著者

HIDEMASA TSUBONUMA

出版者

JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

雑誌

The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.40-49, 1991-03-20 (Released:2007-10-19)

参考文献数

10

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This paper analyses, in the context of a financial market, the effects of disclosure of information by firms on information allocations that are consistent with endogenous information collection. It is shown that, as the precision of information disclosed by firms increases, all of the marketed information becomes concentrated within a smaller fraction of traders, but if the precision exceeds a certain level, the concentrated allocation of information becomes not viable. We also show that welfare impacts of disclosure on traders depend on the level of their initial endowment of a risky asset.