著者

東野 篤子

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.24, pp.96-124,313, 2004-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

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This article explores how the EU reached it decision to finalise accession negotiations with 10 candidate countries at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. At the time of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, there was an apparent lack of consensus on the three crucial questions concerning enlargement—‘timing’ of the conclusion of accession negotiations and the date of the accessions, with ‘how many’ candidate countries, and how to ‘finance’ enlargement. It was extremely hard to find solutions that might satisfy both the current member states and candidate countries. This article analyses when, how and why these questions were solved, and how these painful accession negotiations were able to be finalised at Copenhagen.As for the question of the ‘timing’, most of the EU member states had initially been extremely reluctant to set any specific ‘Target Date’ to conclude the negotiations, while the candidate countries had constantly been demanding the EU to present such a date. The only ‘commitment’ that the EU made at Helsinki was to indicate that it would be ‘in a position to welcome new Member States from the end of 2002’. However, it turned out that the EU had to step up its commitment by a proposal after the Commission and the French Presidency to create the ‘Road Map’, a detailed scenario to finalise the negotiations, which was endorsed in the Nice European Council in December 2000. Although creating the ‘Road Map’ and setting a ‘Target Date’ were not precisely identical, it turned out that implementing the ‘Road Map’ directed the EU almost inevitably to refer to 2002 as the EU's goal to finalise the accession negotiations with the most prepared countries. Also, the pressure from the European Parliament to set the date of the accession as 2004 had a great influence on the conclusion of the negotiations by the end of 2002.The question of ‘size’ was settled in two stages: when the EU decided to conclude the accession negotiations with the most prepared candidates by the end of 2002, the question of the size was almost automatically settled. Then, having to admit the considerable progress of the accession negotiations under the Road Map, the Laeken European Council in December 2001 named 10 countries which were likely to finalise the negotiations by the end of 2002.The finalisation of the negotiations on the chapters with budgetary implications—‘Agriculture’, ‘Regional Policy and Co-ordination of Structural Instruments’ and ‘Finance and Budgetary Provisions’—was by far the most difficult. Although the EU claimed that their common positions were agreed at the Brussels European Summit in October 2002, the candidate countries were far from being satisfied by the deal. The negotiations were therefore on the brink of collapse. However, two factors contributed the finalisation of accession negotiations with the 10 candidate countries at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002: the Danish Presidency played a role as an honest broker to find a compromise between current member states and the candidate countries, and EU member states were ‘entrapped’ to keep their ‘commitment’ at the Laeken European Council to finalise the negotiations by the end of 2002.

著者

鶴岡 路人

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.22, pp.283-312,373, 2002-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

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In January 1999, the biggest project in the history of European integration, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), was realized and a dream of having a single European currency finally came true. The achievement of it was neither foreordained nor just a logical consequence of market integration in the EC. It was rather a project highly political in nature.This article tries to explain the significant initial phases of the political process to create a European single currency from the early 1988 to the end of 1989. In January and February 1988, some proposals for a monetary union in the EC were aired by the French, Italian, and German ministers, which were, however, rather vague in content and proposed mainly as political balloons at the time. But two years later in Strasbourg in December 1989, the leaders of the European Communities came to the agreement to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to draw a new treaty on EMU, which was to begin its work by the end of 1990. Why and in what ways was such a great leap from just a vague balloon to the concrete agreement to revise a treaty made possible during this relatively brief period of less than two years? What has changed the nature of the EMU discussions?The main line of argument is as follows. When some calls for EMU notably the Balladur Memorandum were tabled and the discussions on its possibility became lively in the early 1988, there was no political commitment to the realization of EMU at all. Though the subsequent decision in Hanover in June that year to create a so-called Delors Committee on the study of EMU, and the approval of the Committee's report at the Madrid European Council meeting in June 1989 were of course significant steps forward, they by no means determined or ensured the way to the single currency. In fact, the Madrid summit failed to set a date to convene the IGC to make a new treaty on EMU. We had to wait six more months to have a concrete political commitment to EMU from Paris and Bonn, the two most significant actors on this issue. And the decision at the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 to start an IGC by the end of 1990 made the road to EMU irreversible. Leading up to the Strasbourg agreement, the ever-accelerating upheavals in the Communist countries in the East, the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, and the ensuing acceleration of the issue of German unification all played the significant role of stimulating the emergence of the political commitment to EMU.The situation under which the issue of EMU was discussed thus went through a radical change, which inevitably influenced the positions and perceptions of the actors. As the political commitment particularly by France and West Germany emerged in the fall of 1989, the road to EMU became irreversible, which was a great leap from the situation of two years earlier.

著者

小森田 秋夫

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.39, pp.44-75, 2019-06-20 (Released:2021-06-20)

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In Poland, as a result of the victory of Law and Justice (PiS) party in the parliamentary election in October 2015, a single-party-government was established for the first time since 1989. PiS, enacting one after another statutes of questionable constitutionality, has transformed the Constitutional Tribunal, by replacing its judges, into an organ which is not to control the legislative and the executive from the view point of constitutionality of their acts, but only to legitimate them. Next, PiS moved to the judicial reforms in order to put the whole system of judiciary under the control of the political branches (the legislative and the executive). Such a motion of the ruling party, which undermines the principles of judicial independence and division of power as the bases of democratic state ruled by law, has brought about protests and oppositions of lawyers and citizens within the country. At the same time, this situation in a member state of the European Union puts a serious problem under its nose. Facing an almost unprecedented situation, the European Commission launched the procedure based on the article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union, aiming at resolution of the problem by the “dialog” with the Polish government. But the conflict between the Polish government and the Commission was not settled by the beginning of July 2018, a crucial moment when a group of judges of the Supreme Court (SC) were to be obliged to retire due to the new Act on the SC, lowering of the retirement age for SC judges. So the Commission at last decided to use the infringement procedure on the bases of the article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to protect the independence of the Polish SC. Some courts of the other member states began to seek preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of EU (ECJ) in the context of execution of European arrest warrant issued by the Polish courts. Polish judges, including ones of the SC, also put preliminary questions as to compatibility of some provisions of the Act on the SC with the EU law. In such a situation, in which motions within Poland and those at the EU level, involving the other member states, are complicatedly intertwined, on 19 October the ECJ decided that Poland must immediately suspend the application of the Act on the SC relating to the lowering of the retirement age for SC judges. Now Poland is waiting for the final judgement of the ECJ.

著者

小川 有美

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.39, pp.1-19, 2019-06-20 (Released:2021-06-20)

参考文献数

49

被引用文献数

4

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Abstract During the last decade, Europe has experienced consecutive crises, beginning with the Great Recession, followed by the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, and the rise of populism, the latter of which has successfully combined Euroscepticism and xenophobia. Before answering whether the pessimistic scenario that liberal democratic Europe will backslide or the optimistic scenario whereby more integration can be achieved through crisis is accurate, we should examine how the phases of politicization and the democratic deficit in Europe have been transformed. Peter Mair indicates that the emergence of a non-political polity in Europe (a sedated giant) has hollowed out opposition, both at the national and the European level. This article focuses on the de-politicization of Europeanization as the background of the present crisis in accordance with the work of Mair. However, the dynamic changes in politicization and de-politicization are also central to the discussion. As studies of politicization (Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe; Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande, and Hanspeter Kriesi) have observed, conflicts over European integration exist and are growing. Quantitative studies have also shown to what extent economic crises can lead to the politicization of integration and Euroscepticism. Based on such studies, this article distinguishes three stages of politicization/democratic deficit within the development of European integration. The first stage, politicization/democratic deficit 1.0, was shaped by technocratic governance, which, as per the intentions of national political elites, insulated European integration from public politics. The second, politicization/democratic deficit 2.0, made room for public debate on European integration and introduced national referenda, while the political mainstream contained or marginalized any opposition. The third stage, politicization/democratic deficit 3.0, is characterized by higher electoral volatility that undermines the dominance of mainstream parties. There are furious debates regarding Europe in present member states. These centrifugal effects have led to a renewed democratic deficit in the sense that the present state of politicization is losing sight of any stable solution, as is also suggested by the data analyses given in the last section of the article. The conclusions of this article support neither the scenario of backsliding nor that of integration by crisis but identify a new phase in politicization/democratic deficit that is spinning out standoffs in a multilevel politics across Europe.

著者

鈴木 規子

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.23, pp.212-230,307, 2003-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

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In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht institutionalised the rights of European Union citizens to vote in local elections in their country of residence. This paper describes the main characteristics of the concept of EU citizenship and analyses the way in which national and/or European identities affected the voting behaviour of non-French residents during the French local elections in March 2001.The introduction of these limited political rights within the EU established the notion of “multiple citizenship”, combining both the traditional idea of citizenship of a nation-state, and that of the new wider citizenship based on a multi-national agreement.The author takes the case of the March 2001 local elections, when some reluctance to extend voting rights to include all EU citizens residing in France became apparent amongst the French public, and political parties adopted different attitudes to the issue, in some cases even questioning the basic principle of giving foreigners the right to vote. The newly acquired rights of EU citizens were seen to have created unequal political status in the absence of similar rights for long-term residents in France from non-EU countries.It is important to note that majority of EU citizens in France who have obtained voting rights are from South European countries such as Portugal, Italy and Spain. This fact has drawn the attention of many political parties which had in fact encouraged those with South European nationalities, particularly Portuguese, to stand for the local election of March 2001. The paper argues that some political parties expected these candidates with South European nationalities to attract a large number of potential voters among EU citizens from South European countries.Another aspect covered by the paper concerns the various levels of identity—local, national and regional—reflected in the exercise of voting rights of EU expatriates, within a political system which recognizes the diversity of cultural origins of its electorate.Finally, the author suggests possible future means of achieving European integration and describes several incidents which illustrate the impact of the participation of non-French EU citizens in local elections.

著者

大道寺 隆也

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.37, pp.134-153, 2017-05-25 (Released:2019-05-25)

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This paper analyses the formation process of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), with particular focus on the interaction between international organizations (IOs), namely, inter-organizational relations. It attempts to answer why and how the fundamental rights protection under the Dublin system has been improved. Section 1 exhibits the background of the research. The Dublin system, which allocates the responsibility to examine an application for international protection lodged in an EU member state, has been criticized for the insufficient protection of asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights in particular member states. Although this problem emerged through interrelations vis-à-vis external actors other than EU institutions nor member states, such interaction has been largely ignored. As a corollary, the existing explanations for the formation of the CEAS have not paid due attention to the intersection of multiple actors as well as the outcome thereof. Against this background, Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature with regard to the CEAS formation. It begins by criticizing the traditional debate between the member-state-governments-centric approach and the supranational-organizations-centric one. They are, so to speak, inward-looking thus cannot duly consider the interaction with external actors nor the information inflow from outside. Then the paper examines the external governance approach, thereby theoretically justifies focusing on inter-organizational relations. Particularly, this paper highlights the mode that can be called contestation between IOs, such as reference, criticism and indirect review. Drawing on that framework, Section 3 traces how the legislation process of Dublin III regulation was influenced by criticism and indirect review by other IOs, specifically the Council of Europe (CoE) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These organizations criticize some member states, specifically Greece, for the inadequate reception conditions, based on the information they gain on the ground. Although these criticisms themselves are not legally-binding, they gradually gained legal relevance by being referred to by the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the Court of Justice of the EU. Consequently, the recast regulation substantively reflected the criticisms raised by other IOs. After describing the development, this paper mentions twofold theoretical implications. First, it restates the contributions to the literature reviewed above. Second, it suggests connecting the viewpoint of inter-organizational relations with the literature on global constitutionalism and global democracy. In the end, Section 4 summarizes the overall argument, and shows some remaining agenda.

著者

小山 洋司

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.40, pp.175-198, 2020-05-30 (Released:2022-05-30)

参考文献数

33

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In all new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe except Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia their total populations have been decreasing since their EU accession. Especially striking are cases of Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. A natural increase in population turned negative already in the 1990s in all the countries, but a decrease in total population in these four countries can be mostly ascribed to a massive emigration to advanced EU member states. As the EU has a principle of free mobility of people labor migration within the region is quite natural, but a too rapid outflow of people has been giving serious influences on the economic development of sending countries. In Lithuania, for example, during 27 years from 1992 through 2019 its population has decreased by about a quarter (24.6%). As an aging society with fewer children in parallel with such a too rapid decrease in population is causing a lack of skilled workers and a fear that the pension budget could not be maintained in the future, this situation is taken by many people with a sense of crisis. Such a phenomenon affects also host countries. They show great consideration for migrant workers’ social integration, but it takes a time and a certain cost. If foreign workers flow into advanced EU member states at a too rapid pace, it might cause friction in their society. As for international labor migration, a majority of studies so far have focused on host countries, but this paper considers the problem from a standpoint of sending countries. It examines causes of such an intense emigration from Lithuania, taking into account differences from the case of Estonia where emigration is not so intense. Larger income inequality within the country has been a key factor urging people to emigrate. It seems that a series of reforms after the system change, especially the Lithuanian government’s desperate efforts to enter the Eurozone have caused strains on the society. A decrease in income inequality in the country would require an effective taxation reform and other measures. Assistance to new EU member states from the EU has been directed mainly to the improvement of infrastructure in poorer regions, but such assistance has not brought a creation of sufficient jobs in peripheral member states. It would be better for policies makers as well as researchers to pay more attention to challenges of development of human capital in peripheral member states.

著者

ルイ・フランソワ デゥシェーヌ

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本・EC研究者大会 (ISSN:18842712)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1976, no.1, pp.4-19, 1976 (Released:2010-04-15)

著者

小西 杏奈

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.40, pp.109-129, 2020-05-30 (Released:2022-05-30)

参考文献数

24

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Following the enforcement of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the European Commission prepared the foundation for common fiscal policy within the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC). The first outcome was the creation of the EC common value-added tax (VAT) system stipulated by the EC Council Directive of April 1967. How was this Directive developed? In order to answer this question, we analyse the first steps of the creation of the EC common VAT system between 1958 and 1959 and describe the initiatives taken by the European Commission and the reactions of the member states. For this, we used the Historical Archives of the European Commission and the National Archives of France. In the ECC, fiscal problems are dealt with in the ‘Fiscal Problems’ Direction in General Directive IV, which is an administrative unit of the European Commission. However, administrators of the ‘Fiscal Problems’ Direction could not deal with fiscal problems as a priority because these problems were not considered an important issue in General Directive IV. Moreover, because of the limited competence given to the European Commission regarding fiscal problems, the ‘Fiscal Problems’ Directive could not resolve issues related to border tax arrangements. In order to overcome these problems, the ‘Fiscal Problems’ Directive prepared for sales tax harmonisation in EEC countries. In the Spring of 1959, the ‘Fiscal Problems’ Directive made a working paper on sales tax harmonisation and organised a union for general directors of the member states. However, for a variety of reasons, member states refused the European Commission’s proposals, which asked them to change their fiscal systems. In Autumn of the same year, a small working group was created to deal with sales tax harmonisation. During the working group’s first meeting, the ‘Fiscal Problems’ Directive proposed three common sales tax systems, including a VAT system. At that time, a common VAT system was one of three possible fiscal systems; it was possible that another system could be chosen. Although France-which had already introduced a VAT system-played an important role by explaining VAT and sharing its experience of VAT with member states, the member states could not reach an agreement to create a common fiscal system during 1959. However, the European Commission’s strong initiative contributed to form an important basis to create a European common VAT system.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.35, pp.137-163, 2015-05-25 (Released:2017-05-25)

参考文献数

26

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Ukraine after gaining independence in 1991 suffered the longest economic recession among the former Soviet Republics. Its long-waited economic boom in 2000’s was interrupted by the global economic crisis of 2008, followed by an only small recovery and ensuing stagnation. Its poor performance could be explained by, along with other causes, outdated and inefficient industries, notably ferrous metallurgy. This led to a worsening of its balance of payments in 2010’s, forcing the ruling Party of Regions headed by Viktor Yanukovich to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) in November 2013. Most Ukrainian citizens, however, said ‘no’ not only to this decision but also to the corrupt Yanukovich administration itself, which ended up with a collapse of the regime in February 2014.Ukraine has two traditional trade partners, Russia and the EU, with the amounts of trade turnover with them roughly equal. Ukraine tends to export low value-added commodities to markets outside Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), e.g. to the EU, on the one hand and relatively high value-added items, such as machinery and processed foodstuffs, to Russia and other CIS countries on the other hand. Ukraine, having chosen a pro-EU orientation, risks losing markets of Russia, whose government threatens to impose custom duties on imports from Ukraine.Ukraine’s new administration led by Petro Poroshenko finally signed the Association Agreement with the EU in June 2014. The new administration strives to overcome today’s turmoil by virtue of eurointegration. The immediate effects, however, of creation of a free trade area with the EU, widely proclaimed as a core of the Agreement, on Ukrainian economy should not be overestimated because margins of import duties reduction are rather modest. Structural reforms and adjustments to the EU standards, another aspect of the Agreement with the EU, will be more crucial to Ukraine’s future.

著者

田中 素香

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.32, pp.29-52, 2012-06-10 (Released:2014-06-10)

被引用文献数

1 2

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In 1985 the European Commission produced its White Paper to the European Council setting out its programme for the completion of the internal or single market in the European Community by the end of 1992. This programme consisted of some 300 legislative measures needed to guarantee the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the Community. The economic integration was truly the most advanced in the world and epoch-making in the history of the European Community/Union. The European Council agreed to the programme and decided to revise the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act, which came into force in July 1987. Before the market integration, the Community economy stagnated for more than five years due to lacking competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. The single market integration stimulated international oligopolistic competition within the Community and beyond. The economic growth of the Community rose to more than 3% for three years from 1988 on. The economic structure of the Community was renewed and became much more competitive than before. The single market became a fundamental driving force of the monetary union with the EMS. In the 21st century, it contained Central and Eastern European countries, developing the pan-European production networks. After the world economic crisis, when the demand-side stimulation of the economic growth in the European Union has been narrowly limited, the re-launch of the single market will be an effective measure to revitalize the economy. On the basis of the Monti Report of 2010, the Union is going towards the introduction of the European Market Act, which will be agreed until the end of 2012 according to today’s plan of the European Commission. The first single market integration, which was combined with the name of Jacques Delores, had a strategy to move oligopolistic giant companies of the Community. The second generation of the single market integration gives weight to socio-political legitimacy of the single market and seems to move consumers, workers or people of peripheral regions who could not realize benefits of the single market. At the same time, it aims to extract economic benefits from digital information technologies or other recent technical innovations. The single market is about credibility for market players including consumers etc. on the basis of hard competence and the Community method. If done properly, it can turn into a lever for higher growth in the EU following the crisis.

著者

小川 浩之

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.25, pp.139-173,285, 2005-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

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The British Government under Harold Macmillan made its first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in August 1961. This application marked not only a significant turning point of Britain's post-war external policy, but also a very beginning of the enlargement process of the European Integration (“from the Six to the Twenty-five”).In the existing studies, it has often been pointed out that the British Government's consideration about its “special relationship” with the United States, particularly its recognition that the new John F. Kennedy Administration (inaugurated in January 1961) supported the EEC and Britain's entry into it more vigorously than the previous Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, was one of the factors which facilitated the first application. However, this article, which is based on both British and American governmental records, claims that America's strong support for the European Integration of the Six and its relative coolness towards British initiative such as the European Free Trade Area (FTA) plan (the so-called Plan G) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were largely consistent throughout the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. The British Government tried hard to persuade the Americans into adopting more pro-British and pro-FTA/EFTA attitudes, but those efforts turned out to be mostly abortive. Consequently, the consistency (rather than change, as often pointed out in many existing studies) of the American attitudes facilitated Britain's policy change towards its first application to the EEC.In the diplomatic sphere, Britain's first application to the EEC can be understood as a measure to maintain and strengthen its “special relationship” with the United States, by becoming a member and a “stabilising force” in the EEC. In the trade sphere, Britain's first application can be understood as a measure to secure an equal access to the EEC market, which was expected to be an alternative to the huge but still protective American market but (if Britain remained outside) be surrounded by relatively high common external tariffs. Therefore, it can be pointed out that Britain's first attempt to join the EEC was a primarily defensive effort to avoid the danger of being sandwiched by the United States and the EEC and seriously losing the basis of its international influence and economic power.

著者

八十田 博人

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.37, pp.69-91, 2017-05-25 (Released:2019-05-25)

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Italy has not had a coherent migration policy for long period because of a series of unstable coalition governments and high political cost of reforms against public views on migrants. Its immigration law and citizenship law have been one of the most severest ones in Europe. These factors has caused many diffculties on resucue activities and integration of migrants. Recent massive flow of sea arrivals from the Mediterranean has set Italy and the EU in dispute on migration controls. Confronted by many incidents offshore of Lampedusa, Italian political leaders had felt to be isolated by the EU, without appropriate cooperation. Among them, most active were local goverments’ chiefs of Sicily Region and of Lampedusa who claimed directly to the European Parliament for help to aid offshore rescues and asked Italian government to amend the problematic Bossi-Fini immigration law of 1998. Political leaders of the Left criticized the EU and campaigned for amendment of Bossi-Fini law. From the viewpoint of the EU and other member states, however, Italy seemed to have lacked of well defined immigration laws and systems. The severe incident of migrant ship of October 3, 2013, made Italian government proceed its independent rescue operations called Mare Nostrum, however, it was replaced in a year by the EU’s operation Triton led by the FRONTEX. Nevertheless, even with the rise of public opinion on this occasion, the Italian government and parliament have not fulfilled to abolish the Bossi-Fini law. Although Prime Minister Renzi succeeded to “europeanize” immigrantion problems by virtue of massive migrant flow in the Balkans in 2015, migrant replecement from Italy has been done in a very slow pace. To breakthrough present difficulties, Italy should have a coherent immigration policy with a good balance between human rights and security so that it could be respected by other member states of the EU.

著者

鈴木 弘隆

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.36, pp.196-216, 2016-05-30 (Released:2018-05-30)

参考文献数

42

被引用文献数

2 1

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This survey paper aims to deal with idiosyncratic issues of ECB’s QE by investigating QE literatures and ECB press interviews, and present considerable points to proceed future assessment studies of QE such as portfolio-rebalancing, business-stimulating and inflation accelerating effects. In terms of QE implementation, ECB’s idiosyncratic issues are the extension of ECB’ jurisdiction over adjustment programmes’ conditionality by ESM Treaty 13(3) on countries under QE and multinational risk-sharing especially related to exit strategies of QE. EU’s inequality in this paper means both directly uneven transmission effects of QE-driven stock and asset price increase on GDP and consumption, and indirectly widening income disparity effects by cutting welfare and social security budget demanded by fiscal contraction and structural reforms under Troika’s adjustment programmes.This survey’s findings are as follows. Firstly, a cause of which QE’s businesss-stimulating effects and inflation accelerating effects are limited is balance sheet recession advocated by Richard Koo. Secondly, multinational risk sharing issues are as follows. ECB decides which countries’ government securities to buy and how many. In reality, ECB’s purchases of those are biased toward those of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, which consists of almost 80% of all the purchases under QE. This bias has an influence on unevenly distributed transmission effects of QE on real economy described above. Furthermore, the decision of ECB to implement QE is not unanimous, so if any country defaults, say, Greece, ECB gets to bear fiscal burden against other countries’ will. Germany is most likely to assume responsibility for large parts of the expenses, which makes it difficult for countries in EU to build multinational risk sharing with mutual consent. Consequently, at present, those risk sharing problems relating to QE’s exit strategies are stark. If government securities interest rates possibly jump up for some reason in the future, filling its fiscal losses requires German risk sharing of fiscal transfer to financially fragile central banks. However, its fiscal transfer is strictly banned by TFEU article 123, ESCB rule article 21, and any government debt acceptance by EU institution is also strictly banned by TFEU article 125 known as no bail-out clauses. Therefore, ECB is required to deal with promotion of the fiscal union of EU or revision of the treaties described above so that multinational risk sharing functions properly in case of uncertainties under the exit of ECB’s QE in the near future.

著者

南 義清

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EC学会年報 (ISSN:09130055)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.5, pp.201-230, 1985-10-30 (Released:2010-04-15)

著者

細谷 雄一

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.31, pp.148-167, 2011-07-20 (Released:2013-07-20)

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What was British role in the making of the Lisbon Treaty? Is Britain still “an awkward partner” in the European Union? This article aims to examine British policy towards the European Union from the failure of the ratification of European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007. Soon after the failures of the Treaty ratification both in France and in the Netherlands in June 2005, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared to introduce “a period of reflection” to freeze the process of ratification. From the next month, Britain had hold the presidency of the European Council. Due partly to his domestic stalemate on the ratification, Blair exploited this opportunity to postpone difficult ratification of European Constitutional Treaty. This difficulty originated in Blair’s decision for a referendum on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in April 2004. European Constitutional Treaty which was signed on 29 October 2004 caused a big political debate in Britain. Both the Conservative Party and Eurosceptic medias represented by Rupert Murdoch criticized the government for its intention to further transfer political power to Brussels. Having faced with this serious political difficulty, Blair naturally was “off the hook”. He simply felt “the waves of relief”. Blair’s task was two-fold. First, he had to find a solution to this political stalemate as he would soon preside the European Council. Second, he was necessary to sell a new treaty to British people. To avoid a referendum, the British government needed to find a device which indicated that a new treaty was not “constitutional” one. In other words, a new treaty had to be a “reform treaty” without any new transfer of sovereignty. A new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, supported Britain to advance towards a “reform treaty”. Both French and British governments were contended with omitting any symbol of “federalism” or “constitution”. Within British government, it was generally agreed that Britain needed to defend the “red line” which prevented further transfer of power to the European Union. After having persuaded Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, Britain successfully secured the “red line”, and this meant that British government did not have to go into a national referendum. With this “success”, the EU could reach an agreement on the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty which would become signed in December 2007. After the referendum crises of 2005, British government led the argument on the future of failed Constitutional Treaty. The answer was to save the essence of it by abandoning “federal” and “constitutional” features of the Treaty. This British policy was basically motivated by its own domestic rivalry on the future of Europe. Although Britain might be “an awkward partner” within the EU, the Labour governments tried to find out a way to go out of the crises of 2005 by abandoning some of hopes and wishes that people dreamed.

著者

明山 健師

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.33, pp.277-297, 2013-06-10 (Released:2015-06-10)

参考文献数

21

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European countries started integration of company law from the 1960s. European countries groped for the system which be able to get country agree, aiming at unifying company law. In recent years, in order to correspond to change of environment, such as development of an information technology, and generating of a financial crisis, European Union focuses on corporate governance and is carrying out company law reform.This paper focuses on an argument until it catches the integrative company law which is the foundation of the corporate governance in today’s European Union. First, this paper considers confrontation between the member states produced in the arguments from 1960 to 1990 which aimed at establishment of company law of unific European countries. This paper shows clearly that European countries next shifted the system of the member states into the harmonizing plan by the arguments from 1990 to 2000 which it aimed at establishing an alternative system. Furthermore, this paper clarifies having shifted the plan into integration of corporate governance and having carried forward the step to a new stage by reform in and after 2000 when the Societas Europaea was born in Europe.Integration of the company law system in the European Union is the result to which the 1960s which tried unification of the corporate system to 30 years were applied and which was constructed as a system where it can agree. This result will surely have the power of overcoming the monetary crisis of these days. Furthermore, European Union is gazing at formation of the previously more detailed company law system. This experience of European Union has a possibility of forming the standard in the world, as an example of a success of the advanced experiment which unifies a regional company law system. This paper analyzes the company law institutional reform over this honest long period of time.Then the mission of Europe as an integrated area and a battle of right protection of a member nation are caught systematically.This paper has the novelty of arguing how the corporate institutional reform in European Union is utilized in the future reform.

著者

澤田 昭夫

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EC学会年報 (ISSN:09130055)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.12, pp.31-61, 1992-10-30 (Released:2010-04-15)

被引用文献数

1

著者

吉沢 晃

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.39, pp.153-172, 2019-06-20 (Released:2021-06-20)

参考文献数

29

被引用文献数

1

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Since the 1990s, much debate has existed over the European Union’s (EU) democratic deficit problem. Some theorists argue that, while input legitimacy is essential in redistributive policies, the EU mainly relies on output legitimacy in regulatory policies. However, previous studies have insufficiently analyzed the EU’s exact position on this matter regarding specific regulatory policies. Against this background, this article focuses on the EU’s competition policy―a typical regulatory policy―and investigates a series of policy and institutional reforms conducted by the EU since the 2000s for the promotion of political participation by consumers and consumer organizations. The article will contribute to the literature on the EU’s legitimacy by analyzing the European Commission’s purpose for these reforms, focusing on the case of the failed plan to establish a collective redress system for consumers. Although this plan was not legislated, it constitutes an interesting case study because a decade-long policy debate about it possibly revealed the European Commission’s stance on the issue of consumers’ role in competition policy. The empirical analysis is mainly based on primary sources such as the European Commission’s policy documents, European Parliament resolutions, and responses of stakeholders to the Commission’s public consultations. Empirical findings reveal that the European Commission’s purpose for recent reforms, including the inborn collective redress system, was to enhance the legitimacy of EU competition policy on input and output sides. In other words, the Commission intended to encourage consumers’ political participation while improving policy effectiveness in this area. The failure of the collective redress plan implies that the policy remains largely technocratic despite some other institutional and policy remedies. In conclusion, consumers are now involved in the policy-making and implementation process more deeply than before, yet the process is not as inclusive as the Commission had expected a decade ago.

著者

山内 進

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.38, pp.219-223, 2018

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<p> The unifying theme of this book is the nature of separation and integration of the EU and its new members from Eastern Europe. Although they rejoined Europe after the conclusion of the Cold War, they still found a barrier between them and the original members of the EU. Professor Haba calls the barrier a dividing line. It is usually used among nations and peoples, but what Haba calls the "dividing line" ultimately means separating "us" from "you". It contains both physical and psychological divisions. The return of Eastern Europe to Europe produced a new dividing line and new problems in the EU. Following the principles of human rights, liberty and diversity, the EU has positively received immigrants and created an excellent system allowing the free movements of individuals within the EU. Yet, native workers of the host countries often lose their jobs because new immigrants will work for lower wages. Some of these often hate newcomers and run to xenophobia and nationalism. On the other hand, some second-or third generation members of immigrant families are disillusioned with discrimination in the host countries. The influence of exclusion becomes stronger and the voice of inclusion weakens. The EU seems to be falling in disruption. Haba stresses the importance of the attitude of inclusion and coexistence, diversity and tolerance. The question is, however, how do people possibly attain and maintain that frame of mind? Haba shows the contact zone theory of cultural anthropology as a possibility. This theory was discussed at the International Conference on Minority Races or Groups held at Aszód in Hungary, on 25-27 of August 2004. Haba attended the conference and discovered the theory. Contact Zone is the term applied to social places and spaces where diverse cultures and races meet and attempt to coexist and cooperate with each other. This concept also applies to frontiers, those border areas once considered to be conflict zone. Frontiers are, in fact, where the coexistence of peoples of different races and religions occurs, according to the cultural anthropologists at the conference. Haba stresses that the contact zone theory is not the theory of <i>sollen,</i> but based on the historical <i>sein</i> in the long term. People of different races and religions have continued to coexist, cooperate and harmonize with each other at the frontiers. Haba inspires us to learn about and to study this kind of "historical facts of daily lives". I appreciate those words and I highly value this book.</p>