著者

MUNRO Alistair

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16-16, 2016-09

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When the set of possible messages depends on the actual state of the world, optimal incentive schemes to control environmental problems may not always satisfy the revelation principle. As a result, in equilibrium some agents may send false messages, particularly when the information rents in the truth- telling scheme are high. I characterise optimal pollution regulation schemes and produce some numerical examples to show mechanisms which allow some dishonesty in equilibrium may frequently outperform truth-telling schemes.

著者

LOPEZ Maria Claudia MUNRO Alistair TARAZONA-GOMEZ Marcela

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15-10, 2015-07

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A recurring and puzzling pattern with experiments on intra-household behaviour is the common failure of couples to attain the cooperative solution. Using married couples from a low income area of Bogota, Colombia we conduct an experiment that raises the salience of the family vis-à-vis outsiders. In this experiment husbands and wives play a repeated voluntary contribution game. At the same time each participant plays an identical game with one stranger in the same session. When investments to the common pools are made from separate and non-fungible budgets, most subjects contribute more to the household pool than the stranger pool, but rarely contribute everything to the household even after repetition and opportunities for learning. Efficiency is not obtained. However, when subjects make contributions to the two games from a single budget many individuals converge rapidly on a strategy of investing everything in the household pool and contributing little to the pool with a stranger. Overall the amount invested in some pool rises. Our results are in line with games played with individuals in which in-group cooperation is higher when membership of the group is more salient. They suggest that strengthening family identity may raise intrahousehold cooperation, but at the expense of cooperation of interhousehold cooperation.

著者

MUNRO Alistair

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19-30, 2020-01

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While the use of surveys to understand perception of climate change and adaptation is common in research on agriculture, the reliability of aspects of the methodology is still largely untested. In particular there is limited evidence on (i) the degree to which measures of perception are sensitive to questionnaire design (ii) the accuracy of recall methods for climate change and (iii) the degree to which measures of adaptation based on recall from one-time surveys match the historical record. Using an established panel of farmers from across Kenya and a split sample method, I test both the sensitivity of stated perceptions of climate change to question format and the accuracy of recalled adaptations. In one treatment farmers face open-ended questions about temperature and rainfall changes while in the other treatment farmers are offered closed-end questions. Both approaches are common in the voluminous literature on climate change adaptation. Responses are highly sensitive to question format, both in the degree of perceived change and in the types of changes. Stated adaptations are not so sensitive to question format, but still diverge. Stated adaptations do not correspond well to the historical record of farming practices over the 15 years of the panel. Overall, the evidence suggests that researchers and policy-makers should be highly cautious in their use of subjective perceptions of climate change and the use of adaptation measures based on recall data.

著者

VERSCHOOR Arjan KEBEDE Bereket MUNRO Alistair TARAZONA Marcela

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16-31, 2017-03

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We examine whether the nature of gender relations matters for the effects on household efficiency of exogenous variation in spousal control over the intra-household allocation of resources. Experiments testing for efficiency were conducted among married couples in eight sites representing a range of conjugal cultures: from an extreme form of separate spheres in northern Nigeria to (male) centralised control in North India, along with a variety of intermediate cases. Inefficiency is widespread, varies greatly and tends to be lower when wives control the allocation. The exception is a site in northern Nigeria where female control over resources is well established.

著者

MUNRO Alistair D’EXELLE Ben VERSCHOOR Arjan

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19-11, 2019-07

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In the context of investment decisions, "contingency" refers to the influence agents may exert over the probability distribution of returns on investment. Often, contingency is difficult to detect and investment decisions are influenced by recent experience of (non-)contingency. To investigate the behavioural influence of prior (non-)contingency on investment decisions, we conduct an economic experiment in rural Uganda. Subjects are asked to invest any amount they wish of their endowment, with success dependent on whether they are correct in detecting the heavier of two objects. In one task, there is contingency: trying hard to detect the weight difference should influence the success probability. In another version, there is non-contingency: the weight difference is below the differential that humans are able to perceive. To investigate the effect of prior experience of (non-)contingency we experimentally vary the priming of (non-)contingency with a guessing game organised before the investment tasks. Our main finding is that priming contingency raises investment in the contingency condition. We find in addition that stated perceptions of confidence are also affected by priming contingency. In both cases, the effect is mediated by individuals' risk aversion. Individuals who are less risk averse respond more positively to priming contingency. We conclude that alertness to contingency matters for investment decisions, the more so the less risk averse people are.

著者

MASEKESA Faith MUNRO Alistair

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18-18, 2018-11

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This paper investigates experimentally how changes in wage rates and entitlements affect individual productivity in lab-in-the-field experiments run with married couples from rural regions in Uganda. We design a game in which the production task itself is straightforward, but where the rules governing payment vary across subjects and between rounds. In some cases, all the value of output goes to the husband; in other cases all goes to the wife; in other cases the value of output is shared equally and finally in some cases each spouse receives income according to only their own output. To consider the effects of wage inequality we vary the price paid for each completed item so that the ratio of male to female wages varies from 0.5 to 2. All this is done transparently so that both partners know the rules of the game. The results generally indicate that a rise in relative wages lowers relative effort, a result that is contrary to the most straightforward interpretation of standard models of the household, but compatible with some models of fairness. Men do not generally respond strongly to treatment. In contrast, women’s labour supply is strongly backward bending when all income goes to the husband, but effort rises with wages when each spouse gets to keep their own earnings. The results therefore suggest that the effects of reforming or removing one inequality may depend critically on the existence of other inequalities.

著者

BOOYSEN Frederik MOLOI Tshepo MUNRO Alistair GUVURIRO Sevias CAMPHER Celeste

出版者

GRIPS Policy Research Center

雑誌

GRIPS Discussion Papers

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16-29, 2017-01

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Altruism is one of the single most important social preferences driving human behaviour. In Psychology experiments, the Social Discounting Task is employed as a measure of altruism. A conventional laboratory experiment was conducted with 117 undergraduate students, with students randomly assigned to complete an incentivized and un-incentivized Social Discounting Task. In accordance with the 1/d law of giving, the results exhibit the expected inverse relationship between social distance and altruism. There is weak evidence that incentivizing the Social Discounting Task impacts the measurement of altruism in a student population. More specifically, subjects are more altruistic when incentivized, possibly due to enforced reciprocity. At the same time, making payments real influence the identity of the target recipients: paying makes subjects more likely to choose people who are physically and psychologically close at high ranks, and more likely to report greater physical and psychological distance to subjects at lower ranks. Further research is required to verify the robustness of this result. The study also shows that among students family members are more altruistic toward each other as are those exhibiting greater intergenerational solidarity. Preferences for altruism in this student population is no different from WEIRD subject populations.