著者
早瀬 勝明
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, pp.210-219, 2008 (Released:2021-03-31)

In this essay, I examine discussions of John Hart Ely, Mark Tushnet, Ronald Dworkin, and Cass R. Sunstein, and show that interpretation of Constitution relates to jurisprudence. For example, they discuss constitutional Interpretation based on subjective judgment of justices, or degree of justification by the theory. And their positions are different respectively. But, including skeptic positions about theory, they all logically talk about validity in own position, and the discussion is related to jurisprudential discussion. Their arguments show that if we argue about constitutional interpretation logically, the argument will finally step into the domain of the argument of jurisprudence. The position that jurisprudence has nothing to do with interpretation of constitution is possible. But, it is necessary for the claim in itself to be justified by logic or theory. And if we try the justification, we cannot avoid jurisprudential argument.