- 著者
- MASAYA SAKURAGAWA
- 出版者
- JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
- 雑誌
- The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.44, no.3, pp.216-232, 1993-09-20 (Released:2007-10-19)
- 参考文献数
- 11
In the presence of asymmetric information between a lender and a borrower with costly monitoring, we investigate a contract form and an optimal loan size are investigated. The optimal contract has the features of a standard debt contract. However, the optimal loan size does not always take the form of maximum equity participation. If per unit of return from lending is a decreasing function of the loan size, the contract takes the form of maximum equity participation. Conversely, if per unit of return from lending is an increasing function of the loan size, overinvestment or overborrowing may arise.