著者
CHEN Stacey H. HUANG Wu-Hsiung
出版者
GRIPS Policy Research Center
雑誌
GRIPS Discussion Papers
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17-09, 2017-09

This paper considers the infinite alternative case to prove the existence of continuous social welfare aggregation that is anonymous and respects the unanimity. It clarifies the controversy between Chichilnisky (1982, QJE) and Huang for their contradictory results for the continuum case. Compared to their topological frameworks, the infinite alternative case is easier to understand and pinpoint their difference.
著者
CHEN Stacey H. CHEN Yu-Kuan WU Huey-Min
出版者
GRIPS Policy Research Center
雑誌
GRIPS Discussion Papers
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17-03, 2017-05

Datasets of schools or hospitals often include an urban.rural divide drawn by government. Such partition is typically determined by subjective thresholds for a few variables, such as access to transportation and local population size, leaving aside relevant factors despite data availability. We propose to measure ‘remoteness’ by mapping a comprehensive set of covariates onto a scalar, and define an objective score of remoteness using a standard selection model. We apply the proposed method to data from Taiwanese public elementary schools. Our method replaces 35% and 47% respectively of the current official list of ‘remote’ and ‘extra-remote’ campuses, shifting the remoteness designation to those furthest from train stations, having the highest teacher vacancy percentages, and located in the least populous areas with the least well-educated populations. The campus- and district-level variables used are publicly available and periodically updated in most advanced economies, and the statistical model can be easily implemented.
著者
CHEN Stacey H. CHEN Yen-Chien LIU Jin-Tan
出版者
GRIPS Policy Research Center
雑誌
GRIPS Discussion Papers
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16-20, 2016-10

Parents preferring sons tend to go on to have more children until a boy is born, and to concentrate investment in boys for a given number of children (sibsize). Thus, having a brother may affect child education in two ways: an indirect effect by keeping sibsize lower and a direct rivalry effect where sibsize remains constant. We estimate the direct and indirect effects of a next brother on the first child’s education conditional on potential sibsize. We address endogenous sibsize using twins. We find new evidence of sibling rivalry and gender bias that cannot be detected by conventional methods.