著者

横濱 竜也

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, pp.193-201, 2003-10-20 (Released:2008-11-17)

参考文献数

6

著者

横濱 竜也

出版者

静岡大学

雑誌

静岡大学法政研究 (ISSN:13422243)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.179-192, 2015-12

著者

横濱 竜也

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, pp.198-204, 2009 (Released:2021-12-29)

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Must we adhere to ask and solve the problem of obligation to obey the law? An affirmative answer to this question is not self-evident. On one hand, legal positivists (like Matthew Kramer) who attempt to build a comprehensive descriptive theory of law which covers all the phenomena of law around the world, deny any necessary relations between the concept of law and morality. So they wholeheartedly accept that an evil law is also a law. but they reject the idea that law in general has a value which deserves the basis of obligation to obey the law. On the other hand, for natural law theories (like Michael Moore's) that argue we should recognize the normativity of law only when the law is morally just, an evil law is basically not a law (except when the evil law is useful as a heuristic to find what is morally just), so the problem whether and why we should obey evil laws just because they are law, is not a problem from the very beginning. Legal theories mentioned above treat useless the arguments to solve the basis of obligation to obey the law. But if we recognize that when we fulfill our obligation to obey the law. we should not only comply with laws, but also occasionally we should disobey them in order to improve the law to conform to common values of our society, it becomes clear that it is not sufficient to ask whether laws are useful for us to follow good or right reasons. Rather we must ask whether law's have the intrinsic value of law sufficient to ground obligation to obey the law.

著者

横濱 竜也

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.208-218,259, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

16

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Why should subjects defer to and obey their ruler? This question which is taken seriously especially by civil disobedients, coustitutes the core of the problem of legitimacy, and inquiries of the answer to the question has been mainly done in the theories of political obligation. But standard theories of political obligation have not given enough attention to the moral character of vertical relationship between ruler and subjects and the basis of intrinsic value of the latter's deference to the former. Arguments from fairness regard the state as a social cooperation between the equal members, and as an instrument to supply goods indispensable for us, so they do not adequately recognize the intrinsic value of deference. One of the arguments from natural duty of justice appeals the needs of political institutions which administer stably in a specific territory the principles of justice, but they attach little importance to how the relation between ruler and subjects has formed, and how subjects consider that their ruler believes in good faith that his judgment is just. The reasons for ruler to care about the basis of his political authority and the reasons for subjects to take seriously the basis of their political obligation are essentially different, and we should treat them separately. But in spite of the difference, to the virtue of ruler who presents consistently his understanding of the common goods, subjects have a (strong) reason to defer because in his claim of consistency, ruler has to be open and accountable to dissentients who blame him for inconsistency.

著者

横濱 竜也

出版者

有斐閣

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, pp.198-204, 2008

著者

横濱 竜也

出版者

静岡大学

雑誌

静岡大学法政研究 (ISSN:13422243)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.2, pp.23-39, 2015-02