著者

望月 和彦

出版者

桃山学院大学

雑誌

桃山学院大学経済経営論集 (ISSN:02869721)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, no.4, pp.73-123, 2015-03

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After reopening of stock markets, stock and commodity markets recovered stability temporary in mid-May. But in late May markets began to oscillate again. On 24th May the bankruptcy of Nanajushi Bank shocked markets severely. Mogi-shoten, a big trading company in those days, went bankrupt by failure of speculation on cotton.Nanajushi Bank was an affiliate company of Mogi-shoten and the bank lent about half of its lending to Mogi-shoten. Nanajushi Bank supplied money to silk industry and silk exports as well. Prices of silk threads and silk products fell sharply after the bankruptcy of Nanajushi Bank. Panic expanded to other markets. Many banks faced a run. Rice prices fell down in both future and kind markets because farms inflicted heavy loss by the price fall of cocoon wanted to sell their major product of rice to cover the loss. In money markets the interest rate of overnight lending stayed at lower level, on the other hand discount rate were high and few banks would lend money at that rate. Credits among banks were disappeared. Many trades were made through cash base. Lower interest rates didn't contribute to the recovery of economy. The economy fell into "the trap of liquidity". Businessmen expected the government and BOJ to take measures to the depression after the bankruptcy of Nanajushi Bank. Many newspapers and journals misreported that the government decided to take extra measures to rescue industries. And markets recovered temporally for the misreported news. But the Hara cabinet didn't take extra measures to the financial crisis. Disappointed by the inaction of the government, markets fell down again. In addition the wave of depression came from the US and European economies. The BOJ hesitated to take easy money policy, instead it lend money to an industry which succeeded to organize syndicates to finance from the BOJ. The BOJ provided relief loan at a discretional base which mass media attacked fiercely. A credit squeeze and market closure resulted in systemic risk of financial markets.

著者

望月 和彦

出版者

桃山学院大学

雑誌

桃山学院大学経済経営論集 (ISSN:02869721)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.115-158, 2013-10

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After the great crash of15th March, markets of stocks and commodities continued to turmoil. At the end of March the future markets of stocks and commodities were cleared but that wasn't a true clearance. Because clients of local areas refused to receive stocks which were falling and brokers of stock and bankers who lent money to them found pile up stocks to be cleared in their hands and in their safe. Such manipulation was brought to light by the bankruptcy of Masuda Bill Broker Bank on7th April. Prices of stocks and commodities fell sharply and the stock markets were closed. In meanwhile the tops of stock exchanges begged the finance minister Korekiyo Takahashi and the governor of the BOJ Junnosuke Inoue to finance for the clearance of stock trades. The BOJ announced to finance stock traders through their banks. And the finance minister Takahashi announced the troubles of stock market were resolved by the relief finance of BOJ but the stock market was collapsed on the day Takahashi made the announcement.

著者

望月 和彦

出版者

桃山学院大学

雑誌

桃山学院大学経済経営論集 (ISSN:02869721)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.35-70, 2012-06-15

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On15th March 1920, the prices of stocks and commodities fell dramatically. That great fall was named "Daihando". As has been said in previous papers, a credit squeeze was brought by the domestic and external factors. The former is money fixation in the banking sector which deprived banks of capability to lend money. The latter is money shrink caused by the deficit of international trade. The credit squeeze caused Daihando in two ways, that is, (1) by the credit squeeze the interest rate was higher than a dividend yield of stocks so that it got irrational to invest in stocks, (2) many speculators bought stocks and commodities by borrowing money from banks, but by the credit squeeze the banks refused to lend money to the speculators, so that they had to sell their stocks and commodities if the market of stocks or any commodities had faced the turmoil. The market situation as a whole was so vulnerable to the external or internal shocks through this interlinkage between markets. The price fall began first in the future rice market on 10 th March. Then it spread to other market including stock market with panic sales. On15th March the great price fall came out in the stock market. The credit squeeze was a result of the lending restriction of the BOJ. The BOJ took the tight money policies since October1919, but they had no effect on the bubble ballooning. So instead of rising the discount rates which was politically difficult, the BOJ tried to restrict lending to the banks. This caused the credit squeeze which led the collapse of bubble.

著者

望月 和彦

出版者

桃山学院大学

雑誌

桃山学院大学経済経営論集 (ISSN:02869721)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.105-149, 2001-06

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In this paper, we try to review the economic turbulence of Japan in 1920's through our perspective of 1990's. In both periods we have the same experience about the bubble economy. We have interested in the policies in the burst of bubbles. And those who charged with the policies of post-war era also engaged with policies of crisis of Showa era. We try to explore the events of Taisho era, in order to get lessons from the experiences in Taisho economic policies. For that purpose, we must analyze the Taisho bubble economy. By the WWI the Japanese economy made rapid economic development. It got huge trade surplus and gold which increases money supply in the gold standard system. The economy soared so much. The Japanese government took fiscal and monetary policies which encouraged industries and exports. When the WWI was over, many Japanese thought the economic boom was over too. But the economic boom wasn't over. After the war the Japanese economy experienced a boom more drastic than in the war. And the government sticked to the expansive policies in the boom despite the inflation. But the boom colllapsed in March 1920. That is the beginning of the stagnation which caused the financial turmoil in the Showa era.

著者

望月 和彦

出版者

桃山学院大学

雑誌

桃山学院大学経済経営論集 (ISSN:02869721)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.41-80, 1998-12

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In his famous book, "The Society of Consumption", Jean Baudrillard claimed his famous theory that consumption as such is a sign. It isn't made for the utility which it is alleged to bring, but for escalation of the social class. We can't really enjoy consumption because we are forced to pretend to enjoy it. The utitliy of it is simply an illusion. The consumption is the comsumption of signs rather than goods and services. He finds no relation between price and utility, nor exchange value and use value. According to him, all goods and services have their symbolic meaning, that is the purpose of consumption. And there are only exchange values. They make supply and demand. The exchange values are determined structually. We can't escape from the system of exchange values because they are deeply implanted in ourselves. It is a kind of ideology. So we can't feel our consumption is enforced. They shape our criterion of behavior or way to see the entire world through the aquisition of language. We can't dispute against him because we can't explain the utility definitely nor measue it. It is simply a subjective notion. So if someone claims that it comes from somewhat, not from personal satisfaction, we can't controvert against him. The only one thing which we can do is to give him no agreement. There are, however, relations which don't depend on such subjectivity. That is the technical relation. All goods and services depend each other substitutely or complementary. Such relations come from not only utility but also technical (physical) conditions. And they give rise to competition in capitalist countries that negate any illusion each other. Baudrillard puts emphasis on advertising, but it is not omnipotent. Even if producers often deceit consumers through advertising, the former can't deceive the latter eternally. Baudrillard denies people of the subjectivity, that is the ability of decision making. People always depend someone else. In the event his claim leads us to a nihilism. His theory contains a self-reference. Such theory is indisputable but indeterminant as well. And it is not a scientific hypothesis by the Popper's criterion. So it is inadequate to apply his theory to our economic life.