著者

LITSCHIG Stephan LOMBARDI María

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18-23, 2019-03

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We estimate the effect of initial income inequality on subsequent income per capita growth using sub-national data from Brazil over the period 1970-2000. Holding initial income per capita and standard confounders constant, we find that sub-national units with a higher share of income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow more rapidly, while places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of the middle quintile get no growth boost at all. We document that both physical and human capital accumulation in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial income distribution outpace capital accumulation in more equal places, while inequality in the upper tail of the distribution is uncorrelated with subsequent physical or human capital growth. These results are consistent with theories on credit constraints and setup costs for human and physical capital investments.

著者

LITSCHIG Stephan LOMBARDI María

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17-08, 2017-09

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We estimate the effect of initial income inequality on subsequent income per capita growth using sub-national data from Brazil over the period 1970-2000. Holding initial income per capita and standard confounders constant, we find that places with higher initial inequality exhibit higher subsequent growth. This effect is entirely driven by the lower tail of the initial income distribution: compared to more equal places, sub-national units with a higher share of income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow more rapidly, while places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of the middle quintile get no growth boost at all. We document that both physical and human capital accumulation in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial income distribution outpace capital accumulation in more equal places, while inequality in the upper tail of the distribution is uncorrelated with subsequent physical or human capital growth. These results are consistent with theories on credit constraints and setup costs for human and physical capital investments.

著者

FUNK Patricia LITSCHIG Stephan

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17-07, 2017-09

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This paper investigates whether the form of the legislative institution - assembly versus parliament - affects the level and composition of local public expenditure. We collect data at the commune level in Switzerland over the period 1945-2010 and use two research designs: fixed-effects and regression discontinuity (RD) based on local population. Analyzing communes that switched the form of their legislative institution over time, we find that introducing a parliament leads to a 12 percent increase in both general administration and education spending per capita and an increase in total spending and revenue of about 6 percent. In contrast, regression discontinuity estimates cannot be distinguished from zero for any spending category or overall. These contrasting results highlight the local nature of discontinuity estimates since population is an order of magnitude larger in our switcher sample compared to the RD sample. To understand the mechanism at play, we run a survey among assembly participants and document a sizeable under-representation of 20- to 40-year-olds as well as of women in town meetings compared to both the electorate and to voters in elections. Switching from assembly democracy to parliament thus increases the representation of two demographics that are known for their relatively high preference for education spending.

著者

LITSCHIG Stephan ZAMBONI Yves

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19-20, 2019-10

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This paper estimates the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments. We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by central government auditors. The identification strategy is based on an institutional rule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research design exploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identical population size from other districts in the same state where they are not the most populous. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent. The effect is concentrated among first-term mayors, suggesting that judicial presence operates through an increased probability of detection and prosecution rather than an increased probability of conviction, which should discipline second-term mayors as well.

著者

FUNK Patricia LITSCHIG Stephan

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19-27, 2019-11

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This paper investigates whether the form of the legislative institution - citizen assembly versus elected parliament - a¤ects the level and composition of local public expenditure. Our empirical analysis focuses on medium-sized and mostly German-speaking communes in Switzerland that switched from assembly to parliament between 1945 and 2010. Event study estimates suggest that parliament adoption increases total spending by about 6 percent and that this increase is driven mostly by general administration and education spending. To understand potential mechanisms at play, we run a survey among assembly participants and document a sizeable under-representation of 20- to 40-year-olds, as well as of women in assemblies compared to both voters in elections and to the electorate at large. Since these two demographics have relatively strong preferences for public spending on education in our setting, switching from citizen assembly to parliament likely increased their representation in the political process.

著者

FUNK Patricia LITSCHIG Stephan

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17-14, 2018-02

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This paper investigates whether the form of the legislative institution - assembly versus parliament - affects the level and composition of local public expenditure. We use two research designs in distinct samples of Swiss communes. Our event study analysis focuses on medium-sized and mostly German-speaking communes that switched from assembly to parliament from 1945 to 2010. The regression discontinuity analysis is based on small communes from a French-speaking canton over the period 1986-2005 and exploits a cutoff in local population. Event study estimates suggest that parliament adoption increases total spending by about 6 percent and that this increase is driven mostly by general administration and education spending. In contrast, regression discontinuity estimates are too noisy to be informative. To understand the mechanism at play, we run a survey among assembly participants and document a sizeable under-representation of 20- to 40-year-olds as well as of women in assemblies compared to both the electorate and to voters. Switching from assembly democracy to parliament in our setting therefore seems to increase the representation of two demographics that are known for their relatively strong preferences for education spending.