著者

Bret W. DAVIS

出版者

Society for Philosophy of Religion in Japan

雑誌

宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.80-91, 2006 (Released:2019-03-21)

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In an earlier essay I argued that, for the Kyoto School, the relation between “philosophy” and “religion” is neither that of a modern subjection of religion to the judgment of a purportedly pure reason, nor is it that of a medieval subjugation of philosophy to the role of handmaid to theology. Rather, in the Kyoto School we find a provocative and indeed productive ambivalence ——a relation of mutual supplementation and critique—— between philosophy and religion. Moreover, this mutuality is made possible by a third term that mediates the often antagonistic relation between reason and faith, namely “practice” (行). In this article I explore the Buddhist background for such a radical rethinking of the relationship between reason, faith, and practice. I begin by examining the non-separation of “philosophy” and “religion” in Asian traditions. Focusing on Buddhism, which is oriented by the problem of suffering rather than an intellectual curiosity, I discuss how soteriology is intimately bound together with epistemology, and vice versa. We find this attitude still clearly reflected in Hisamatsu Shinichi’s claim that “religion without philosophy is blind; philosophy without religion is vacuous.” I then go on to discuss further the manner in which philosophy and religion in Asian traditions consist of a “practice of a way (道) of life,” rather than either a dogmatic faith or a merely academic exercise of reason. Although Buddhism has often been held to be compatible with the modern rational world-view, I argue that its requirement of extending rational discourse into embodied spiritual practice both challenges and is challenged by the presuppositions and limits of modern Western philosophy. Finally I turn to the question of “faith,” attempting to hermeneutically clarify the differences between Buddhist and Western conceptions of this term. Buddhist understandings of “faith” (śraddhā ; shin 信) generally do not carry modern Western connotations of irrationality, and Buddhist faith is usually considered to be a preliminary step on the path towards liberating wisdom. In Zen Buddhism this emphasis on insight over faith is most evident. But even in Pure Land Buddhism faith is ultimately seen as a gateway to enlightenment, and it is always connected with a concrete practice. By clarifying some of the fundamental differences involved in thinking from a Buddhist rather than (or in addition to) a Western philosophical-religious background, I believe we will be better prepared to appreciate the provocative ambivalences found in the Kyoto School’s philosophies of religion. And such an appreciation can in turn help provoke us to fundamentally rethink the meaning and relation between the terms of reason, faith, and practice.