments regarded these movements as threats, and closely monitored and severely suppressed political activists. Under such circumstances, many revolutionaries were forced into exile by arrest and deportation or in order to escape detention. Exiled activists regularly moved between different cities connected by modern transportation and communication technologies. The cities served as their bases from which they partook of many itineraries of revolutionary activity abroad. This paper focuses on the itineraries of three famous Asian revolutionaries, namely, Sun Yat-sen, Nguyen Ai Quoc, and Tan Malaka, who lived in exile from 1895 to 1916, from 1911 to 1941, and from 1922 to 1942 respectively. The paper offers a comparative study of the particular cities in which these exiled revolutionaries based or pursued their political movements, and explains why these cities were chosen for their arenas of revolutionary activity. Between them, the exiles lived and operated in Tokyo/Yokohama, Shanghai, Manila, Amoy, Canton, Hong Kong, Hanoi, Bangkok, Singapore, and Penang. These were the major maritime cities of Asia, serving as national or colonial state capitals or the leading trading centers in the region. Besides the advantage of having regular services of steamships and communication technologies at hand, the revolutionaries had differing reasons for selecting cities for their revolutionary headquarters. For example, Sun Yat-sen frequently visited and stayed in Tokyo/Yokohama because of his links with Japanese politicians, entrepreneurs, and supporters. On the other hand, Shanghai was the preferred city of underground revolutionaries, such as Tan Malaka, because Shanghai was divided into three municipalities. In short, a close understanding of the relations between cities and revolutionary movements requires a careful analysis of the political, economic, social, and historical background and character of the cities themselves.

著者

千葉 大奈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_89-181_102, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

39

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Although there are theoretical reasons to expect that stronger agreements promote durable peace,the extant empirical research provides mixed support for this expectation. This paper reexamines this argument empirically, addressing two inferential problems overlooked in the past studies. First, since the strength of cease-fire agreements is endogenous to the baseline prospect for peace, I employ a copula-based estimation that explains agreement strength and peace duration jointly. Second, I allow the effect of agreement strength to vary over time. This is important because agreement strength matters little right after the war, for there exists a rough consensus among the ex-belligerents about the likely outcome of a next war. As time passes, however, the effect of agreement strength will start to show because there will be a greater chance that some exogenous shocks distort this consensus. Analyzing the duration of postwar peace from 1914 to 2001, I demonstrate that stronger cease-fire agreements indeed stabilize peace after war.

著者

内田 孟男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.137, pp.12-29,L6, 2004-06-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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The prototype of the post-World War II order was formulated at the Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods conferences in the summer of 1944. The United Nations system has since occupied a central place in the international collaborative framework in peace and security as well as in development and environment. The accelerated process of globalization, however, in the wake of the end of the cold war, has increasingly eroded the existing “international” order and transformed the role of the states. Non-state actors such as civil society, NGOs, the private sector, and other social forces have appeared on the global arena, to supplement if not supplant, the states in the making of a new order.Against this historical backdrop, this essay purports to examine the possible role that can and should be played by the United Nations in constructing a humane and more equitable global order. After reviewing briefly the impacts of globalization and the concepts and theories of global governance, the essay focuses on the UN's role in various phases of global public policy making, starting from the identification of global issues, consensus-building on goals and principles, deliberations and decision-making, implementation, and review and evaluation. The UN's unique status that enjoys legitimacy as the sole general and universal organization has contributed to each of these phases. A difficult phase is that of deliberation and decision-making. The decision-making in the Security Council reflects quite directly the power configuration of the permanent members and by constitution is restricted to the issues of international peace and security. The General Assembly decision-making, on the other hand, mirrors the concerns of the majority of the developing countries. The consensus arrived at by the General Assembly serves as guidelines, though not legally binding, for world society to act as well as for the UN system.The implementation of the decision is possibly the most problematic phase in the global policy making since the bulk of its actual execution has to be done by the states. This is a crucial phase of providing the global public goods. In further elaborating this phase, the essay attempts to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of global public goods in the making of global public policy within the all-inclusive perspective of global governance. Through this exercise, we may build a manageable theoretical frame on the UN's role in the new global era. It finally addresses the role of the UN Secretariat in particular the leadership and initiative in mobilizing the resources through forming and developing partnerships with NGOs, business and regional organizations. Such efforts led by the Secretary-General augur the nature of a nascent new global order.

著者

光辻 克馬 山影 進

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_119-200_134, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

39

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In fields ranging from physics to biology, there has been an increasing realization that the exploration into the self-organizing process of the interactive agents will give us a new understanding of the world. Adopting a new Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, we can shed light upon the patterns and processes of international relations which has been considered to be incomprehensible and unpredictable, or overlooked and undervalued.In this article, we propose two simple models using agent-based methodologies that focus on alliance formation and conflict generation in international politics. The interactions among the virtual states in the models result in the skewed distribution of the sizes of alliances and conflicts which contain both exceptionally large ones and unusually large amounts of small ones. Such distributions with long tails of alliance and conflict are empirically observable in the real world. The results show that the models have the possibility to give a new explanation of the pattern and processes of state behavior in the international system.The performance of the models presented in this article, which is formalized with the simplest rules, shows us that the research program from the CAS perspective with agent-based methodology is a useful and promising strategy for the exploration in explanation and understanding of international politics.

著者

江﨑 智絵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_108-195_122, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

71

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The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has gained much support from its sponsor states including Iran and Syria, which has been a cause of deep concern for Israel. The biggest problem for Israel is that Hamas has been launching missiles from the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since June 2007. Some of these missiles are said to have been supplied by Iran. In response, Israel imposed a land and air blockade on Gaza and attacked Hamas military base in Gaza three times between December 2008 and August 2014. However, in October 2011, Hamas and Israel held a prisoner exchange deal, mediated by Egypt. Why did Hamas climb down to a prisoner exchange deal with hostile Israel? What was Hamas’s logic behind managing its foreign relations in this manner?Previous studies on Hamas’s foreign relations indicate that the organization behaves according to political expediency rather than ideology and religious solidarity. This means that Hamas acts flexibly in response to the context it finds itself situated in. These foreign strategies need to be verified further, with a focus on a case that changed the relations between Hamas and the involved countries. Therefore, this paper examines the background of prisoner exchange deal between Hamas and Israel in the context of deteriorating relations between Hamas and its sponsor states.The results of this study are summarized as follows. First, Hamas agreed to a prisoner exchange with Israel to minimize the damage resulting from Iran’s suspension of financial support. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, Hamas did not accept Iran’s request to support the Syrian regime and thus weakened its relations with Iran. Harking back to Hamas’s historical background would bear out that they were inclined to support the Syrian people’s aspiration. Thus, Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip who were most effected by the waning financial assistance from Iran needed Egypt to ease the blockade imposed on the area. For them, an indirect negotiation with Israel on a prisoner exchange presented a good opportunity to reach out to Egypt, which played a mediator role in the negotiation.Second, Hamas’s rational for entering a prisoner exchange deal with Israel indicates that Hamas exercises flexibility in fostering relations with foreign countries. It is inevitable for a non-state actor such as Hamas to need the support of other countries as much as possible. Factors such as ideology and religious solidarity would not go well with this aim because they limit the number of countries to which Hamas can appeal for support.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_161-154_165, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

著者

岸田 純之助

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.32, pp.53-71, 1967-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

9

著者

申 国柱

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.31-51, 1962-04-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

154

著者

池井 優

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.34, pp.58-74, 1967-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

86

著者

吉田 徹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.177, pp.177_57-177_69, 2014-10-30 (Released:2015-11-13)

参考文献数

60

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François Mitterrand was elected as the President of French Republic in 1981. The article asks if this change of government in France had a substantial and direct effect to the foreign policy of the country, especially when one compares it with the previous administration. It starts with an examination of the existing literature of the relationship between national politics and foreign policy. The author states that there is no direct and mechanical effect between the change in national politics and in the diplomacy; however, the latter is activated by the former when some conditions are met. When analyzing the case of “Euro-missile Crisis” in the early 1980’s, we clearly see that the Mitterrand Presidency has changed its policy stance as compared to the opposition period and also to its predecessor. The Mitterrand Presidency showed a clear preference to the “Atlantist” policy, and supported the deployment of the U.S Pershing Missile in West Europe. At least this case leads to the fact that there is an obvious shift in policy that has been made by the change of government, and that the literature stressing on the continuity in French diplomacy doomed to be false. In fact, the reasons of the decision made by the new presidency were multi-faced: 1) to give assurance to the U.S. that the new presidency, even there are Communists inside the government and to be recognized as the legitimate Left government, 2) to show its electorates the difference compared to the former government, 3) to exclude the possibility that the West Germany possess a nuclear weapon, and finally 4) to keep French strategic independence. But the decision was not clearly taken from the beginning; the above-mentioned policies were consequence of a strategic consideration after failure of the Socialist diplomatic agenda which intended to change the U.S monetary policy and to strengthen North-South cooperation. The French diplomatic historian Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle pointed out that in the age of democratic governance, political leaders had to be careful about the “mood” generated by the direct and indirect demand from the internal politics. If they are only adaptive to the international environment, it can be contrary an obstacle to the diplomacy. In other words, a skilful diplomacy means to conciliate the state as an actor and as an arena. After a close examination of the Mitterrand diplomacy in the early 1980’s, we can conclude, despite many miscalculations, that at least the maneuver on missile deployment has been a success as a result of the change of government, and has restore the equilibrium between France and conditions of the New Cold war.

著者

秦 郁彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.11, pp.71-84, 1960-01-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

大庭 三枝

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.124, pp.137-162,L15, 2000-05-12 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

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Since Erikson theorized the concept of identity in psychology, it has been applied to other academic fields such as sociology and political science. Especially in the 1990s, identity theory has been introduced to IR theory and much academic writings has argued on the importance of the concept of identity in international relations from several viewpoints. The purpose of this article is to develop a frame of reference to the concept of identity in IR theory.This article, firstly, tries to clarify what “identity” means. “Identity” means the contents of self-identification—one's thinking about “what I am” or “what we are”. About the concept of identity, there are two important points. The first point is that other members in the society should recognize one's insistence about his/her own self-identification. Without the recognition by other members in the society, one's self-identification is only equal to his/her self-image. The second point is that the definition of “I” or “we” simultaneously defines “the other” and the difference between “I”/“we” and “the other” tends to be emphasized.Secondly, this article surveys literature focusing on identity in international relations in the 1990s, for example, arguments by Wendt, Katzenstein, Campbell, Neuman and others. Then it points out that most of them overlook the existence of “double contingency”. For meaningful arguments over “identity”, “double contingency” should be considered and possible gaps between one's perception about the content of self-identification and the other members' should be explicitly dealt with. When such gaps exist over one's self-identification, he/she often falls into “identity crisis”. The above arguments hold true with respect to collective identity.Finally, this article takes Japan and Australia as examples of identity crisis in international society and describes how national leaders and intellectuals have tried to overcome such crises.

著者

藤原 帰一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.128, pp.1-11,L5, 2001-10-22 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

5

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It has been quite some time since Peter Gourvitch, among others, had indicated that the interaction between international relations and domestic political change might have a more dynamic and theoretically interesting character than previously believed. A lot of water under the bridge since then, but not much has changed: the linkage between international politics and comparative politics has yet to be established. As a preface to the featured articles, this paper illustrates both the origins of this divide, as well as the important attempts that have been made to fill the gap.There are two sources for the conceptual divide between domestic politics and international politics. The first is the legacy that has been carried over from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which not only ended religious wars in Europe but also established a world composed of secular sovereign states. Such transition to a world divided into secular states, however, was always limited and was placed under various challenges against that division. The Westphalian legacy, in many ways, has been elevated from history into a simplified myth.A more academic source that established the domestic-international divide will be the works of Kenneth Waltz and his distinction of three analytical levels in international studies, one that effectively ruled out the search for domestic determinants of foreign policy as reductionist. But in effect, Waltz may have been working on a reductionism of his own, where domestic political priorities are reduced to that of a monolithic state, state priorities reduced to a mere outcome of anarchy, where patterns of power distribution appears as the only viable arenas for inquiry.For students of international political economy, in their studies of the interactions between the international market and individual governments, Waltz's rigid category appeared too narrow and inadequate. Thus started a stream of academic works that aimed to move away from Waltz's third image, first studying the second image in reverse, and then directly castingdoubts on his dismissal of the second image. In this paper, I trace such theoretical developments, first in the field of international political economy, then on regional integration and international sociology, and finally on more regime-level transitions and the role played by international factors in such transition.

著者

細田 晴子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_115-128, 2009-09-30 (Released:2011-11-30)

参考文献数

48

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Using newly available diplomatic sources from Spain and the United States dating from the 1970s to the 1990s, this article examines both the transformation of the relationship between the two countries as the Cold War came to an end in Europe and Spain's effort to conduct an “independent foreign policy” in the Mediterranean under the old bipolar system.Franco's dictatorial regime, initially isolated after World War II, had attempted to draw closer to the West through a bilateral agreement with the United States based on an anti-communism platform as Cold War tensions grew. The article thus first considers how this bilateral relationship was affected by the process of the winding down of the Cold War.We conclude that during this period Spain changed the manner and focus of its participation in international politics from passive to active and from bilateral to multilateral, especially with regard to Europe. Specifically, Spain, which had been drawn into the Cold War through an anti-communist bilateral partnership with the United States, gradually aimed to increase its international influence by continuously confronting its sense of rivalry and distrust towards the United States as well as its feelings of inadequacy vis- ` a-vis Europe. After democratization, Spain resolved this internal inconsistency between its foreign and domestic policies and transformed itself from an economic, military, and political dependency of the United States to a country pursuing a multilateral foreign policy.Secondly, the article considers how the democratizing Spain, which had long hoped for a “return to Europe,” utilized the opportunities provided by the process of the Cold War' s close and how it later balanced its actions on the international stage with its bilateral relationship with the United States.This period proved a felicitous one for the new Spain as it tried not only to return to Europe but also to expand its activities in the international arena. We conclude that Spain effectively utilized this period to achieve a reduction in the number of American troops stationed within its borders while consolidating its democracy and playing a bridging role between theWest and other Mediterranean countries. Specifically, steadily gaining the support of the public after joining the NATO and the EC, the Spanish government exhibited a flexibility that transcended bipolar divisions as the progressive PSOE (The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) moved to the right, allowing Spain to reduce its American troop burdens while maintaining balance in its relations with Europe, domestic politics, and the Spanish-American bilateral relationship.

著者

入江 昭

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.34, pp.1-19, 1967-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

著者

野口 和彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.133, pp.124-140,L13, 2003-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of power shifts on war. Realists have argued that the change of the distribution of power among states is a major cause of war. Yet, they failed to explain how and why it affects state's incentive to attack another country. I propose a window theory for clarifying the causal relationship between them. I argue that the rapid change of relative power affects state's motivation to initiate a war in two ways. First, war is more likely when the window of vulnerability opens. When a state is the declining power, it tends to begin a preventive war for stopping its weakening. Second, war is more likely when the window of opportunity opens. Under the condition that the costs of an offensive war are low, a state in the rising process may want more secure position by the use of forces.I examine the cases of the opening of the Korean War and the Entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers in 1950 for testing the above hypotheses. North Korea decided to invade South Korea with the approval of the Soviet Union because it expected that the United States would not militarily intervene in the war. The Acheson's announcement of the defensive perimeter indirectly excluding South Korea gave Stalin an opportunity to permit the North's war plan against the South. Kim Il Sung also estimated that North Korea would win the war without US intervention in the short period of time because South Korea was quite weak. Chinese decision makers almost agreed to send the Chinese People's Volunteers to Korean peninsula immediately after that the US-led UN forces advanced across the 38 parallel. China expected better outcomes from the preventive war than a war started later because time would make its security worse. In short, the empirical tests confirm this window theory.

著者

大庭 三枝

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.196, pp.196_97-196_115, 2019-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

30

著者

大石 一男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.139, pp.45-59,L8, 2004-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

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Were they harmonious with each other, treaty revisions by Munemitu Mutsu and the Sino-Japanese War? This article tried to examine this problem.Shigenobu Okuma (1888-89 in office), one of the minister for foreign affairs in this period, has been thought as a political rival against Okuma's predecessor Kaoru Inoue and the succeeding prime minister Hirobumi Ito. But, when you investigate their own personal histories, the planning process for the Okuma's negotiation, and the character of the negotiating strategy after Okuma retired, it will be apparent that they three politicians —“Kaimei-Ha” or an enlightenment party— had much common points. They thought that treaty revisions, especially the recovery of tariff autonomy, should take first priority, and that an advance to East Asia should be restrained with all their might.Then, why Okuma failed and the cooperation of them three ceased? The reason was that there were some middle-management bureaucrats who were hostile to the common thought of the three politicians. They were active behind the scenes, agitated “the public opinions”, and tried to tear Kaimei-Ha into pieces to prevent the treaty revisions. The typical example was Kowashi Inoue. And as a result, Mutsu the minister for foreign affairs, who were forced to begin the negotiations under insufficient condition, was heavily criticized by “Taigai-Ko-Ha” or hard-liners for foreign affairs. And finally he decided to enter the war. Kaimei-Ha was in power almost throughout in this period because they have the clearest foresight, but small number of them made themselves powerless against internal betrayal or terrorism. So they could not yield sufficient success.

著者

岩 志津子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.107, pp.43-56,L8, 1994-09-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

54

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In this article an attempt is made to analyze how the Brezhnev government coped with the Prague Spring, by focusing on the following three points; military pressure on Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's ability to control the situation, bilateral and multilateral negotiations among socialist bloc countries.CPCz April plenum adopted the Action Program as the guideline to reform socialism in Czechoslovakia. Although CPSU April plenum gave an indirect warning that such an activity might be dangerous, the Soviet Politburo sent a letter of “good will” to Dubcek's government as a conciliatory measure. In May, WTO contries, with the exception of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia and agreed on military exercises there as a temporary measure. After Kosygin's and Grechko's visits, Czechoslovakia also gave its consent to such military exercises in June. Although CPCz May plenum promised not to radicalize the reform, a dicision was reached to hold an Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9.Reacting to the Prague Spring, the Soviet leadership sought negotiations with the USA and FRG. Czechoslovakia also showed an interest in the relations with FRG. As a result of these attempts, Ulbricht attacked the very possibility of such exchanges with FRG and the situation in Czechoslovakia had not changed. Then Brezhnev proposed bilateral talks with the Dubcek government in the middle of June, but Dubcek rejected the offer. This rejection influenced Brezhnev's perception of Dubcek as a leader whose policy was not in line with the orthodox communist tradition.Military maneuvers which started from June 20 were strongly opposed by the Czechoslovak people and the famous “Two Thousand Words” was published in Prague. This statement proved to be a turning point and the Brezhnev Politburo changed their policies in three main aspects. 1. The Soviets stopped the negotiations with the FRG concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 2. They postponed the end of the military maneuvers. 3. They replaced the bilateral meeting with Dubcek by the multilateral meeting in Warsaw.In the Warsaw meeting, Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov, who had attacked the Prague Spring from March, once again heavily criticised Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev also showed strong doubt in Dubchek's leadership and decided to secretly seek a puppet government. After the meeting, Soviet and Czechoslovakia had bilateral talks at Cierna nad Tisou and later a multilateral conference at Bratislava. No decisive and concrete agreements were reached, but at the time of the Bratislava conference, a letter to ask “brotherly aid” was sent to Brezhnev. The political negotiations were over. It depended on Dubcek's leadership whether to take resolute measures or not. Soviet leaders had gone on the summer vacation.Even in the middle of August, the situation in Czechoslovakia had hardly changed, and Chervonenko reported it to Brezhnev at Yalta. Ulbrichit and Shelest, who had strongly opposed the Prague Spring, also conveyed the same information.At last the Soviet Politburo gathered on August 16 in Moscow and decided on a military intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were some indications that Western countries were not likely to react too strongly if such an intervention did take place.In conclusion, it may be said that military intervention did not only result in the consolidation of the Soviet bloc and promoted the creation of the basis of the detente at that time, but also deprived the socialist countries of the reform impetus beyond the Prague Spring for twenty years.