著者

シュラトフ ヤロスラブ

出版者

北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.59-81, 2020-07-16

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Sakhalin occupies a special place in the history of relations between Russia and Japan. Depending on the times, the island has been a battlefield or a place for cooperation; the rivalry over Sakhalin was often an agenda-setting factor for bilateral relations. The island could be set as a sort of “crossroad,” where Russia and Japan interacted variously; a “mirror,” reflecting the condition of Russo-Japanese contact. The situation over Sakhalin was particularly dynamic in the first half of the twentieth century. The island became the last battlefield in the Russo-Japanese War, and then the final crucial problem at the peace conference. According to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Sakhalin was divided between the two empires, which created a precedent of revising the Russo-Japanese borderline with military force?since 1905, it has been changed only by wars. Still, the demarcation of a new border took place in a peaceful atmosphere, symbolizing the cooperative trend in the bilateral relations after the war. The situation seemed to have been resolved. Yet the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 rendered Sakhalin the subject of Russo-Japanese bargaining again. Then, with the outbreak of civil war in Russia, Japan took an active part in intervention, deploying the largest contingent of troops to Siberia and the Far East. The center of Sakhalin Oblast, Nikolaevsk, was occupied by Japanese troops in 1918. After the clashes with partisans and annihilation of the Japanese garrison and its inhabitants in 1920 (the “Nikolaevsk Incident”), Japan occupied Northern Sakhalin, making it the hostage of settlement with Russia. After the USSR was established and Soviet-Japanese negotiations launched officially, Sakhalin became the key problem, particularly at the final stage. After reaching a compromise on this issue, the Peking Convention was signed in 1925. A new “Soviet” Russia repossessed Northern Sakhalin, and the USSR was officially acknowledged by Japan, which carved out concession rights for Sakhalin oil and coal, effective until 1944. These events became the subject of attention by many prominent scholars, including John Stephan, Teruyuki Hara, Takashi Murakami, Naoki Amano, etc. However, mostly due to lack of archival sources, the period of 1917-1922 remains insufficiently researched, particularly from the viewpoint of diplomatic history. What place did Sakhalin occupy in the negotiations between Japan and its Russian counter-partners, especially given the enormous dynamics of changes and diversity of political actors involved? This article analyzes the role and evolution of the Sakhalin issue in Russo-Japanese relations after the collapse of the Russian Empire in February 1917 to the establishing of the USSR in late 1922. The author conducts multi-archival research and examines the position of the provisional government, the Kolchak administration, Russian military circles, and local authorities, as well as the Bolsheviks and Soviet officials in Moscow and the Far East, providing analysis of the complicated “mosaic” over Sakhalin in Russo/Soviet relations during the abovementioned period. The article uses various declassified files mostly from Russian archives (AVP RI, AFP RF, RGIA, and RGASPI), as well as materials of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Gaimush? Gaik? Shiry?kan) and published documental collections. The issue of Sakhalin appeared on the table of negotiations with Japan soon after the February Revolution. Japan worried about the US involvement in developing the island’s resources, and encouraged the provisional government to exclude American capital and provide the Japanese with prerogatives, but Petrograd was reluctant to do so. The Russian military also took a cautious stance towards Japan, suspecting it of using Russia’s weakening position and expanding its influence over her eastern territories including Sakhalin. After the Bolsheviks took power in November 1917, the situation became more complicated. Amid the collapse of governance and the state system in Russia, Japan actively engaged in the intervention and intensified her attempts to participate in mining at Sakhalin. Yet Kolchak and his administration, which subsequently took control of most of Siberia and the Far East, generally inherited a guarded attitude toward Japan, suspecting her of using Russia’s weakness and seizing key positions in the economy of its eastern territories, including purchase of Northern Sakhalin and obtainment of wide concessional rights. Despite the Japanese bids, the Omsk government eventually decided to employ the “free hands” principal in Sakhalin, denying exclusive rights to the Japanese. Tokyo’s hopes of gaining the privileges in fact turned out to be a false dawn. Ironically, except for Japanese-backed G. Semyonov, it was the Bolshevik government that constantly claimed to acknowledge prerogatives for the Japanese in East Russia. The Soviet officials made the first attempts to reach an agreement with Japan as early as in December 1917, offering privileges in a vast territory including Northern Sakhalin. From the very beginning, the Soviets regarded the island as one of the important tools for negotiations with the Japanese. But Japan did not take it seriously and refused to keep contact with the Soviet government. Being fully occupied with the Civil War, Moscow was unable to deal with Japan, but the situation changed after the fall of Kolchak. While organizing the Far Eastern Republic (DVR) as a buffer state in order to avoid the risk of war with Japan, Chicherin and other Soviet officials claimed sovereignty over Siberia and the Far East and appealed to Tokyo, promising various economic benefits in the region. Moscow’s conciliatory attitude was criticized by the local Bolsheviks who stood for immediate Sovietization and a hard line against Japan, assuming this tactic most effective. One of the examples likely to be successful were the actions of Ya. Tryapitsyn and his group, who could reach agreement with the Japanese troops and gain control over Nikolaevsk, the center of Sakhalin Oblast. Yet, after the Nikolaevsk Incident, which caused the occupation of Northern Sakhalin and rebooting of interventionist actions by Japan, as well as after Merkulov’s coup d’etat, the local Bolsheviks and DVR leaders assumed a much more circumspect position and attempted to provide cessions. On the other hand, Moscow reinforced its influence, gradually pushing away the DVR actors and striving for direct negotiations with Japan. Thinking that time was on her side and implementing a “carrot and stick” attitude, the Soviet government used the so-called American factor or “international pressure,” while continuing to offer to grant concessions, the area of which shrank from the whole of East Siberia to Northern Sakhalin.

著者

シュラトフ ヤロスラブ

出版者

北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 = Slavic studies (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.67, pp.59-81, 2020

著者

シュラトフ ヤロスラブ

出版者

ロシア史研究会

雑誌

ロシア史研究 (ISSN:03869229)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.86, pp.48-66, 2010

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Период 1905-1916 гг. является действительно уникальным в истории российско-японских отношений. Как известно, за этот короткий срок Россия и Япония смогли пройти долгий путь от вооружённого противостояния до союзнических отношений, оформленых в 1916 г. Динамичный характер двусторонних взаимоотношений в указанных временных рамках привлекал внимание множества исследователей из разных стран. Вместе с тем, ряд существенных аспектов российско-японского диалога 1905-1916 гг., в частности, вопросы военно-стратегического характера, долгое время оставались недостаточно раскрытыми. Кроме того, до сих пор пока не было попыток составить структурную картину восприятия Японии ключевыми политическими игроками, ответственными за принятие решений в японской политике Петербурга. В данной работе представлен сравнительный анализ позиций дипломатов, военных, центрального правительства, местных элит и других политических акторов Российской империи по вопросу построения отношений с Японией. На основе многочисленных первоисточников показана целостная картина восприятия японской угрозы представителями военного и морского министерств, Приамурского генерал-губернаторства, дана характеристика курсу российского МИДа, направленного на развитие и укрепление партнёрства с Токио. Фактически, в указанный период российско-японские отношения носили чрезвычайно сложный характер, и обе страны одновременно рассматривали друг друга как в качестве союзника, так и потенциального противника. Данное противоречие оказало значительное влияние на дальнейшие взаимоотношения двух государств.

著者

シュラトフ ヤロスラブ

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, pp.183-205, 2007