著者

犬童 健良

出版者

関東学園大学

雑誌

関東学園大学経済学紀要 (ISSN:13451588)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.25-103, 2015-03-31

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This study proposes a risky decision model, which models a single decision maker as a collection of microlevel agents. In this model, each agent focuses on gambles comprising two branches on their basic aspects, i.e., possible monetary outcomes and probabilities. In addition, it considers each agent as a simple condition of difference at a branch pair of the two gambles in comparison for each basic aspect, and a tuple of such conditions for both gambles forms a coalition of agents that may be effective (promotional) or preventive (inhibitive) to choose. This model is a special case of noncompensatory multiattribute decision making and is described through voting functions, which was first introduced by K. Jacobs in Socio-Combinatorics (in O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, eds., Game Theory and Related Topics, 1979, 309–335). We reanalyze the experimental data in the literature, especially that in E. A. Mellers et al. (Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1990, 52, 331–369) to reconstitute the aspects and voting function of real people. This analysis revealed three main facts: First, a merit in probability is effective in changing a choice, but it makes the reasons for the choice unreliable. Second, a nonlinearity occurs if the voting functions for gain and loss are merged. Third, the priority heuristics proposed by E. Brandsttäter et al. (Psychological Review, 2006, 113, 409–432) can be considered as a search procedure for an effective aspect in agreement with the voting function. The appendices present the Prolog programs of voting functions and computational experiments.