著者
田代 和也 タシロ カズヤ Tashiro Kazuya
出版者
大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科
雑誌
国際公共政策研究 (ISSN:13428101)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.18, no.2, pp.97-108, 2014-03

The purpose of this paper is to explain paradoxical outcomes of peace operations. Previous research has suggested that there is a possibility of the escalation of armed conflicts as a consequences of peace operations. Although Morgenthau had suggested that collective security carries this danger, it has been still a problem to make theoretical explanation of such a paradox. I would like to reinforce my argument by submitting a theoretical model to explain the paradox from a realist perspective. This study concludes that the real cause of the paradox is not collective security, but the collective buck-passing, which is an attempt to manipulate the balance of power.