著者
植村 和秀
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.35-53, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

1943 verfasste Kitaro Nishida seinen Entwurf über Prinzipien für eine neue Weltordnung[sekai shinjitsujo no genri]. Darin schlug er der japanischen Regierung vor, dass ihre künftige Aussenpolitik auf schöpferischen Prinzipien beruhen müsse, damit eine neue geschichtliche Epoche durch Schaffung einer weltpolitischen Neuordnung insbesondere im asiatischen Raum, die China, Japan und Südostasien umfassen sollte, eingeleitet werden könne. Nishida forderte dabei von der damaligen Regierung Tojo(1941-1944)ein weltpolitisches Umdenken durch Abgehen vom bisherigen imperialistischen Grundton der japanischen Aussenpolitik. Er hoffte ernstlich, dass sein Konzept von der Regierung aufgenommen und als Teil des Regierungsprogramms vor dem Parlament offiziell verkündet werde. Doch Nishidas Entwurf hatte letztlich keinerlei politischen Einfluss auf die Gestaltung der japanischen Aussenpolitik ausgeübt. Warum waren Nishidas Bemühungen vergebens ? Dazu kann man drei Gründe anführen: ・Erstens hatte die Kokusaku Kenkyukai,[Forschungsgemeinschaft Staatspolitik], die sich damals aus hohen Beamten, Politikern und Akademikern zusammensetzte, entgegen den Vorstellungen Nishidas nicht einen so grossen Einfluss, als dass sie sich bei der Tojo-Regierung mit seinem Konzept Gehör verschaffen haette können. ・Zweitens hatte die Tojo-Regierung auch gar nicht das philosophische Verlangen nach einer weltpolitischen Wende. ・Drittens konnte-oder wollte - Nishida auch nicht die politischen Realitäten eines totalitären Staates, der in einen Weltkrieg verwickelt war, verstehen. Jedenfalls gelang es Nishida nicht, noch zu Lebzeiten politischen Einfluss zu erlangen. Aber sein Weltordnungskonzept an sich, hat auch noch für die heutige Zeit schöpferisches Potential. Daher ist es von Wert, Nishidas Entwurf nochmals zu analysieren und kritisch zu durchleuchten.
著者
板橋 勇仁
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.55-76, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

The idea of the state, in Nishida’s latter thought, cannot be analyzed without viewing the big change in his idea of ethnic people. By this change, Nishida considers the state is the community, which can be possible by denying thoroughly our desire to find substance(substratum)that requires nothing else, nor the action of the other, in order to exist. Nishida says, in the actual world and human Life, all the entities (including past and future entities)exist as far as they interact each other. In the world, every entity requires the action of the other; any substances cannot exist. So in the interaction, they act as themselves one another uniquely and individually(個性的に)in every present. It means that the actual world creates the world itself uniquely and individually in every moment. For Nishida, the state-community will be made when this“individual self-creation of the world”(世界の個性的な自己創造)has realized well in human life. Therefore, each of the states exists, by becoming a focus of the individual self-creation of the world where no substance exists, to have all subjects(i.e., communities)and all individuals(their members)realize the individual self-creation of themselves.
著者
田中 久文
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.77-90, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

Compared with other contemporary Japanese philosophical ideas, Nishida’s theory of the nation is original in character. This paper will focus on the fundamental qualities of Nishida’s theory of the nation in terms of three points of view: individuality, universality and transcendency. Although Nishida insists that the nation is based on ‘historical species,’ he does not ignore the question of individuality in his theory of the nation. In fact, he argues that the nation is created by individuals. This individuality is also related to the question of universality in that individuals create nations through a kind of universality. The nation is, as such, not something solitary but instead something international in nature. The individuality or specificity of the nation is, morevoer, deeply rooted in what Nishida calls transcendency, or ‘absolute nothingness’. Consequently, the nation, which is created by individuals, has its own transcedental qualities. After discussing these issues, the paper then turns to Nishida’s hypothesis about the role of the nation in the evolution of world history. Nishida insists that all national cultures are metamorphoses of one‘cultural prototype’, suggesting that there are no essential differences of worth or value among different cultures. This position also supports the peaceful coexistence of different nations and peoples through mutual effort. Nishida surmises that Japan has this as its world historical mission, namely, bridging the gap between East and West.
著者
小田桐 拓志
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.91-103, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

In this paper, I will discuss Nishida’s ideas of “the noumenal self” (eichiteki Jiko 叡 智 的 自 己 )and “the noumenal world”(eichiteki sekai 叡 智的世界)in his writings dating around 1930s. I will analyze these notions using a few concepts,namely, “exteriority,” “openness,” and “contingency.” The notion of “the noumenal world” underlies Nishida’s entire philosophical enterprise, and is both philosophically unique and problematic. The logical structure of this “noumenal world” resembles what Henri Bergson calls “cinematograph” in Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. Bergson’s basic logic is that, even though the phenomenal materiality is a continuous flux, our intellects tend to misperceive it as a series of discrete states (“snapshots”), or a succession of static images. Unlike Bergson, however, Nishida considers the nature of time to be precisely cinematographic, and attempts to elucidate the “noumenal” nature of temporality. In this respect, it is possible to regard Nishida’s “noumenal world” as a philosophical analogue of Eisenstein’s montage theory, which defines a montage as a collision of multiple distinct realities. I will investigate how this particular problem of cinematograph complicates Nishida’s philosophical inquires in his middle(and some late) works, namely, his works in the 1930s.
著者
満原 健
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.105-117, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

Der Gedanke Nishitanis hat ziemlich viel Ähnlichkeit mit der Philosophie Nishidas. Andererseits gibt es einige Differenzen zwischen den gedanklichen Inhalten der beiden Denker. Eine der Differenzen ist das Verständnis der philosophischen Logik: Nishida fasst die Logik sehr positiv auf, dagegen eher Nishitani negativ. Der Zweck dieses Aufsatzes ist die Klärung des Grundes dieser Differenzen. Nishitani findet in Nishidas Philosophie zwei Probleme: die Unklarheit des Verhältnisses der Logik zum sie Überschreitenden und die Unvollständigkeit der Platzierung der verschiedenen Aspekte philosophischer Logik. Um die verschiedenartigen Spielarten der Logik unter einem System zu platzieren und diesen die eigene Bedeutung zu geben, versucht Nishitani zu klären, wie die Selbstnegation sich in diesen Aspekte der Logik zeigt. Nishitani denkt, dass auch Nishidas Logik Elemente der Selbstnegation aufweist. Nishitani sieht diese Selbstnegation als die Erscheinung der Kraft absoluter Negativität an, die für Nishitani das die Logik Überschreitende ist. Im Unterschied zu Nishida findet Nishitani die Bedeutung aller philosophischen Logik durch diese Selbstnegation oder durch die absolute Negativität. Das ist eben die Einheit aller Logik, die in Nishitanis Denken vorherrscht. Nishitani muss daher die Logik negativ auffassen, und darin besteht auch der Grund der Differenz zwischen den Gedankeinhalten der beiden Denker.
著者
三宅 浩史
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.95-110, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

In this paper, I try to make a clear picture of the reflective world of Nishida and Miki to grasp the essence of Nishida philosophy through three dialogs between master and pupil. They converse on culture, humanism, and ethics in the texts introduced in this paper. At first, the subject is focused upon Japanese culture. Nishida suggests that musicality is characteristic of Japanese culture and has the capacity to draw worldwide attention. This research inquires as to how it would be following mainly along Nishida Philosophy. Secondly, “the ground of Action”in Nishida philosophy is reflected from the viewpoint of humanism, and “the logic of Nothingness” is deliberated as a principle of Nishida philosophy. Subsequently, “nature”is considered as a derivation of “the logic of Nothingness”in Nishida philosophy. This “nature”manipulates our actions. It requires a proper direction in order to be that which makes this world preferable. Therefore an inquiry is made as to what ethical point this “nature”leads us to.
著者
城坂 真治
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.111-124, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

The aim of this study is to reveal the influence of Aristotle’s concept of ‘hypokeimenon’ upon Nishida Kitaro’s logic of locus. In An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida discussed two characters of pure experience: (1) Pure experience does not refer to the contents of the ‘that-clause’ which is the object of knowledge as expressed in discursive judgment, rather pure experience refers to the event (or state) of seeing something, hearing something etc., (as it is, prior to discursive discrimination). (2) Pure experience is the original source of our knowledge, which we then proceed to elucidate via judgment(or propositions). In the process of developing his logic of locus, Nishida adopted (1) as a base, and modified aspects of (2) in light of this. He found in Aristotle’s thought about the ‘hypokeimenon’ an argument that knowledge of perception of objects with non-conceptual content is justified by reference to the individual object itself, prior to(discursive)judgment. Under the influence of this aspect of Aristotle’s thought, Nishida came to develop his logic of locus as a means to locate events within the sphere of reason. However, there is a crucial difference between Aristotle and Nishida. Nishida was concerned not with the ‘hypokeimenon’ as a means to interpret knowledge of objects with non-conceptual content; but rather with what he termed ‘locus’. With it, Nishida attempted to relate knowledge to our various forms of commitment to the world, thus making it possible to consider knowledge from a practical, rather than purely theoretical, point of view.
著者
小田桐 拓志
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.168-145, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

本稿では、次の三つの問題をとりあげる。 1) 一人称的視点をめぐるとくにその認識論的な諸問題 2) 西田の実践理性概念、とりわけその歴史的現実世界における意義 3) 西田におけるこの二つの問題の関連性 まず、はじめに、現代分析哲学において「一人称的権威」と呼ばれる問題を要約し、 この認識論的問題に関するいわゆる「合理性命題」を検討する。とくにその一例 として、一人称的権威に関するタイラー・バージの論証を検討し、その理論の基 礎にある実践理性的な前提条件を明確にする。次に、西田の中期の著作に基づき、 いわゆる「推論式的一般者」の議論などにみられる西田の「推論」概念をとりあ げる。西田の「推論式的一般者」の概念には、いくつかの特徴があるが、本稿で は、とくにその実践理性的な側面に焦点をあてて検討する。西田は、しばしば、「推論」という現象の複雑な多義性を問題としている。推論には、その論理的必然性 という側面と、歴史的現実における実践理性という側面とがあり、西田は前者を 推論の「構成的」側面、後者をその「直覚的」側面と形容している。西田の推論 についての基本的な考えは、とくにこの第二の側面(「直覚的」側面)について の考察において、現代分析哲学における「合理性」命題と異なっている。本稿で は、さらに、西田の「推論式的一般者」についての一連の思惟が、実は彼の「叡 智的自己」及び「叡智的世界」の概念と密接に関連していることをあわせて明ら かにする。
著者
林 永強
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.186-169, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

日本と中国の鎖国から開国への「巨時代」の激動的な流れの中で、西田幾多郎と牟宗三は、各自の伝統の視点から「歴史」について批判的で詳細に検討してい る。彼らは西洋哲学を受け入れながら、禅と儒教を含めた「東洋」の伝統的な思想を用い、それぞれの哲学的運動を導いている。疑いもなく、両者の「歴史」に おいての理解の中に政治的、経済的、文化的差異が含まれている。しかし、両者 は「歴史」についての考察と同じように、一つの方法論として、「理性」を強調 している。西田にとっては、「歴史」を考察する際、西洋と日本との間に、それ ぞれの「特殊性」が意図的に強調されるべきではなく、普遍的な「論理」あるい は厳密なる学問的方法が認識されるべきである、ということである。牟にとって は、歴史における「理性」は「事理」(shili, the logic of events)であり、その「事」 (shi, events)は「物理的事」(wulideshi, physical events)ではなく、「人事」(renshi, human affairs)であり、その「理」(li, logic)は人事の意味を示すも のである、ということである。「理」というのは「辯證的理」(bianzhengde li, dialectic logic)や「辯證的直観」(bianzhengde zhiguan, dialectic intuition)と して理解されなければならない、と牟は考えている。本稿では、両者が「理性」 と「歴史」とをどのように関係づけるのか、また、「理性」が西田と牟のそれぞ れの「歴史哲学」をどのように引き出すのか、ということについて検討したい。 圧倒的多数の西洋と日本、あるいは西洋と中国についての比較研究に加えて、東アジアにおける日本と中国の哲学的対話に潜まれた可能性と問題性について考察 する時期がきたことを示したい。
著者
張 政遠
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.198-187, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

本稿では、西田幾多郎の哲学におけるシンパシーという概念を考察し、とりわけ感情移入と共感との差異・他者問題に注目したい。この研究は、M. シェーラー のシンパシーの本質に関する現象学的分析で手がかりとし、西田の他者論を類推 説や感情移入説ではなく、現象学的に読み直す研究である。シンパシーの現象を 解明することが、今後の日中哲学交流を深めるだろうと期待したい。
著者
清水 高志
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.147-159, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

It is widely known that Kitaro Nishida consistently criticized and opposed the dualism of the European philosophy. This study reveals that Nishida was inspired toward this opposition by his unique intuition of totality and the continuity of the world. This study also analyzes this issue of “continuity” through a dialogue with the pragmatic perspective of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), and particularly, with his viewpoint on the abduction theory. It also considers his thesis “Self-Identity and Continuity of the World Sekai no Jiko-Douitsu to Renzoku, “Introduction to Metaphysics( Keijijo-gaku Joron),” and “A Study of Good( Zen no Kenkyu),” and argues, from a multilateral perspective, that Nishida’s philosophical notions on “inclusion” and “continuity” were confirmed by empirical as well as scientific thought.
著者
井上 克人
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.19-40, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

The standpoint at the Kitarō Nishida’s philosophy has an extremely strong religious color, especially in relation to Buddhism. That is truly Eastern form of thought, i.e. ‘holistic monism,’which is of a different nature than the Western form, especially with regards to the dualism characteristic of the Latin Western tradition. This monism describes a transcendentally single principle which, while preserving to the end its transcendence, develops itself by arising within itself, is a logic which transforms all things from within, and is a whole from which all origination of development is derived. In other words, we can say that this principle is a logic of ‘substance(tǐ)and function(yòng). It should also be noted, however, that the ‘transcendent unity’of this holistic monism, while we can say that it is transcendent, is not something externally transcendent. In this sense it can be contrasted to that which is featured by the Latin tradition of Western thought in its assumption of an external, personal, singular, divinity which stands outside of that which it transcends. The Eastern transcendent unity of which I speak is, to the utmost, an ‘internal transcendence.’ However, Nishida’s philosophy has inexhaustible depths to offer. We can see this depth in his notion of “oppositional correspondence(gyaku-taiō)”emphasized in his later years. What Nishida tried to teach via his logic of oppositional correspondence is that “the self is itself insofar as it transcends itself.” To put this in other words, we can say that the self which turns its back to God is, just as it is, enveloped within God’s love, or that the self full of desires which cannot cleanse itself of its sin, is, just as it is, receiving the salvation of divine mercy. The paradoxical situation which Nishida describes is that while the individual self is separate in relation to the absolute self, that individual self remains, at the same time and just as it is, unified with the absolute self in deep reality. In short, Nishida’s logic is none other than a “logic of immanence and transcendence.” While transcendence remains utterly within the absolute Other, it is precisely there that the relative existent being is something utterly finite. While there is an absolute division between these two, in the depths they are unified. The finite relative self, in the depths of itself, finds ‘transcendence,’and it is here that such a kind of perspective opens towards the absolute other. This problem of the ‘transcendental other’ at the root of the relation between self and self constitutes the centre of Nishida’s thought.

1 0 0 0 OA 哲学と建築論

著者
香西 克彦
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.41-58, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

Under the theme of “Philosophy and Art”, my task is to consider the relationship between philosophy and the logic of architecture. From the viewpoint of philosophers, Aristotle and Plato, regarded architecture in Greek as representing technology which could control all types of technologies, and architect as a man with both theory and practice. In Idealism in Germany, architecture as art and architectural space became subject of philosophy. In phenomenology, especially by M. Heidegger, architecture became considered from human and living. As to architectural theory, Keiichi Morita (1895-1983)is the pioneer, introducing Vitruvius, who established the logic of architecture in B.C. 30, insisting that architect should learn all of the studies. Morita achieved his original logic of architecture based on studies of Vitruvius and other Western aesthetics. He also referred to architectural space. In his theory, architecture Should represent architecture itself, and should be considered in total. His followers developed various theories referring to aesthetics, space, They seem to trend opposite to Morita’s theory, but the principle of their architectural theory has been the same as that of Morita’s based on something occurring among human and architecture. Reviewing the logic of architecture and comparing it with Nishida’s theory, they seem to resemble each other, particularly considering the original point of these theories.
著者
米山 優
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.59-72, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

In our era of Hegel’s “end of art” thesis, I shall dare to consider creating art of a sort out of philosophy, taking the risk of being called anachronistic. The clue lies in the efforts of philosophers who employed styles close to those of literature. For example, the writing styles of moralists such as Montaigne, Pascal and Alain will serve as reference. The issue is what precisely “writing style” means. While there are cases where even Nishida’s philosophy has been called “philosophical essayism or essayistic philosophy”and criticized for it, I will instead put this factor in a positive light. Therefore, the “artisticbeauty” to be focused on here will on here will mainly be the beauty inherent in the prose. I consider that the locus for the realization of such beauty is where the prose can be said to be alive, and where the words can be said to have life. This can only be when they become entities with bodies. This state cannot be achieved when the style is something that could merely be called logical. What is the issue then? I shall try to develop the issue manifestly as a story of “language and the body.”That is to say, I am engaging in Nishida’s clearly stated argument of “language as the body of thought.”In addition, I shall clarify how this argument is actively linked with the factors Nishida tried to develop in his later years as “creative monadology.”I shall demonstrate that “creative monadology”is what enables us to elegantly enter the so-called “hermeneutic cycle,”which is generated from the obvious situation that “although individual words constituting prose cannot be understood within the work made from the assemblage of prose without grasping the whole of what is known as the assemblage, the whole also consists of individual words.”In doing so, I shall state the possibility of gaining a hint as to the place of “active intuition,”using as a clue the fact that the active point of departure for Nishida in his commentary on art is the body’s being transcended in the direction of the body, and by examining what is called “thought,” which can be possessed by a flesh-and-blood human being, i.e., by an entity with a body. Finally, I shall suggest that, by expanding the discussion from prose to the world, it will become possible to thematize the situation where the world is formed by monads, and that, in fact, this situation of “formation”itself is the part that should be called the quintessence of “creative monadology.”
著者
朝倉 祐一郎
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.83-94, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

We can see how unique philosopher Nishida Kitaro’s grasp of art was by examining his analysis of Konrad Fiedler, the 19th century philosopher of art. Instead of merely absorbing Fiedler’s aesthetics, Nishida explored its fundamental “religious”nature. According to Nishida, only art that is fundamentally “religious”can be true art. In this sense, a study of his aesthetics may lead us towards a broader and deeper understanding of Nishida’s philosophy. Therefore, we cannot treat aesthetics as an auxiliary discipline to philosophy. Nishida saw how the realms of religion, philosophy, art, and morals all centered on human “Life”and explored their ideal forms accordingly. In the end, he defined this ideal form as “religion”in his philosophical work.