著者
野口 和彦
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.4, pp.37-55, 2007-10-31 (Released:2014-09-30)
参考文献数
68

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.
著者
本名 純
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.4, pp.22-41, 2015-10-31 (Released:2015-11-10)
参考文献数
48

Indonesia’s post-Suharto governments have conducted democratic elections every five years since 1999 for both parliaments and presidency. The latest elections in 2014 showed a heated battle between two presidential contenders, namely Joko Widodo (popularly called Jokowi)—the Governor of Jakarta—and Prabowo Subianto who led his right-wing political party, Gerindra. The victory of Jokowi in the presidential election has widely been seen as a success story of ordinary man with no elite background to enjoy strong grass-roots support. Jokowi’s rise to Indonesia’s seventh president is therefore evaluated both domestically and internationally as a critical step towards the country’s democratic consolidation. However, the fact that Prabowo—who was Suharto’s son-in-law and a top army general during the authoritarian days—gained 47% of total votes and performed a close contest with Jokowi should not be ignored to understand the nature of electoral democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia. Why could Prabowo, a legacy of the authoritarian heyday, gain such a large number of votes and become a serious threat to Jokowi? It was antiforeign nationalism and Suharto-era romanticism that characterized Prabowo’s electoral appeal. On the one hand, he clamored for the return to good old days in facing today’s ‘excessive’ democracy heavily influenced by the West. On the other hand, he openly criticized that foreign companies operating in Indonesia are predators who exploit the country’s economic resources, insisting on the need for propelling protectionism in various sectors in the name of saving the country. If he were the winner of the 2014 presidential election, Indonesia’s democratic outlook would be very different. This article examines the dynamics of Prabowo’s electoral challenge and reveals socio-economic structures that contributed to his vote mobilization. I argue that Prabowo’s challenge has been discussed mostly in the context of his personal political ambition, but it actually goes beyond that and resonates with socio-economic cleavages that have been deepened under the previous government led by President Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Thus, the article concludes, it is possible that a similar challenge will recur even without Prabowo in the future, and, to understand such a threat to democratic consolidation, it is important for us to ‘de-personalize’ Prabowo’s challenge and examine the socio-economic vulnerability that creates wider political space for right-wing conservative elitism to maneuver in the age of globalization.
著者
宮城 佑輔
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.62, no.2, pp.18-36, 2016-04-30 (Released:2016-05-17)
参考文献数
28

During the 2000s, grass-root xenophobic movements have developed in East Asian countries. In Japan, many groups calling themselves “Conservatives In Action” and within them, the core group called “Zaitokukai” have been criticized by many people for their use of hate speech. Counter-protesters have fought them not only on the street but also on the internet.The radicalization of mass media discourse has been identified by critics. For example, “Book Lovers Against Racism” (BLAR) condemns publications containing xenophobic figures as “hate books.” Influenced by those books, Conservatives In Action and Zaitokukai have developed their own mass media organization and discourse.Although people criticize the current trend of books that contain bitter criticisms of China, South Korea, and North Korea as “hate books,” such labeling tends to obfuscate the differences between Old and New Conservative media. In fact, while New Conservative media uses hate speech as an “effective measure,” many Old Conservative media sources criticize the practice.This paper explores the magazine Japanism as an example of New Conservative media speech. Seirindo, the publisher of Japanism, has published books by former Zaitokukai leader Makoto Sakurai. His books were meant to encourage the Conservatives In Action and Zaitokukai.This paper also compares the perspectives of Old Conservative media, using the example of Seiron, with those of New Conservative media, using the example of Japanism, to explore the respective views of Old and New Conservative media on China, South Korea, and North Korea.Some critics believe views expressed by Old and New conservative media exist in different methodologies but are based on the same idea. This paper reveals that their differences exist not only in their methodologies but also in their ideas. Specifically, while their perspectives on China are similar, their perspectives on South Korea and North Korea are quite different. Before the main analysis, this paper follows the long-term change of the social movement led by Zaitokukai to focus on the initial split of the two conservative groups. After that, several specific differences between Old and New Conservative media are discussed.
著者
玉田 芳史
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.4, pp.42-60, 2015-10-31 (Released:2015-11-10)
参考文献数
37

Thai politics has become chaotic since 2006 due to democratization and the tenacious attempts to oppose it. Democratization advanced slowly from the 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s, partly because the military, politically influential for a long time since 1932, retreated from politics after 1992. It became possible for the people to choose the prime minister and the government through general elections. However, anti-democratic demonstrators who felt unhappy with democratization appeared in 2005. They paid little respect to elections results and, instead, asked the monarchy to dismiss the prime minister and appoint a new one. They formed the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in 2006. There have been three waves of de-democratization. Anti-democratic forces, spearheaded by PAD, included judicial institutions and the military as the main actors. They successfully toppled elected governments in 2006, 2008 and 2014. In 2013, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), led by several politicians of the opposition Democrat Party, assumed the role of commanding demonstrators in place of PAD. Court verdicts and military intervention have become more instrumental in the change of national leaders than national elections. This essay will analyze how the anti-democratic forces succeeded in negating election results and depriving the people of power. In their struggle against democratization, they have resorted to a kind of nationalism. The nationalism is neither ethnic nor exclusionist, partly since democratization in Thailand was not the product of external pressure. Rather it is nationalism opposed to democracy, or popular sovereignty. It gives the highest priority to the monarchy rather than the people. The Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul has called it “royal nationalism.” The Thai political regime officially stipulated in the constitutions since 1978 has been “a democratic regime with the monarch as the head of the state.” The bizarre feature of this regime is that the monarch and the people are co-owners of sovereign power. It is not a democratic regime based on the principle of popular sovereignty. The monarchy is not necessarily under the constitution. Respective percentage shares in sovereign power between the monarchy and the people have never been fixed. It is quite reasonable to allege that the monarchy holds the larger share in order to negate or dilute the democratic legitimacy of elected politicians. This is the reason why the anti-democratic forces, PAD/PDRC, the military and the judiciary have pledged their allegiance to the monarchy and have lavished the highest laudatory statements on the monarchy. Thus the undemocratic forces, unhappy with the advancement of electoral democracy undermining their conventional power and privileges (for example, the royalists hoping for an expanded role for the monarchy, and the urban middle-class feeling disadvantaged due to their numerical inferiority) have supported “royal nationalism.”
著者
伊藤 正子
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.63, no.3, pp.12-29, 2017-07-31 (Released:2017-09-05)
参考文献数
10

During the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973, more than 310,000 Korean soldiers were dispatched to Vietnam. The killings of many Vietnamese civilians that occurred during this period are often mentioned in the recent ‘anti-Korean sentiment’ boom in Japan. This article discusses narratives of the memory of killings in both Korea and Vietnam. At the end of the 20th century in South Korea, what was once a ‘bravery story’ that killed ‘Aka (Communist)’ began to be viewed as an event that ‘killed civilians’. This difficulty in facing the reality of the home country’s negative history resulted in divided public opinion. A Korean NGO, NAWAURI, has attempted to contribute to future peace by apologizing to the Vietnamese people, listening to the people who survived from the killings, and understanding victims’ feelings.
On the other hand, in Vietnam, based on the slogan ‘Close the past and head towards the future’, Vietnamese survivors can only mention the historical recognition of the war in a way that does not affect international relations. This slogan has not only been simply championed by the state but also become a national consciousness, so there is little movement to record war memories of the general people so as to convey them to posterity. The slogan suppresses the honest feelings of survivors of mass killings, who have been forced to live difficult lives.
The national history of the Vietnam War, therefore, is a story of the brilliant triumph of the North Vietnamese army, or the National Liberation Front, who fought risking their lives. As a result, memories of mass killings that are unrelated to the victory would inevitably be unrecognized in Vietnamese national history. This means that when the state regulates memories and constitutes it as ‘the history of so-and-so country’, only favourable events are recorded, and some memories that do not promote nationalism are truncated. Memories of mass killings by the Korean army usually disappear with the death of the survivors, but ironically, the activities of the Korean NGO, which is revealing war memories of survivors in an attempt to ensure future peace, are contributing to the healing of the survivors and also to maintaining diverse war memories that are not subsumed by the state.
著者
林 泉忠
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.63, no.1, pp.48-67, 2017-01-31 (Released:2017-03-24)
参考文献数
31

The aim of this paper is to raise a new concept; namely, the “China Rise Syndrome”, which is based on the concentric spreading characteristics for analyzing the phenomena of the conflicts in four different levels due to the rise of China. The paper emphasizes the steadfast rejection of democratization under the circumstances of rapid growth of power is the origin of the syndrome. Before the rise of China, the negative influence exercised by the authoritarian CCP was only limited in mainland China. However, it has been spreading quickly to other territories outside the country while corresponding with the growth of China’s power; firstly, Hong Kong; secondly, Taiwan; thirdly, the neighboring countries with which China has sovereignty disputes over the nearby islands, and lastly, the rest of the world. In this period, CCP‘s China backed by her exponential growth of political, economic and military power tends to press severely her ideology against the challenges from the outside world, thus inducing varied conflicts. There are three major findings in this paper: Firstly, Hong Kong and Taiwan, China’s “closest peripheries”, experience interferences and threats from China much more directly and fiercely than others, and on the other hand, were also driven to the most intense rebellions. Secondly, although China claims her territorial sovereignty on both Hong Kong and Taiwan simultaneously, the speed of Chinization in Hong Kong is faster than Taiwan which is still cherishing her independence from China. Thirdly, with the Chinization phenomena in Hong Kong and Taiwan and the anti-democracy virus of China Rise running alongside, the people’s local identity and the centrifugal force away from China in both societies have been staying at the strongest in history. This paper lays stress upon the phenomena of Chinization and the rebellions against China in both Hong Kong and Taiwan are the paramount observation points in understanding how the Chinese Value, the Chinese Model, and the Chinese System in the era of China Rise spread externally, and how do they induce misgivings, tension, threats, panic and collision with the outside world and how do they influence the world order.
著者
阿部 純一
出版者
Japan Association for Asian Studies
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.3, pp.4-24, 2007

Due to its adversarial relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union, China developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles during the 1960s and 1970s in order to have its own deterrent. By the beginning of the 1980s, China had completed a series of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, in particular the DF-5 ICBM, that covered all of the North American continent.Since then, China has begun to develop a second generation of ballistic missiles; these are powered by solid fuel and and can be moved by road, and so have enhanced responsiveness and survivability. By the end of 1980s, China had developed the JL-1 SLBM and its variant, the DF-21MRBM, although the Xia-class SSBN (Type 092), which was the platform of the JL-1, was unsuccessful and has never been a real strategic asset.<br>China is now attempting to develop the DF-31 ICBM and its variant, the JL-2 SLBM, which will be stable retaliatory forces. The Jin-class new generation SSBN (Type 094), which carries the JL-2, is also under development.<br>As a latecomer to the nuclear club, China resisted joining international non-proliferation regimes, especially the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which China accused the United States and the Soviet Union of being a" nuclear dictatorship." However, in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China joined the NPT and changed its position to support international non-proliferation.<br>In spite of its position, China has continuously exported nuclear technology and ballistic missiles and missile-related materials to Pakistan and other countries. This behavior of China has been regarded by the United States as causing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMDs).<br>Since late 1980s, the United States has organized a Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) with the G8 member countries and legislated domestic laws prohibiting proliferatiig behaviors by other countries. The United States has taken unilateral economic sanctions against countries violating US laws. And since 1991, China has been a main target of these US economic sanctions.<br>In the 1990s, China itself made efforts to legislate its domestic regulations controlling exports relating to WMDs, but since 2001, under the Bush administration, the United States has takensanctions against China as many as 19 times. Hence, it can be said that China's behavior in terms of nuclear proliferation has resulted in a bilateral dispute between the United States and China.
著者
堀本 武功
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.2, pp.36-47, 2006-04-30 (Released:2014-09-30)
参考文献数
36

Indian diplomacy since that country’s independence in 1947 can be broadly divided into three phases: (1) a policy of non-alignment (from 1947 until the end of the 1960s); (2) alignment with the Soviet Union (from the 1970s until the end of the Cold War); (3) the post-Cold War phase of participation in multilateralism and the forging of closer links with the United States.Although the Cold War environment had a considerable influence on India’s foreign policy, certain crucial factors, such as promotion of national interests and a constant desire to pursue an independent diplomacy, played a vital role in the evolution of that policy. The non-alignment policy was an upshot of that exercise, which India stuck to despite enormous external pressures.It essentially meant joining hands with those that shared this perception — this was the beginning of maintaining strategic partnerships — but India obviously looked at the Soviet Union more favorably than the United States. This in turn led Moscow to emerge as a strategic partner for New Delhi, which is the main characteristic of the second phase. It would be wrong to assume that India’s foreign policy was merely a dependent variable of the Cold War.In the more recent and current phase, while taking an active participation in regional multilateral mechanisms, India’s endeavor appears to be to incorporate the United States as a strategic partner. Aside from mutual economic gains, shared concerns and interests, the rise of China seems to be instrumental in shaping the evolving India–US relationship.In short, the Indian diplomacy can be characterized by the struggle to advance its national interests by balancing an independent foreign policy with the international politico-security environment. In this respect, India could be called the ‘France of Asia’. France shares certain values and interests with the United States but pursues its own autonomous policy. India looks like following this line until such time as it becomes a major power.
著者
樹中 毅
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.1, pp.1-17, 2005-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)
参考文献数
46

In the 1920s and the 1930s, Leninism and fascism were the two dictatorship models imitated by the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China. In this study, I would like to discuss the characteristics of Chiang’s dictatorship and the development of his ideology by focusing on how he brought Leninism into his policy and his transformation of Leninism into fascism.The legitimacy of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) party-state was based on the principle of party dictatorship. The KMT’s formal ideology lacked the ability to build a party-state system, and therefore Chiang Kai-shek had to use the prevailing models of dictatorship from Russia, Italy and Germany as his basis.Essentially, Chiang Kai-shek was an anti-communist. Notwithstanding the ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, Chiang combined democratic centralism and the Führerprinzip into a model of a party-state regime for the KMT. Although there was an ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, as far as proposing an elitist dictatorship, power centralization, rigid organization and the negation of human rights were concerned, the two ideologies were completely coherent.Chiang Kai-shek attempted to establish the party-state by building centralism and Führerprinzip into a formal system of ideology. Leninism and fascism were most influential under the KMT’s political regime, especially in the following three aspects: (i) the strategy of the National Movement; (ii) the establishment of the revolutionary dictatorship; and (iii) the principle of organization. Therefore, the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek can be seen as a mixture of Leninism and fascism.Nevertheless, Chiang did not accept Leninism and fascism unconditionally. Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, the National Revolution Movement launched by the KMT modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship.What Chiang seriously feared was the lack of the rigid party organization necessary to support the strong one-party politics essential to Leninism and fascism. In fact, because the KMT was organizationally weak, Chiang Kai-shek could not establish himself as a charismatic leadership in the mould of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini. Although Chiang’s dictatorial regime had the characteristics of the party-state and totalitarianism, its actual method of ruling was different from that of Leninism and fascism. The structure of the one-party dictatorship created by the KMT was an authoritarian regime based on military force.
著者
杉浦 康之
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.54, no.4, pp.70-86, 2008-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)
参考文献数
71

This study attempts to establish the limits of the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s perception of Japan based on negotiations over the Fourth Japan-China Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki national flag incident. It explains the underlying rationale for and reason why the Chinese decided to break off relations with Japan, what their perceptions of the situation were, and what they had failed to perceive. In addition, this study analyzes the interaction between Chinese intelligence acquisition, data analysis and the perception of Chinese policy-makers. When the trade negotiations began in Beijing in September 1957, China’s policy-makers, albeit wary of the Kishi cabinet’s attitude towards China, were optimistic about the prospects for Japanese domestic approval of Sino-Japanese trade; China’s negotiators were not ready to compromise. After the negotiations broke down, demand for trade with China grew strong in Japan and the Kishi cabinet actively worked towards concluding an agreement, whereby the Chinese leaders, although holding fast to certain principles, displayed a more flexible stance. Negotiations were reopened in February 1958, but there was no change in the ambivalent position of the Chinese policy-makers on Japan and their negotiator won some concessions from the Japanese side. During these negotiations, any arbitrary analysis of information obtained by China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies was checked and nothing suggested that the policy-makers entertained any noteworthy misunderstandings of Japan. China turned to stronger methods when Taiwan’s objection to the Fourth Japan-China Trade Agreement developed into a dispute between Japan and Taiwan. At the time of Japan’s general elections, Chinese policy-makers tried to encourage a more China-friendly public opinion by criticizing the policy towards China that the Kishi cabinet was practicing, thereby hoping to alter the Kishi government’s position on China. These moves were consistent with China’s existing policy of “Japan neutralization”. However, there was limited domestic criticism of how Kishi dealt with China, a fact that Chinese intelligence agencies were to some extent informed of. Motivated by a disapproval of the Kishi cabinet and high hopes for Sino-Japanese trade, they made arbitrary deductions based on gathered information suggesting that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. In these circumstances, Chinese policy-makers adopted an even tougher position on Japan in the wake of the Nagasaki national flag incident and decided to break off relations. The Chinese did not intend a complete and permanent cessation of relations, but rather wanted to apply pressure on Kishi. As such, the decision was in line with China’s policy of “Japan neutralization”. On the other hand, Kishi perceived China’s hard-line stance as interference with Japan’s general elections, and chose to observe calmly how events unfolded. Japanese opinion continued to support Kishi government policies. However, China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies disregarded this fact and produced arbitrary intelligence that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. Hence Chinese policy-makers persisted with their hard-line stance and did not modify their “Japan neutralization” policy. In retrospect, this chain of events suggests that one cause for China’s failed Japan policy was the failure of its intelligence agencies to comprehend that mounting Japanese domestic demand for trade with China had the potential to alter Japan’s foreign policy. Chinese intelligence analysis had backed up its policy-makers’ hard-line stance, and hence China continued to maintain the ambition of achieving its “Japan neutralization” policy. The limited insight of China’s Japan-related intelligence agencies was the result of the following three factors: firstly, their abilities to collect and analyze intelligence were not yet fully developed;
著者
シナン レヴェント
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.1.2, pp.69-88, 2012-04-30 (Released:2014-09-15)
参考文献数
60

The term Eurasia is more than just a geographical statement; it acquired political meaning in the first half of the 20th century. As the term is capable of various definitions, here we restrict the meaning to former-Soviet lands. This paper examines the political intentions of imperial Japan towards the region in the interwar period in terms of Japanese policy towards Islamic populations and the Axis allies, especially German–Japanese military co-operation. The sources are mainly those that relate to questions about Islam and anti-Soviet feelings during this period.The strategy of supporting those who opposed the regime in Russia dates back to the Russo-Japanese war. Based on this experience, Japan, in an attempt to play a more important role in international issues after the Paris Conference in 1919, tried to make Tokyo an émigré-center, like Berlin, Paris, and Istanbul at the time. From early 1920s Turkic-Muslim people were recruited and formed a community in Japan under the leadership of the influential Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali. Subsequently, Abdurresid Ibrahim arrived in 1933 and took the initiative by replacing Kurbanali in 1938. It was assumed that Japan was utilizing these anti-Bolshevik Muslim factions to foster the anti-Sovietism adopted by the military; this explains the infiltration of Japanese influence into the Muslim groups, especially those suppressed by Soviet Russia.As is well known, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed the Anti-Commintern Pact in November 1936 against international communism in name, but in fact against Soviet Russia. Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese military attaché to Germany at the time, made an agreement with Wilhelm Canaris on behalf of the German army covering two areas: (i) anti-Soviet intelligence co-operation; and (ii) aid to support propaganda of anti-regime minorities based on an order from the Chief of the Army General Staff of imperial Japan. To summarize the agreement: ‘To collaborate with the German army concerning the intelligence of the Soviet Union so that the independence movements of minorities in the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda can be easily supported. This would assist the Japanese army to understand the deficiencies of Soviet Russia and move accordingly in the case of war between Japan and Russia’.Finally, the plans mentioned above did not bear fruit in terms of putting Eurasia under Japanese influence due to the fact that Japanese military operations on the Asian mainland and the German invasion in Russia ultimately ended in failure.