著者

ムスラキス ジョージ

出版者

The Japan Association of Legal Philosophy

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, pp.205-215, 2009 (Released:2021-12-29)

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J. S. Mill thinks of individuality as the most essential of human interests. Individuality is equivalent to freedom as meaning self-determination - the principal condition of and main ingredient in self-development. Accordingly, non-interference is, for him, a vital prerequisite of the good life: it is a fundamental presupposition of his liberalism that individuals should not be interfered with unless their activities can be shown to injure the interests of others. But in addition to the individualist-functionalist strain in Mill's thought there is also a strong strain of skepticism and this is a fundamental component of his liberalism. As well as presupposing a particular view of the nature of man. Mill’s liberali.sm also rests on an empiricist view of the nature and possibilities of human knowledge. From this point of view, fallibilism is seen to be one basis of his belief in toleration, k corollary of Mill's fallibilism is his conception of human nature as essentially open and incomplete. His doctrine of individuality and self-development, on the other hand, appears to imply that the individual is definable by certain necessary and permanent characteristics. Following a discussion of the empiricist and fallibilist strain in Mill's liberalism, this paper offers an interpretation of Mill's view that reconciles these two seemingly discordant elements in his understanding of man.