著者

久米 暁

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.14-28, 2006

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In response to Mr. Watanabe’s review of my Hume’s Scepticism, this paper elucidates Hume’s “sceptical solution” of his own “total scepticism”. Sceptical solution in general intends to solve scepticism or sceptical doubt by showing that the logical step from sceptical argument to scepticism makes use of some assumption external to our ordinary beliefs or common assertions. However, Hume’s Scepticism characterizes Hume’s “total scepticism” as an internal one, which is deduced only from some assumptions internal to our common sense. Instead of pointing out some external assumption, Hume’s “sceptical solution” of internal “total scepticism” states that it is proper we should indulge our emotive inclination to judge and believe, notwithstanding our rational scepticism.