著者

吉澤 文寿

出版者

朝鮮史研究会

雑誌

朝鮮史研究会論文集

巻号頁・発行日

no.36, pp.171-195301, 1998

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This article is an analysis of the negotiations over property claims during talks between Japan and South Korea, focusing on the period beginning with the conference between Foreign Ministers Kosaka Zentaro and Ch'oe Tok-shin in March 1962, followed by talks in October and November at which agreement was reached between Ohira Masayoshi and Kim Chong-p'il, and concluding with the approval by both countries' leaders in December of the so-called Ohira-Kim Chong-p'il memorandum. The central question underlying this research was my suspicion that, because both Japan and South Korea, from the biginning of negotiations, saw property claims (compensation) and economic aid (economic development) as linked, a political compromise was finally reached over property claims when both sides accepted intervention by the United States. Accordingly, in this article I examine how Japan, the United States and, particularly, South Korea saw the relationship between property claims and economic assistance. I also clarify the structure of Japan's "bureaucratic offense" and South Korea's "political defense." Moreover, I point out the formation of diplomatic policies based on a non-conciliatory "businesslike approach" and a conciliatory "political approach" on the part of the Japanese and South Korea governments at the stage of political compromise, In addition, I criticize the perception of the compromise as a political one achived under U.S. leadership, emphasizing that, despite Washington's "political" intervention, Japan and South Korea had worked toward a compromise until October and that, after the talks deadlocked, a breakthrough came besed on a "political approach" by those two countries. I also attempt to explicate the true character of the diplomacy pursued by Japan and South Korea, which accepted U.S. intervention.