著者

本村 耐樹

出版者

日本印度学仏教学会

雑誌

印度學佛教學研究 (ISSN:00194344)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.1, pp.353-348, 2016-12-20 (Released:2017-10-17)

参考文献数

6

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In the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, one of the most important texts of the Yogācāra school, it is stated that two things remain as a real existence in the theory of emptiness (śūnyatā): “unreal notion” (abhūtaparikalpa) and “emptiness” (śūnyatā). The understanding of “something remaining” (avaśiṣṭa) in the Yogācāra school has been based on this theory of emptiness in this text. On the other hand, “something remaining” is also discussed in the Bodhisattvabhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi. This text deals with the “thing itself” (vastu) and “verbal designation” (prajñapti). Many scholars understand that these two things, the “thing itself” and “verbal designation,” remain in the theory of emptiness in this text. However, through an investigation of the usage of the term “self-nature” (svabhāva) in this text, it is possible to conclude that the term “self-nature” means “the ground for the application of the verbal designa­tion” (pravṛttinimitta). In Buddhist thought, the existence of “self-nature” was denied by the Buddha. Therefore, if “self-nature,” which is the ground for the application of the “verbal designation,” does not exist, it is also impossible that “verbal designation” exists as a real existence. Hence, the purpose of this study is to clarify that only the “thing itself” remains, but “verbal designation” does not exist in the Bodhisattvabhūmi.