著者

竹内 修一

出版者

上智大学神学会

雑誌

カトリック研究 (ISSN:03873005)

巻号頁・発行日

no.75, pp.53-101, 2006

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Conscience is one of the most prominent phenomena of human persons. The term "conscience," however, is polyvalent and ambiguous, and complicates one's understanding of it. By its very nature, conscience has both individual and socio-ethical characteristics. This understanding derives from another aspect of conscience: transcendence. In other words, conscience is essentially open to the Absolute, and has not only a moral dimension, but also a metaphysical or religious dimension. One can view this not only from an etymological examination of the term "conscience," but also from one's experience of conscience. This experience is nothing but self-awareness. When one experiences conscience, it is often as a "bad conscience." Conscience is not restricted to merely intellectual knowledge, but is related to the whole existence of a person. In this sense, conscience is almost synonymous with moral consciousness, but this in itself does not fully or directly define conscience. Conscience is composed of "con" (together, whole) and "science" (knowledge). From this, we can distill several meanings of conscience such as "to know something together," "to have common knowledge," and "communal knowledge." In order for this "communality" to exist there must be a common horizon of understanding. This horizon is the basis of the universality of conscience and this universality should be found in "con." On the other hand, "science" is not mere intellectual or objective knowledge. It is, rather, a moral or existential knowledge of the human person. In Hebrew there is no term for "conscience." However, there are a few words which represent the phenomenon of conscience, such as leb or lebab (heart) and ruah (spirit). The term "heart" is most frequently used in the Old Testament stories about sin and, in turn, most often correlates with remorse or pangs of conscience. However, there are also several stories in which "heart" is used positively, stressing the prais-eworthiness of a "good conscience." There is a term for conscience in Greek: syneidesis. The term "conscience" does not appear in the Synoptic Gospels. Paul is the first person to use the term "conscience" in the New Testament. Though it is still disputed as to where Paul may have adopted this term, there is general agreement among scholars that Paul uses the term syneidesis, to refer to conscience. He regards conscience as an inner tribunal with both a judicial and a legislative function. However, for him, conscience has not only an ethical but also a theological importance. Thomas Aquinas regards a human being as a person who is created by God in the image of God. Every description of his ethical discourse flows from this understanding. The human person is essentially oriented toward a final end: the good itself. Conscience has an important function in this design. It is an application of knowledge to concrete and particular acts. In this application, conscience has a binding force which is based on that of synderesis. As the first principle of practical reason, synderesis unconditionally claims the precept of doing good and avoiding evil. Conscience can be erroneous. However, it retains a binding force, because it requires one to follow its judgment by nature, regardless of whether conscience is good or evil. Indeed, the binding force remains as long as conscience participates in synderesis, which is never fallible.