著者

楊 麗君

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.55-76, 2003 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

津田 元一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.45-67, 1969 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

岩武 照彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.2, pp.43-96, 1980 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

荒 哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.3, pp.33-59, 2018-07-31 (Released:2018-08-28)

参考文献数

84

被引用文献数

1

---

This study is intended to answer the following questions: what caused some of the Filipino masses to collaborate with the Japanese?; and why did their collaboration for the Japanese bring about severe violence? Over seventy years or so since the end of the Asia-Pacific War in Asia, numerous academic works have been discussing so far the subject matters on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. However, only a few of them have discussed the issues of the collaboration with the perspectives from “below.” Even though there have been published numerous studies on the Filipino popular history, very few historians have examined the nature of collaborationism transpired in the local setting of the Philippines with such perspectives. This paper aims to shed light on rampant severe violence frequently happened among the masses or locals in Leyte Island of the Philippines, one of the rural areas of the country, during the Japanese occupation, that have not yet been thoroughly examined in Philippine historiography. Applying theoretical frameworks of Ranajit Guha (2007) dealing with the historical study on the mass movement in India, this study tries to clarify the characteristics of the mass violence by focusing on the actuations of a number of actors, most of whom belonged to low middle class including some local governmental officials (municipal mayors, treasurers, or chieftains of small villages in the province), local small merchants or landless peasants with a scant educational background. These kind of people tended to be treated as minor actors in “periphery” in the Philippine society when describing the history of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some of them were said to be involved in severe violence during the time of their organizing some paramilitary groups for the Japanese such as the Home Guard in Ormoc or Jutai in Abuyog. Being minor one in Philippine historiography, the significance of mass violence have had been ignored, and these violent incidents were considered nothing but black side of patriotic movements against the Japanese initiated by the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. Therefore, their involvement in the local history have been forgotten on the minds of locals and local historians as well. Discussing several cases presented in this paper, the author tries to posit that such minor actors in “periphery” of the Philippine society tried to delineate themselves in the elite-dominated society like Leyte Province by collaborating with the Japanese. Unfortunately, their activities were too sporadic to unite other minor elements toward the unified movement as the Sakdal Movement or Hukbalahap Movement in Luzon Island did during that time.

著者

古屋 博子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.73-91, 2002 (Released:2014-09-15)

被引用文献数

1

著者

土屋 貴裕

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:21882444)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.4, pp.50-68, 2012-10-31 (Released:2014-02-05)

著者

野口 和彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.4, pp.37-55, 2007-10-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

68

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The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.

著者

木村 光彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.3, pp.73-91, 1988 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

松本 理可子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.4, pp.16-32, 2016-10-31 (Released:2016-11-23)

参考文献数

42

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How has Quanjude, a restaurant renowned for its Peking Duck—a local specialty of Beijing—developed in the wake of China’s economic reform? Although Quanjude is classified as a state-owned enterprise, it cannot be considered a brand that has developed only by virtue of this classification. Should the role of longstanding enterprises be considered similar to that of other state-owned enterprises? Along with many other longstanding enterprises, Quanjude was founded in the Beijing district of Qianmen, which is located in the jurisdiction of the city’s municipal government. Then, how is Quanjude viewed by the Beijing government? This study attempts to investigate the status given to longstanding enterprises by the Beijing government with reference to the two paradoxes proposed by Martin Whyte (2009) regarding “decentralization of authority” and “a return to matters rejected during the Cultural Revolution.” With a principal focus on four topics, this study undertook a detailed investigation of a broad range of materials that included statistical yearbooks as well as current articles and journals. It found that (1) brand value is protected as intellectual property through certification as a “China Time-honored Brand,” and this cultural resource is reflected in the policies of the Beijing government. (2) Apart from commercial activities, these enterprises are simultaneously engaged in activities that cannot be considered primarily profit-oriented. Although longstanding enterprises have developed on the basis of the principle of competition, they are grounded in the relationships of “mutual aid” by which large-scale enterprises drive SME firms through partnerships that enable omni-channel marketing through outlets such as brick-and-mortar stores and online shopping. (3) Areas with high concentrations of longstanding enterprises (and thus of tourism resources) represent a shared resource and therefore require certain macro controls that enable them to address the preservation of this resource. (4) Finally, the ownership and governance structure of longstanding enterprises include elements of a conglomerate structure that is conducive to effective policy implementation by the Beijing government. The Beijing government thus positions longstanding enterprises as both “commercial firms” and a “cultural industry,” while some of these firms also possess properties distinct from those of more conventional state-owned enterprises in terms of how they exercise influence by embodying businesses embedded in the community against a background of history, culture, and politics.

著者

山根 聡

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.3, pp.1-17, 2015-07-31 (Released:2015-08-11)

参考文献数

44

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This article discusses how Pakistani society has clearly distanced itself from terrorism. On 6th January 2015, the 21st Amendment Bill passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan has officially changed the constitutional definition of “Muslim terrorist(s)” into “terrorist(s) using the name of religion”. Pakistan has been called a hub of terrorists ever since several active terrorist groups are known to be based in Pakistan – such as the Sunni extremists Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement, TTP) or Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Some of these groups are said to be supported by the Pakistani military and claim they will establish an Islamic order in society. However, Pakistani society itself has been suffering from terror and has been mobilized in the war on terror. This paper shows the transformation of Pakistani society concerning the concept of “Islamic-ness”.
Pakistan has been a frontline state in conflicts such as, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, or the war on terror after 9/11. During the anti-Soviet war, Pakistan received huge financial and military assistance from both Western and Islamic countries. The Western countries supported Pakistan in the Cold War proxy war against the USSR, and Islamic countries provided assistance in the name of jihad against the Communists. In the 1980s, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’s military regime promoted Islamization of society, a process which was never criticized by the international community which needed the Pakistani military regime’s cooperation in the war.
Needless to say, Islam is the national religion of Pakistan and 95% of the total population of Pakistan belongs to Islam. Although the peoples of Pakistan may have different religious practices in their everyday life, all of them are attached to a firmly based monotheistic faith, and regard Muhammad as the last Prophet. However, there has generally been widespread reluctance to criticize Islamization or even Islamic extremists who kill in the name of religion. Also, terrorists often expressed their disapproval of the Pakistani government as not being “Islamic” or being a “puppet of the US”. As a result, Pakistani society has often been confused concerning the “Islamic-ness” of its own governments. This may be one of the reasons why there was not much criticism of the extremists even if they killed in the name of Allah.
Since the tragic attack on a Peshawar school in December 2014, Pakistani society has evolved radically on that issue. Even Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who originally supported the idea of negotiating with the terrorists, has now approved an amendment to the Constitution establishing special military courts which are to be active for a two-year period only and designed to be rapidly dealing with crimes related to terrorism. The amendment states that Pakistan is willing to permanently wipe out and eradicate terrorism from the country. This decision shows not only the firm intention of the government on its war on terror, but also the decisive break with the terrorists who monopolize the cause of religion in Pakistani society. For Pakistan, it could be said that the consequence of voting such an amendment represents the greatest social transformation ever experimented since the Islamization of the 1980s.

著者

大庭 三枝

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.68-87, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

49

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This paper aims to identify the various phases of historical issues between Southeast Asia and Japan. Japanese military rule during World War II (WWII) in Southeast Asia lasted about three years. Although they ruled differently in each area, life under Japanese rule was harsh in general for the people and communities in Southeast Asia. Japanese rulers exerted control and cracked down on anti-Japanese factions, even slaughtering them in some cases. They also economically exploited the local communities, which led to serious economic damage including starvation. In addition, they mobilized a great number of local people as forced labor (romusha), comfort women (ianfu), and auxiliary soldiers/auxiliary service personnel (heiho).In comparison with other Northeast Asian countries like South Korea and China, the negative legacy of Japanese rule is currently not politicized in Southeast Asian countries. However, not long ago, wartime experiences caused by Japanese imperialism were serious political issues between these countries and Japan. This paper shows how historical issues between Southeast Asia and Japan have been politically dealt with from the 1950s and the 1990s; it also examines Japan’s treatment toward these issues and its problems then and now.The 1950s and 1960s saw Japan and Southeast Asian countries conclude Japan’s provision of reparations and sub-reparations, which had lasted almost 20 years. However, Japanese reparation did not completely resolve the friction arising from the legacy of Japanese imperialism during the WWII; in the post-WWII era, human rights had begun gaining traction as a global code of norms, and demands for “war responsibility” and “war compensation” had been rising since the 1970s. Against this backdrop, many Asian peoples who suffered under Japanese imperialism began to raise their voice, including Korean women who were taken in as comfort women. Similar demands for compensation also came from the Philippines and Indonesia in the 1990s with varying degrees of success. The Asian Women’s Fund to compensate and restore dignity to former comfort women was relatively successful in the Philippines, but did little for those in Indonesia. On the other hand, the Tokyo Local Court, Tokyo High Court, and The Supreme Court had rejected a law suit by the group of former comfort women in the Philippines who had demanded the Japanese government to compensate them. The Japanese government also did not respond to calls for compensation by ex-auxiliary soldiers/auxiliary service personnel in Indonesia.These days, Southeast Asian countries avoid friction with Japan, maintaining a good relationship with Japan in order to balance the rising China. However, as the 21st century progresses, the mainstreaming of human rights continues to advance. “War compensation” is being taken more seriously than before. Japanese people should recognize that they carry the negative legacy and “war responsibility” of having imposed suffering on local peoples and communities in Southeast Asia.

著者

本名 純

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.4, pp.22-41, 2015-10-31 (Released:2015-11-10)

参考文献数

48

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Indonesia’s post-Suharto governments have conducted democratic elections every five years since 1999 for both parliaments and presidency. The latest elections in 2014 showed a heated battle between two presidential contenders, namely Joko Widodo (popularly called Jokowi)—the Governor of Jakarta—and Prabowo Subianto who led his right-wing political party, Gerindra. The victory of Jokowi in the presidential election has widely been seen as a success story of ordinary man with no elite background to enjoy strong grass-roots support. Jokowi’s rise to Indonesia’s seventh president is therefore evaluated both domestically and internationally as a critical step towards the country’s democratic consolidation. However, the fact that Prabowo—who was Suharto’s son-in-law and a top army general during the authoritarian days—gained 47% of total votes and performed a close contest with Jokowi should not be ignored to understand the nature of electoral democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia. Why could Prabowo, a legacy of the authoritarian heyday, gain such a large number of votes and become a serious threat to Jokowi? It was antiforeign nationalism and Suharto-era romanticism that characterized Prabowo’s electoral appeal. On the one hand, he clamored for the return to good old days in facing today’s ‘excessive’ democracy heavily influenced by the West. On the other hand, he openly criticized that foreign companies operating in Indonesia are predators who exploit the country’s economic resources, insisting on the need for propelling protectionism in various sectors in the name of saving the country. If he were the winner of the 2014 presidential election, Indonesia’s democratic outlook would be very different. This article examines the dynamics of Prabowo’s electoral challenge and reveals socio-economic structures that contributed to his vote mobilization. I argue that Prabowo’s challenge has been discussed mostly in the context of his personal political ambition, but it actually goes beyond that and resonates with socio-economic cleavages that have been deepened under the previous government led by President Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Thus, the article concludes, it is possible that a similar challenge will recur even without Prabowo in the future, and, to understand such a threat to democratic consolidation, it is important for us to ‘de-personalize’ Prabowo’s challenge and examine the socio-economic vulnerability that creates wider political space for right-wing conservative elitism to maneuver in the age of globalization.

著者

伊藤 正子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.3, pp.12-29, 2017-07-31 (Released:2017-09-05)

参考文献数

10

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During the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973, more than 310,000 Korean soldiers were dispatched to Vietnam. The killings of many Vietnamese civilians that occurred during this period are often mentioned in the recent ‘anti-Korean sentiment’ boom in Japan. This article discusses narratives of the memory of killings in both Korea and Vietnam. At the end of the 20th century in South Korea, what was once a ‘bravery story’ that killed ‘Aka (Communist)’ began to be viewed as an event that ‘killed civilians’. This difficulty in facing the reality of the home country’s negative history resulted in divided public opinion. A Korean NGO, NAWAURI, has attempted to contribute to future peace by apologizing to the Vietnamese people, listening to the people who survived from the killings, and understanding victims’ feelings.
On the other hand, in Vietnam, based on the slogan ‘Close the past and head towards the future’, Vietnamese survivors can only mention the historical recognition of the war in a way that does not affect international relations. This slogan has not only been simply championed by the state but also become a national consciousness, so there is little movement to record war memories of the general people so as to convey them to posterity. The slogan suppresses the honest feelings of survivors of mass killings, who have been forced to live difficult lives.
The national history of the Vietnam War, therefore, is a story of the brilliant triumph of the North Vietnamese army, or the National Liberation Front, who fought risking their lives. As a result, memories of mass killings that are unrelated to the victory would inevitably be unrecognized in Vietnamese national history. This means that when the state regulates memories and constitutes it as ‘the history of so-and-so country’, only favourable events are recorded, and some memories that do not promote nationalism are truncated. Memories of mass killings by the Korean army usually disappear with the death of the survivors, but ironically, the activities of the Korean NGO, which is revealing war memories of survivors in an attempt to ensure future peace, are contributing to the healing of the survivors and also to maintaining diverse war memories that are not subsumed by the state.

著者

津田 元一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.45-67, 1969

著者

宮城 佑輔

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.2, pp.18-36, 2016-04-30 (Released:2016-05-17)

参考文献数

28

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During the 2000s, grass-root xenophobic movements have developed in East Asian countries. In Japan, many groups calling themselves “Conservatives In Action” and within them, the core group called “Zaitokukai” have been criticized by many people for their use of hate speech. Counter-protesters have fought them not only on the street but also on the internet.The radicalization of mass media discourse has been identified by critics. For example, “Book Lovers Against Racism” (BLAR) condemns publications containing xenophobic figures as “hate books.” Influenced by those books, Conservatives In Action and Zaitokukai have developed their own mass media organization and discourse.Although people criticize the current trend of books that contain bitter criticisms of China, South Korea, and North Korea as “hate books,” such labeling tends to obfuscate the differences between Old and New Conservative media. In fact, while New Conservative media uses hate speech as an “effective measure,” many Old Conservative media sources criticize the practice.This paper explores the magazine Japanism as an example of New Conservative media speech. Seirindo, the publisher of Japanism, has published books by former Zaitokukai leader Makoto Sakurai. His books were meant to encourage the Conservatives In Action and Zaitokukai.This paper also compares the perspectives of Old Conservative media, using the example of Seiron, with those of New Conservative media, using the example of Japanism, to explore the respective views of Old and New Conservative media on China, South Korea, and North Korea.Some critics believe views expressed by Old and New conservative media exist in different methodologies but are based on the same idea. This paper reveals that their differences exist not only in their methodologies but also in their ideas. Specifically, while their perspectives on China are similar, their perspectives on South Korea and North Korea are quite different. Before the main analysis, this paper follows the long-term change of the social movement led by Zaitokukai to focus on the initial split of the two conservative groups. After that, several specific differences between Old and New Conservative media are discussed.

著者

団 陽子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.4, pp.38-57, 2018-10-31 (Released:2018-12-05)

参考文献数

111

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Although the Republic of China, which was victorious in the Second World War, intended to obtain more war reparations from Japan than any other victorious country, the issue of the Republic of China’s demand for reparations did not develop as the government had initially expected. This was due to the US’s change to its policy in the occupation of Japan and its reduction of reparations collected. However, among the allied nations and governments, the detailed processes of negotiation and intentions regarding reparations have still not been clarified. Thus, it is possible that there were issues and circumstances affecting the Republic of China’s demands for reparations beside the reduction of reparations due to policy change in the US. This paper focuses on the Republic of China’s decision-making process regarding the question of how to deal with the former Japanese navy vessels, which the government considers to be very important, and offers a detailed explanation of how this relates to the US’s provision of surplus military vessels to the Chinese Navy moved forward at the same time. This paper explores other possible factors affecting the Republic of China’s reparations claims, apart from the much-discussed US policy change.

著者

大泉 さやか

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.1, pp.21-36, 2020-01-31 (Released:2020-03-12)

参考文献数

39

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This paper investigates the control exerted by the Vietnamese government on the distribution and performance of South Vietnam era songs after the end of the Vietnam war—which is referred to as the Liberation of the South—and explains why the government recently announced the abolition of the special control system intended to censor these songs. Soon after the end of the Vietnam war, the government prohibited South Vietnam era songs, due to their decadent and antigovernment characteristics. However, Vietnamese people living overseas, most of whom had been exiled from former South Vietnam to Western countries, have continued to sing these songs in their communities. From the latter half of the 1980’s, Vietnam incentivized Vietnamese people living overseas to return, either temporarily or permanently, because of their financial potential. The government also gradually eased restrictions on South Vietnam era songs. Until 1999, several government agencies maintained control on the use of South Vietnam era songs. Until 2012, provincial-level government agencies remained in control of local stage performances. After 2012, the Department of Performing Arts (DPA), under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, was tasked with controlling permissions related to songs composed in South Vietnam before 1975 and overseas, and in 2016, the range of the DPA’s control expanded to songs composed before 1975 and overseas. Ongoing debates reveal that the contemporary censorship system had already reached its limit because (1) no authoritative entity, including the DPA itself, fully understands which songs had been permitted since the end of the 1980’s, and (2) the DPA cannot control the vast number of songs that fall under the literal interpretation of the present decree, as “the songs composed before 1975” technically includes all songs composed in Northern Vietnam before 1975. Considering Vietnamese song markets, Vietnamese singers living or traveling internationally tend to return or expand their business to Vietnam due to the international markets’ shrinkage; this encourages singers to refrain from engaging in politically sensitive activities in international communities. From around 2012, Boléro songs, which are often South Vietnam era songs, have comprised a major trend in Vietnam. However, people superficially refer to nostalgia for songs that were sang in former Saigon, concealing the South-Vietnamese identity of these songs. The Vietnamese government intends to remove the special control system to overcome such procedural limitations, accompanied by the atmosphere in Vietnamese song markets as they attempt to limit the proliferation political messages in South Vietnam era songs.

著者

新免 康

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.37-54, 2003 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

小針 進

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.86-89, 2009-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

倉田 徹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.68-84, 2017-01-31 (Released:2017-03-24)

参考文献数

12

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The 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong succeeded in mobilizing large number of people by demanding democracy which meets “international standards” and by deteriorating “Hong Kong–China conflict”. However, there is a difference of nature between “international standards” and “Hong Kong–China conflict”. The former represents elitist value and the supporters of the international standards prefer liberal and peaceful activities, while the latter is an issue particular to Hong Kong, and people demanding to solve the issue tends to criticize those westernized elites who are apart from the Hong Kong society. They are Hong Kong nationalists and they accept violent resistance to a certain extent. During the prolonged Umbrella Movement, nationalists criticized liberal leaders of the movement and the dispute split the movement. After the movement, Liberal members formed “Self-determination groups” who insists that Hong Kong people should determine their own political future through referendum. And nationalists formed “Localist groups” who see Hong Kong people as a nation and expel mainlanders. Although there exists conflict between the Self-determination groups and the Localist groups, both of them rely on political freedom which enables political activities on the street and rule of law which protects the rights of opposition. Although both political freedom and rule of law in Hong Kong are now under threat to a certain extent, internet freedom and judicial independence is guaranteed so far. When the government tries to infringe on it, both Self-determination groups and Localist groups resist strongly. And both groups are in opposition to the Chinese central government. Both “democratic self-determination” which liberals demands and “self-determination of nations” which localists demands are not acceptable for the central government. Central government tries to isolate “a very few” pro-independence groups by co-opting democrats and moderate localists. But if the central government take action to expel radicals, they would make an enemy of liberals at the same time. In the Legislative Council election on 4th Sep. 2016, 6 members of the new political groups (3 candidates from “Self-determination groups” and 3 candidates from “Localist groups”) were successfully elected. Legco may experience a huge change by accepting new members of new generations. But before the election, the Government rejected some candidates whom the Government saw as pro-independent and some newly elected Legco members were disqualified by not swearing allegiance to the PRC. They brought some actions against the Government and the new political groups which arose from street politics are to continue its fight against the Government both in the parliament and court.