著者

伊原 尚正 東藤 大樹 櫻井 祐子 横尾 真

出版者

一般社団法人 人工知能学会

雑誌

人工知能学会論文誌 (ISSN:13460714)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.5, pp.AG16-E_1-9, 2017-09-01 (Released:2017-09-01)

参考文献数

18

---

The cake cutting problem is concerned with the fair allocation of a divisible good among agents whose preferences vary over it. Recently, designing strategy-proof (SP) cake cutting mechanisms has caught considerable attention from AI and MAS researchers. Previous works assumed that an agent’s utility function is additive so that theoretical analysis becomes tractable. However, in practice, agents have non-additive utility over a resource. In this paper, we consider the all-or-nothing utility function as a representative example of non-additive utility because it can widely cover agents’ preferences for such real-world resources as the usage of meeting rooms, time slots for computational resources, bandwidth usage, and so on. We first show the incompatibility between envy-freeness (EF) and Pareto efficiency (PE) when each agent has all-or-nothing utility. We next propose a SP mechanism that satisfy PE, which is based on the serial dictatorship mechanism, at the sacrifice of EF. To address computational feasibility, we propose a heuristic-based allocation algorithm to find a near-optimal allocation in time polynomial in the number of agents, since the problem of finding a PE allocation is NP-hard. As another approach that abandons PE, we develop an EF and SP mechanism. Furthermore, we argue about false-name-proofness (FNP), which is the expansion of SP, and propose FNP and EF cake cutting mechanism. Finally, we evaluate our proposed mechanisms by computational experiments.

著者

伊原 尚正 鶴田 俊佑 東藤 大樹 櫻井 祐子 横尾 真

出版者

人工知能学会

雑誌

人工知能学会全国大会論文集 (ISSN:13479881)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, 2015

---

本論文ではケーキ分割問題において,参加者が任意の一定区間以上の割当を望む場合を対象とする.我々は,まず,パレート効率性を満たす戦略的操作不可能なメカニズムを提案する.しかしながら,パレート効率的な割当決定問題はNP困難であるため,多項式時間で割当を決定することを保証する戦略的操作不可能なケーキ分割メカニズムの提案を行う.さらに,計算機実験により割当に関する評価を行う.