文献一覧: 北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター (出版者)

2 0 0 0 OA シリア戦争とロシアの世界政策

著者: 松里公孝
出版者: 北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター
雑誌: スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.68, pp.71-105, 2021-09-08

The military interventions led by the United States and its allies in Iraq (2008), Libya (2011), and Syria (indirectly since 2011), despite their promised purposes, produced failed states and nurseries of jihadism. This dismantled the moral legitimacy of the unipolar world. Bitter lessons procured from the Libyan crisis made Russia and China veto any resolution authorizing the West’s and Gulf States’ possible military intervention in Syria at the UN Security Council. In 2012-2014, Russia’s police and security organs intentionally allowed domestic Islamists to emigrate to Syria to become jihadist fighters for the sake of domestic security on the eve of the Sochi Olympic Games. Fearing their return to Russia and the former Soviet territories after the expected seizure of Damascus by the radical Islamists, President Vladimir Putin decided (perhaps in early August 2015) to conduct air strikes on their military facilities in Syria. The essay critically examines widespread interpretations attributing Russia’s participation in the Syrian War to Putin’s domestic populism, Russian leaders’ desire to protect the Bashar Assad regime, and their attempts to overcome Russia’s diplomatic isolation after its annexation of Crimea. The main purpose of Russia’s military intervention was to change the decision making procedure of the unipolar world. Russia’s Middle East policy was benefited from its developed Middle Eastern studies inherited from the Soviet Union, whereas in the United States “Arabists” have traditionally been alienated from policy-making vis-à-vis the Near East and North Africa. Based on area specialists’ expertise, Russian policy-makers do not primordialize confessional confrontations in the Middle East, which facilitated Russia’s brokering roles between conflicting local parties. Michael Kofman calls Russia’s decision-makings on the Syrian and Middle Eastern problems a lean strategy, which, in my view, well echoed the “hedging diplomacy” pursued by Middle Eastern countries. The collaboration between Russia and the US since the beginning of Russia’s military intervention in Syria in September 2015 could not continue due to US domestic politics in 2016. Instead, the radical Islamists’ evacuation from Aleppo to Idlib was implemented by the collaboration of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In 2017, this tri-polar collaboration developed into the Astana Process managing de-escalation zones in Idlib, East Ghouta, and North Homs, while the collaboration of the US, Russia, and Jordan in Southern Syria generated the Amman Process to control the South de-escalation zone. In 2018, three de-escalation zones, except for that of Idlib, practically functioned as mechanisms to allow radical Islamists to evacuate from there to Idlib, as a result of which these territories returned to government control. The Russian MFA is skeptical of the Astana Process and is concerned about the practical shelving of Syria’s political transition, determined by the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254 (December 2015). For the MFA, a “multi-central dualism” privileging the participants in the Yalta-Potsdam Declarations, not just a multipolar world, should follow the declining unipolar world. Thus, dual diplomacies between the Russian MFA and military emerged, which has barely been coordinated by the hyper centralizing presidential authorities.

2023-03-24 15:49:47
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http://hdl.handle.net/2115/84291

2 0 0 0 OA ロシア革命とサハリン : 日露関係から日ソ関係へ(1917-1922年)

著者: シュラトフヤロスラブ
出版者: 北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター
雑誌: スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.67, pp.59-81, 2020-07-16

Sakhalin occupies a special place in the history of relations between Russia and Japan. Depending on the times, the island has been a battlefield or a place for cooperation; the rivalry over Sakhalin was often an agenda-setting factor for bilateral relations. The island could be set as a sort of “crossroad,” where Russia and Japan interacted variously; a “mirror,” reflecting the condition of Russo-Japanese contact. The situation over Sakhalin was particularly dynamic in the first half of the twentieth century. The island became the last battlefield in the Russo-Japanese War, and then the final crucial problem at the peace conference. According to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Sakhalin was divided between the two empires, which created a precedent of revising the Russo-Japanese borderline with military force?since 1905, it has been changed only by wars. Still, the demarcation of a new border took place in a peaceful atmosphere, symbolizing the cooperative trend in the bilateral relations after the war. The situation seemed to have been resolved. Yet the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 rendered Sakhalin the subject of Russo-Japanese bargaining again. Then, with the outbreak of civil war in Russia, Japan took an active part in intervention, deploying the largest contingent of troops to Siberia and the Far East. The center of Sakhalin Oblast, Nikolaevsk, was occupied by Japanese troops in 1918. After the clashes with partisans and annihilation of the Japanese garrison and its inhabitants in 1920 (the “Nikolaevsk Incident”), Japan occupied Northern Sakhalin, making it the hostage of settlement with Russia. After the USSR was established and Soviet-Japanese negotiations launched officially, Sakhalin became the key problem, particularly at the final stage. After reaching a compromise on this issue, the Peking Convention was signed in 1925. A new “Soviet” Russia repossessed Northern Sakhalin, and the USSR was officially acknowledged by Japan, which carved out concession rights for Sakhalin oil and coal, effective until 1944. These events became the subject of attention by many prominent scholars, including John Stephan, Teruyuki Hara, Takashi Murakami, Naoki Amano, etc. However, mostly due to lack of archival sources, the period of 1917-1922 remains insufficiently researched, particularly from the viewpoint of diplomatic history. What place did Sakhalin occupy in the negotiations between Japan and its Russian counter-partners, especially given the enormous dynamics of changes and diversity of political actors involved? This article analyzes the role and evolution of the Sakhalin issue in Russo-Japanese relations after the collapse of the Russian Empire in February 1917 to the establishing of the USSR in late 1922. The author conducts multi-archival research and examines the position of the provisional government, the Kolchak administration, Russian military circles, and local authorities, as well as the Bolsheviks and Soviet officials in Moscow and the Far East, providing analysis of the complicated “mosaic” over Sakhalin in Russo/Soviet relations during the abovementioned period. The article uses various declassified files mostly from Russian archives (AVP RI, AFP RF, RGIA, and RGASPI), as well as materials of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Gaimush? Gaik? Shiry?kan) and published documental collections. The issue of Sakhalin appeared on the table of negotiations with Japan soon after the February Revolution. Japan worried about the US involvement in developing the island’s resources, and encouraged the provisional government to exclude American capital and provide the Japanese with prerogatives, but Petrograd was reluctant to do so. The Russian military also took a cautious stance towards Japan, suspecting it of using Russia’s weakening position and expanding its influence over her eastern territories including Sakhalin. After the Bolsheviks took power in November 1917, the situation became more complicated. Amid the collapse of governance and the state system in Russia, Japan actively engaged in the intervention and intensified her attempts to participate in mining at Sakhalin. Yet Kolchak and his administration, which subsequently took control of most of Siberia and the Far East, generally inherited a guarded attitude toward Japan, suspecting her of using Russia’s weakness and seizing key positions in the economy of its eastern territories, including purchase of Northern Sakhalin and obtainment of wide concessional rights. Despite the Japanese bids, the Omsk government eventually decided to employ the “free hands” principal in Sakhalin, denying exclusive rights to the Japanese. Tokyo’s hopes of gaining the privileges in fact turned out to be a false dawn. Ironically, except for Japanese-backed G. Semyonov, it was the Bolshevik government that constantly claimed to acknowledge prerogatives for the Japanese in East Russia. The Soviet officials made the first attempts to reach an agreement with Japan as early as in December 1917, offering privileges in a vast territory including Northern Sakhalin. From the very beginning, the Soviets regarded the island as one of the important tools for negotiations with the Japanese. But Japan did not take it seriously and refused to keep contact with the Soviet government. Being fully occupied with the Civil War, Moscow was unable to deal with Japan, but the situation changed after the fall of Kolchak. While organizing the Far Eastern Republic (DVR) as a buffer state in order to avoid the risk of war with Japan, Chicherin and other Soviet officials claimed sovereignty over Siberia and the Far East and appealed to Tokyo, promising various economic benefits in the region. Moscow’s conciliatory attitude was criticized by the local Bolsheviks who stood for immediate Sovietization and a hard line against Japan, assuming this tactic most effective. One of the examples likely to be successful were the actions of Ya. Tryapitsyn and his group, who could reach agreement with the Japanese troops and gain control over Nikolaevsk, the center of Sakhalin Oblast. Yet, after the Nikolaevsk Incident, which caused the occupation of Northern Sakhalin and rebooting of interventionist actions by Japan, as well as after Merkulov’s coup d’etat, the local Bolsheviks and DVR leaders assumed a much more circumspect position and attempted to provide cessions. On the other hand, Moscow reinforced its influence, gradually pushing away the DVR actors and striving for direct negotiations with Japan. Thinking that time was on her side and implementing a “carrot and stick” attitude, the Soviet government used the so-called American factor or “international pressure,” while continuing to offer to grant concessions, the area of which shrank from the whole of East Siberia to Northern Sakhalin.

2023-03-05 22:25:31
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http://hdl.handle.net/2115/84283

2 0 0 0 OA 長崎稲佐ロシア海軍基地をめぐる明治初期日露関係 : 借地交渉とその意義

著者: 醍醐龍馬
出版者: 北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター
雑誌: スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.68, pp.45-70, 2021-09-08

In 1875, soon after the sealing of the St. Petersburg Treaty stipulating the exchange of Sakhalin and the Kurill Islands, Japan and Russia agreed on a land lease of Inasa Village in Nagasaki to the Russian navy. This was a juridical confirmation of the Russian Squadron’s long-standing practice of using this locality as its winter base, which would remain intact until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. In fact, this agreement brought about stability of the bilateral relationship, serving as a prerequisite for Japan to embark on its subsequent Korean policy. This article attempts to contextualize this particular land lease in the increasingly entangled relationship between Japan and Russia. Nagasaki’s importance as a resort for the Russian navy increased, with its failure to obtain Tsushima as a strategic base under pressure from the British in 1861 and with its pivotal port moving from Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to Vladivostok in 1871. Against this backdrop in 1870 the Russians succeeded in renting a piece of land Hiradogoya for ten years by directly negotiating with the landowners and the Nagasaki administration. Two years later, when Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich visited Japan, he found it inconvenient to maintain a naval hospital and dock in Hiradogoya. This led one of his attendants, vice admiral of the navy Constantin Possiet, to propose to the Japanese government the Maruoyama foothills as an alternative for the Russian navy base. The Japanese government in turn rejected this proposal for two reasons. First, the Japanese navy was afraid that the occupation of this strategically important location by the Russian navy would raise security concerns. Second, the increase of places of mixed residence outside the fixed enclaves could threaten Japanese sovereignty. Undaunted, K. V. Struve, the Russian minister in Japan, tried to renegotiate in 1874, arguing that the lease of Maruoyama would have a positive effect on Russo-Japanese relations. However, the Japanese navy was a staunch opponent to this deal; it even purchased the disputed land for an admiralty house in haste so as to forge a fait accompli. Ultimately, the Japanese government was forced to propose an alternative land lease in Inasa in exchange for the old one in the same locality. In 1875, after Struve’s on-the-spot inspection of the proposed site along the coast of Nagasaki Bay, the Russian navy and a local landowner Shiga reached an agreement. The timing was crucial: this was right after the sealing of the St. Petersburg Treaty. While the establishment of a navy base in Inasa in the following year caused anxiety among the Japanese and the British, the Russians began to make efforts to maintain their friendship with Japan in order to keep this base. Together with the Maria Luz case in 1875, where the tsar worked as an arbitrator of the dispute between Japan and Peru, this Inasa controversy was a significant opportunity buttressing an improving bilateral relationship under the St. Petersburg Treaty. While the Russian Squadron’s utilization of Nagasaki as its winter base since the end of the Edo era had been possible thanks to the relatively good relationship between the two countries, the foundation of the Russian squadron’s berth in Inasa immediately following the St. Petersburg Treaty only reinforced the cemented friendship. Renewed in 1886, the land lease in Inasa continued to function until the Russo-Japanese War. Despite some negative reactions particularly from the British, the Meiji government’s recognition of the Russian navy base in Inasa alongside the St. Petersburg Treaty was an important factor in maintaining Russia as Japan’s ally and thereby allowing Japan’s strategic leeway in East Asia.

2022-04-19 01:03:15
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http://hdl.handle.net/2115/84290

1 0 0 0 OA 生成する世界とメシア的な主体 : ベルジャーエフの世界戦争論をめぐって

著者: 北見諭
出版者: 北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター
雑誌: スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.66, pp.55-90, 2019-09-10

Настоящая статья посвящена осмыслению философских воззрений Н. А. Бердяева на войну и нацию в период Первой мировой войны. Прежде всего, мы рассматриваем этот вопрос в контексте онтологии Бердяева, т. е. его теории о творчестве, которая выступает философским фоном его идей о войне и нации; и, вовторых, ? в контексте других философских концепций, существовавших в период так называемого русского религиозно-философского ренессанса. Исследуя философскую мысль выдающихся религиозных мыслителей вышеупомянутого периода, таких как Н. А. Бердяев, С. Н. Булгаков, С. Л. Франк, Н. О. Лосский, Вяч. Иванов, можно обнаружить, что их философские идеи имеют немало общего, при том что концепции значительно различаются или даже противоречат одна другой. Общим для русских религиозных философов того периода является стремление непосредственно постигать ≪вещь в себе≫, или ноуменальный мир, лежащий за пределами феноменального мира. Более того, их представления о ноуменальном мире формируются под влиянием так называемой философии жизни (например, Ницше, Бергсона, приверженцев прагматизма) ? другими словами, этот мир видится им как нечто жизненное, находящееся в непрестанном процессе становления, творчески преобразующее себя самое. Однако в то же время в русских философских концепциях философия жизни критикуется за то, что философы этого течения представляют ноуменальный мир как хаотический, преобразующийся бесцельно и бесконечно. Через эту критику предпринимается попытка придать собственной онтологии, формировавшейся под влиянием философии жизни, элементы платонизма, находящегося в противоречии с философией жизни в том, что касается позиционирования ноуменального мира. В этом смысле в русской религиозной философии этого периода можно наблюдать определенную общность взглядов. Однако наблюдаются и различия: в то время как большинство русских философов отдают первенство платонизму и рассматривают ноуменальный мир как статический и гармонический, Бердяев, верно следуя духу философии жизни, считает вещь в себе динамической и хаотической. Можно сказать, что эти общность и различия выражаются и в их концепциях войны и нации, и возникают две тенденции: ≪мессианизм≫ и ≪миссионизм≫, говоря словами Н. Бердяева и Е. Трубецкого. Что касается сходства, то почти все религиозные философы, включая Бердяева, хотят, чтобы мировая война разрушила буржуазный мир, ? феноменальный мир, строившийся повсеместно в процессе империализма, ? и тем самым обнаружила скрытую под ним реальность, т. е. мир как ≪вещь в себе≫. В своих гносеологии и онтологии эти мыслители, отвергая такие философские тенденции XIX века, как позитивизм и материализм, поле зрения которых ограничивается феноменальным, стараются выявить метафизическую реальность. И они надеются, что мировая война сделает явной эту реальность, находящуюся за пределами феноменального мира. Отвергая славянофильство как разновидность историзма в духе XIX века, рассматривающего характер нации на уровне таких ее эмпирических особенностей, как история, традиционная культура, бытовые обычаи и т. д., эти философы формулируют собственную теорию нации в духе эссенциализма или мистицизма, осмысливая понятие нации на уровне ноуменального или метафизического. Они, следуя своей философии, понимают и войну, и нацию как нечто, имеющее связь не с феноменальным миром, а с вещью в себе. Но такое осмысление войны и нации, подобно гносеологии и онтологии, в дальнейшем разделяется на две концепции. Для обеих концепций характерно представление о том, что мировая война разрушит буржуазный мир и тем самым обнаружит ноуменальный мир, который выйдет из-под обломков искусственно созданного мира. Но в то время как большинство мыслителей представляет мир, который должен появиться из глубины как уже завершенный и гармонический, подобный миру идей платонизма, лишь Бердяев видит его хаотическим, пребывающим в аморфном и текучем состоянии и продолжающим непрерывно преобразовываться. Подобное различие во взглядах наблюдается и в отношении нации: в то время как большинство мыслителей под влиянием платонизма понимает нацию ? ≪вещь в себе≫ ? как платоническую идею, а отношения между нациями как завершенную всеединую систему, подобную миру идей, Бердяев понимает нацию как нечто жизненное, динамично и творчески преобразующее себя. Согласно логике каждой из концепций, приверженцы первой обвиняют империализм и мессианизм в кощунственном намерении искусственно изменить завершенный божественный порядок, замысел Творца. А последователи второй, в свою очередь, положительно относятся к империализму, в целом одобряя развитие и преобразование нации как жизненного существа и, наоборот, отрицательно относятся к антиимпериалистической философии или антивоенному движению толстовцев, так как и то и другое может препятствовать развитию нации. Таким образом, исходя из контекста онтологической философской мысли периода русского религиозно-философского ренессанса, мы попытались осмыслить концепции войны и нации, характерные для мыслителей того времени. Особый интерес, на наш взгляд, представляет мессианизм Бердяева, являющийся, с точки зрения многих исследователей, продолжением славянофильской теории нации. Так, например, современники философа критиковали его идеи заодно с мессианизмом славянофильства, видя в них языческий национализм, чуждый христианского универсализма. Но на самом деле Бердяев, как и многие другие русские мыслители, относится к теории нации славянофильства отрицательно, как к языческому национализму, и отстаивает свою идею мессианизма как христианского универсализма. Мессианизм Бердяева на первый взгляд кажется непоследовательным и непонятным, но, рассматривая его в контексте бердяевской онтологии, т. е. философии творчества в духе философии жизни, можно обнаружить последовательность этой концепции и, к тому же, выявить сходство и различия с идеями современных Бердяеву философов. Хотя здесь мы лишь кратко резюмируем основное содержание, в самой статье философское осмысление мессианизма Бердяева представлено более детально.