著者

鈴木 弘隆

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.36, pp.196-216, 2016-05-30 (Released:2018-05-30)

参考文献数

42

被引用文献数

2 1

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This survey paper aims to deal with idiosyncratic issues of ECB’s QE by investigating QE literatures and ECB press interviews, and present considerable points to proceed future assessment studies of QE such as portfolio-rebalancing, business-stimulating and inflation accelerating effects. In terms of QE implementation, ECB’s idiosyncratic issues are the extension of ECB’ jurisdiction over adjustment programmes’ conditionality by ESM Treaty 13(3) on countries under QE and multinational risk-sharing especially related to exit strategies of QE. EU’s inequality in this paper means both directly uneven transmission effects of QE-driven stock and asset price increase on GDP and consumption, and indirectly widening income disparity effects by cutting welfare and social security budget demanded by fiscal contraction and structural reforms under Troika’s adjustment programmes.This survey’s findings are as follows. Firstly, a cause of which QE’s businesss-stimulating effects and inflation accelerating effects are limited is balance sheet recession advocated by Richard Koo. Secondly, multinational risk sharing issues are as follows. ECB decides which countries’ government securities to buy and how many. In reality, ECB’s purchases of those are biased toward those of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, which consists of almost 80% of all the purchases under QE. This bias has an influence on unevenly distributed transmission effects of QE on real economy described above. Furthermore, the decision of ECB to implement QE is not unanimous, so if any country defaults, say, Greece, ECB gets to bear fiscal burden against other countries’ will. Germany is most likely to assume responsibility for large parts of the expenses, which makes it difficult for countries in EU to build multinational risk sharing with mutual consent. Consequently, at present, those risk sharing problems relating to QE’s exit strategies are stark. If government securities interest rates possibly jump up for some reason in the future, filling its fiscal losses requires German risk sharing of fiscal transfer to financially fragile central banks. However, its fiscal transfer is strictly banned by TFEU article 123, ESCB rule article 21, and any government debt acceptance by EU institution is also strictly banned by TFEU article 125 known as no bail-out clauses. Therefore, ECB is required to deal with promotion of the fiscal union of EU or revision of the treaties described above so that multinational risk sharing functions properly in case of uncertainties under the exit of ECB’s QE in the near future.