著者

木島 泰三

出版者

法政大学文学部

雑誌

法政大学文学部紀要 = Bulletin of Faculty of Letters, Hosei University (ISSN:04412486)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.31-48, 2012-10

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In another article, I proposed an interpretation of Spinoza’s view on causality, according to which Spinoza conceived every kind of causation as a peculiar type of agent causation, namely, deterministic agent causation. And in this paper, I will apply this reading to Spinoza’s theory of complex bodies and reconsider its conceptual structure from the point of my Spinoza-as-agent-causalist interpretation. Agent causation is a kind of causation in which an agent is the cause and its action is the effect. In Spinoza, the substance or God is the agent-cause and the "modes" are its effects, and again, the modes - which are the "affections" of God and amount to particular individuals such as human bodies or other bodies - are the agent-causes and (at least some of)their affections are their effects. Namely, both of God and his modes are the causes of their affections. In Spinoza’s terminology, such kind of cause is called "immanent cause". In the case of modes, they are also "transient causes" that have their effects outside them. And in causation between modes, both of immanent cause and transient cause have their own causal contribution in the effect. We saw this model of causation has at least three levels of causal terms: substance, modes and affections of modes. Now one can ask whether there are more levels, for example, affections of affections of modes. I reply to this question affirmatively. Indeed, these levels are so many as the number of the levels of complex bodies. Above structure of causation must be preserved in the production of complex bodies, e.g. human bodies, by other individuals. In the case of a human body, the transient causes of it are the external bodies which are necessary for production and preservation of the body. And its immanent causes are its composing bodies collectively determined to compose the body. Therefore, a human body is causally dependent on its components wholly, just as the modes on God or the bodily affections on its body. Again, these composing bodies are caused immanently by bodies composing these composing bodies, and so forth until most basic particulars or the "simplest bodies". So, the simplest bodies are the first order modes, and every other (complex) body is caused immanently and determined by the simplest bodies. This conclusion we got may sound very similar to the reductionist view of human body (or human mind). But it also has similarity to the emergentist view as well. For, it acknowledges distinct reality of human bodies or composed individuals generally, because they have immanent causal powers.