著者

SHINJI OHSETO

出版者

JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

雑誌

The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.97-105, 1994-06-20 (Released:2008-02-28)

参考文献数

10

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Recently it was shown that any social choice correspondence which can be implemented in undominated strategies by a bounded mechanism satisfies an incentive-compatibilitytype condition called strategy-resistance. In this paper we show that the plurality correspondence is implemented in undominated strategies by a bounded mechanism if and only if n=2 or #A=2 (n is the number of agents and #A is the number of outcomes), although it is strategy-resistant if and only if n and #A satisfy one of following four conditions: (i) n=2, (ii) #A=2, (iii) n=3, #A_??_3, (iv) n=5, #A=3. These results imply that strategy-resistance is not a sufficient condition. We also describe Nash-type implementability of the plurality correspondence.