著者

藤岡 大助

出版者

亜細亜大学

雑誌

亜細亜法學 (ISSN:03886611)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.113-142, 2013-07

著者

藤岡 大助

出版者

亜細亜大学法学研究所

雑誌

亜細亜法学 = Asia University Law Review (ISSN:03886611)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, no.2, pp.29-51, 2022

著者

藤岡 大助

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, pp.161-170, 2008 (Released:2021-03-31)

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G.A. Cohen argues against the Rawls’ background premise that distributive justice is applied only to the social basic structure, not to the choices people make within it. Because it is not only structure but also people’s daily actions within it that effects on the prospect of Rawls’ Difference Principle, his exclusion of daily actions from range of justice fails to take justice seriously. Many Liberal conceptions of justice, including Dworkin’s Equal Concern as Sovereign Virtue, share the same background premise of Rawls. According to Cohen, unless these Liberal conceptions of justice abandon this background premise, they face with bankruptcy for inconsistency. However, if we follow Cohen’s suggestions, we shall allow government far-reaching intervention against people’s own choices of their life styles. In order to avoid both of illiberal consequences of Cohen’s inclusion and inconsistency of Liberal exclusion, we should understand Liberal exclusion not as background premise but as positive commitment, namely the part of the conception of justice. If we realize them so. Liberal exclusion works as a side constraint against fulfillment of the distributive scheme. In this recasting, Liberals have to bear a load of debt to justify why Liberal exclusion is accepted at the price of prospect of distributive scheme, but it becomes possible to avoid bankruptcy for inconsistency.

著者

藤岡 大助

出版者

亜細亜大学法学研究所

雑誌

亜細亜法学

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1-23, 2014