- 著者
-
Yajima Naoki
- 出版者
- 国際基督教大学キリスト教と文化研究所
- 雑誌
- 人文科学研究 (キリスト教と文化) = Humanities: Christianity and Culture (ISSN:24346861)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- no.51, pp.77-92, 2019-12-15
This paper discusses Hume’s Conceivability Principle, according towhich whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense.Although this principle is not thoroughly argued by commentators,Hume relies on this principle in almost all significant arguments of hismetaphysics. The principle is involved in the crucial relationship betweenmind and reality of modern philosophy. Therefore, it is possible to find arelevant counterargument of this principle in metaphysics from Descartesto Berkeley. This paper focuses narrowly on the comparison betweenHume vis Descartes, and Hume vis Spinoza, and elucidates that Hume’sinnovation of this principle intends the transformation of the concept ofnecessity, and development of the concept of probability. This paper alsooffers a possible solution to a famous interpretative problem regarding therelationship between what is inconceivable and impossibility, and with it, thefundamental character of Hume’s empiricism and scepticism will be clarified.This paper thus aims to be a preliminary consideration for clarifying theintricate connection between the Conceivability Principle and Hume’s entiremetaphysics.