著者
Hatakeyama Masaomi Hashimoto Takashi
出版者
Springer
雑誌
Artificial Life and Robotics (ISSN:14335298)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.2, pp.500-503, 2009-03

We propose a kind of self-amendment game, Minimum Nomic, as a model to study rule dynamics. Nomic is a game in which changing a rule of the game is a move. Minimum Nomic is a reduced version of the original Nomic, which keeps the essence but promotes the evolvability of the self-amendment game. We discuss the characteristics of Minimum Nomic from the viewpoint of how the changeability of the rules and the durability of the games change with the progress of the game. By analyzing the dynamics of purpose and goals, and the self-referential property in observations of the games played, we claim that Minimum Nomic is an interesting tool to study rule dynamics.