著者

柳町 功

出版者

日本経営学会

雑誌

日本経営学会誌

巻号頁・発行日

no.5, pp.77-89, 2000-05-30

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It is the aim of this paper to review the backgrounds and features of corporate restructuring that has been undertaken in Korean big business groups, or chaebol, in 1990's. We can explain the traditional structure of Korean chaebol from two features such as absolutely closed ownership by founder on his family, and highly diversified business structure. Through recent corporate restructuring we can confirm that traditional features in Korean chaebol has been changing. Corporate restructuring can be explained from two aspects such as "inside" factors and "outside" factors. As inside factors, for example, we can point out two major changes, such as the wealth inheritance and distribution among the chaebol families, and aggressive restructuring drive aimed for the world best company. And as outside factors we can consider stepped up the Kim Dae-jung administration's policy for chaebol reform. In the last two years after the onset of Korea's IMF crisis, many chaebols have successfully overcome the worst recession through painful reforms. But among the largest five chaebols, the Daewoo group, which was famous for its "globalization strategy" and "emperor-management style" by chairman Kim Woo-choong, collapsed in the summer 1999. In the top-four chaebol, the Samsung group is undisputedly the best "role model" in Korea's corporate restructuring drive. Samsung's corporate restructuring can be explained from the two aspects above mentioned. Other groups, Hyundai, LG, and SK are also highly estimated in their successful restructuring efforts by President Kim Dae-jung and the government. In early January 1998, President-elect Kim Dae-jung and five tycoons of Korean largest chaebols agreed to drastically reform their business practices. The five-point accord, which became the main targets of President Kim's chaebol-policy, was as follows: to hold chaebol leaders more accountable for their managerial performances, to boost managerial transparency, to improve their financial health, to focus on core businesses and to eliminate loan guarantees among affiliates. And at the end of August 1999, President Kim has started new three reform programs. These new measures are aimed at restricting the chaebol's control of the non-banking financial sector, barring them from circular cross-unit equity investment and inside trading and checking illegal inheritances and the transfer of wealth among chaebol family members. As a whole, these government-pressured policies are very severe. But the most important point is not the government policy but the chaebol's understanding of crisis and their positive attitude for reforming themselves in order to survive intensifying global competition.