著者

任 哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.1-18, 2009-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

51

被引用文献数

2

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Since 2002, the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has issued numerous policies to suppress the price of real estate across the country. These policies, however, have shown little effectiveness at the local level. Why did the central government fail to suppress these high prices in the real estate sector?Existing interpretations in the literature often put much emphasis on the responsibility of local governments for overheating in the real estate sector. Many studies point out that the financial dependence of local government on the real estate sector is the main reason. However, the conventional interpretations fail to clarify which level of local government should be responsible to the failure of policy implementation.This paper presents two arguments. First, I argue that the financial dependence of grassroots local government on the real estate sector is the major reason for the failure of policy implementation. By analyzing the fiscal revenues of central, local and grassroots government from 2000 to 2004, this paper finds that the proportions of revenue from the real estate sector in local government is higher than in the central government, but lower than in grassroots government. Most taxes from the real estate sector become fiscal revenue of government at the grassroots level but not at the local level. This paper also insists that grassroots level government has no incentive to progress policy, as their fiscal revenues rely more on tax and expenses from the real estate sector, rather than on local and central government.Second, I argue that state-owned companies are the major obstacle to the effectiveness of the policy and the existence of these companies undermines policy implementation initiated by the central government. The real estate companies are divided into three categories for analysis: central government-owned company, local government-owned company and private company. In this paper, I focus on three regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong) and analyze those companies which are ranked in “China’s Real Estate Top 10” project. I demonstrate that half of them are state-owned companies. In the case study of Shanghai, for instance, I find that local government-owned companies play a decisive role in softening the intensity of policy implementation.